The Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand

Tiakina Aotearoa Protect New Zealand

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Table of Contents

 

Letter from the Minister for Biosecurity, The Hon Jim Sutton MP

Office of Hon Jim Sutton
Minister of Agriculture
Minister for Biosecurity
Minister of Forestry
Minister for Trade Negotiations
Minister for Rural Affairs
MP forAoraki

Growing international trade, greater mobility and climate change make New Zealand's border increasingly vulnerable to new pests and diseases, many of which could destroy our economy, our lifestyle and our iconic species of birds and plants. Too many species have been lost forever; others are imperilled.

New Zealand's isolation from ravaging diseases, such as Foot-and-Mouth, isn't just due to geography. Responsible people understand many of the issues, but it is imperative that all New Zealanders (and all our visitors) understand why we have such rigorous biosecurity measures to protect us, and future generations. Obeying biosecurity rules must become as fundamental as wearing seat belts in cars.

New Zealand has had some major biosecurity successes, but many challenges remain. Biosecurity deals with living problems, inevitably changing, so we must ensure our systems are dynamic, constantly evolving to keep pace. New Zealand's response, one of continuous improvement, must be relentless.

Our biosecurity interests have been actively policed by our biosecurity agencies (Agriculture & Forestry, Conservation, Fisheries and Health), for which we should all be grateful. As Minister for Biosecurity , I'm giving my full support to the recommendations of "Tiakina Aotearoa -Protect New Zealand" (New Zealand's first biosecurity strategy). It is the result of months of consultation and deliberation. I would like to record my appreciation to the wide spectrum of interested parties who contributed -amongst others the government departments, regional councils, representatives of industry and farming, and conservation organisations.

I hope this strategy will be widely read and that it will encourage everyone to take personal responsibility for biosecurity , and remain vigilant. As Minister for Biosecurity, I will be working to ensure the Biosecurity Council's expectations are fully implemented by the Government.

Yours sincerely

Signature of Minister for Biosecurity

Hon Jim Sutton
Minister for Biosecurity

Biosecurity Council

Dr John Hellström, Chair, Biosecurity Council; Barry O’Neil, Group Director, MAF Biosecurity Authority; Murray Sherwin, Director-General, Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry; Karen Poutasi, Director-General, Ministry of Health; Hugh Logan, Director-General, Department of Conservation; Warwick Tuck, Chief Executive, Ministry of Fisheries; Barry Carbon, Chief Executive, Ministry for the Environment; Dr Bas Walker, Chief Executive, ERMA NZ; Basil Chamberlain, Regional Councils’ representative; Leith Comer, Chief Executive, Te Puni Kokiri; Dr James Buwalda, Chief Executive, Ministry of Research, Science and Technology; Craig Lawson, primary production industry representative, Te Ohu Kai Moana; Dr Wren Green, environmental organisations’ representative; Dr Mick Clout, alternate environmental organisations’ representative; and Bob Diprose, alternate primary production industry representative.

Strategy Advisory Group

Dr Anton Meister, Chair and Head of Department of Applied and International Economics, Massey University; Richard Bowman, Biosecurity Manager, Environment Southland; Nici Gibbs, Policy Manager, NZ Seafood Industry Council; David Hansen, General Manager Operations, Auckland International Airport; Mike Harding, Environmental Consultant; Dr Virginia Hope, Manager (Environmental Health), Auckland Regional Public Health Service; Tom Lambie, President, Federated Farmers of NZ (Inc); Maui Solomon, Barrister; Neil Taylor, recent Chief Executive, Meat NZ; and Dr Liz Wedderburn, National Science Leader, Land & Environmental Management, AgResearch Ltd.

Acknowledgements

David Moore, Director, LECG; Nicola Young, ViewPoint Communications; Sean Goddard, Senior Policy Analyst, Department of Conservation; Robbie Thomson, Consultant, Eight Red Fish Consulting; Chris Baddeley, Team Leader, Biosecurity Policy, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Annie Coughlan (Ministry of Health Representative); Johannah Branson, Senior Policy Analyst, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Andrew Sweet, Consultant (Treasury Representative), Firecone New Zealand; Gillian Mylrea, National Adviser, Animal Biosecurity, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; Deborah Hume, Senior Risk Consultant (MFish Representative), URS; Justin Coutts, Economist, LECG; Hayden Glass, Economist (Treasury Representative), LECG; Simon Thomas, Communications Manager, NZ Seafood Industry Council; Mark Trainor, Trade Negotiations Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade; Neil Hyde, Director, Border Management, MAF Biosecurity Authority.

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Part I

Foreword

John Hellstorm
John Hellström, Biosecurity Council chair

New Zealand is more dependent on biosecurity than any other developed country. Our economy and trade are largely based on the exotic species brought here by settlers in the 19th century; and our freedom from major pests and diseases is critical to producing efficiently and trading freely.

Almost 60% of our exports and 20% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) depend on efficient and healthy primary production. Importing countries are becoming increasingly concerned about any risks to their own production systems; consumers care more about pests and diseases carried on produce. This strategy illustrates just how much we all have at risk.

But biosecurity is equally important to two other special aspects of Aotearoa – our unique indigenous flora and fauna and our relative freedom from pests that affect human health and welfare.

Charles Darwin visited New Zealand in 1835, 24 years before he published the ‘Origin of the Species’, on the Beagle, a British navy brig. In Waimate, Northland he observed imported species over-running native plants and animals. "It is said that the common Norway rat, in the short space of two years, annihilated in this northern end of the island, the New Zealand species", Darwin wrote. "In many places I noticed several sorts of weeds, which, like the rats, I was forced to own as countrymen." "A leek has overrun whole districts, and will prove very troublesome, but it was imported as a favour by a French vessel. The common dock is also widely disseminated, and will, I fear, for ever remain a proof of the rascality of an Englishman, who sold the seeds for those of the tobacco plant."

Over the past 100 years there has been a profound change in the way Pakeha New Zealanders regard native species. From the time of James Cook’s voyages, Europeans have been trying to modify New Zealand’s biota. By the time of Darwin’s visit, in 1835, the transformation of New Zealand’s biodiversity was already unstoppable. In the next 60 years, the primeval environment of Aotearoa was changed forever. Only then, and almost too late, did people like Richard Henry start trying to protect what remained. Now, most New Zealanders recognise that what we have left of the native biodiversity is unique and precious, and endangered.

The activities we now call biosecurity started in 1849, initially to protect the newly introduced farmed species from pests and diseases that would cause economic loss. By the 1960s, we had world-leading systems to protect our farms, exotic forests and orchards, and our ability to trade. Still, little thought had been given to protecting our native flora and fauna on the land and in lakes, rivers and wetlands from pests; none had been given to protecting our marine eco-systems.

DEFINITION: Biosecurity is the exclusion, eradication or effective management of risks posed by pests and diseases to the economy, environment and human health.

It is against this background of development in systems, expertise and changing social values that biosecurity has come under scrutiny and challenge in the last decade.

New Zealand’s Biosecurity Act, passed in 1993, was a world first; a law specifically to support systematic protection of all our valued biological systems - introduced and indigenous - from the harmful effects of exotic pests and diseases. Unfortunately, scant resources were applied too slowly, making it impossible to achieve the changes in systems and attitudes needed to match this new concept.

It has become clear - not least from the numerous recent reviews - our biosecurity system is struggling to cope. This is not because our biosecurity people don’t care, or aren’t committed. Instead, they have been unable to develop the capabilities required because of the dual challenges - huge increases in pressure on the border, and heightened public expectation about the protection of our natural heritage, both marine and terrestrial.

Despite this, New Zealand has been well served by a system that has kept our livestock amongst the healthiest in the world, and our fields and forests highly productive and tradable. But our national biological assets are now under greater threat than before as the volume, sources and speed of movement increases the chances of exotic pests arriving with imported goods and passengers. Our biosecurity systems have to evolve quickly and perform even better than in the past. They need to become more extensive as the border becomes more diffuse, more adaptable to respond quickly to unpredictable threats and more robust to repel invading species.

This poses a challenge to all New Zealanders, not just those with formal biosecurity roles. We need support, participation and compliance from all New Zealanders to protect our ideal - a country where healthy systems of primary production thrive alongside a secure and stable indigenous biodiversity and where people remain untroubled by harmful pests that are venomous or spread disease.

The Biosecurity Council has recommended changes it believes are needed urgently to provide the foundations for achieving that vision. Beyond that, there is little detail on implementation in this strategy; much of this is contained in the accompanying Cabinet papers. Instead, there is an explicit set of expectations throughout this strategy. Many of these expectations need to be achieved soon, over the next three to five years; others are longer term.

The Council expects this document will still be a useful benchmark 10 years from now, providing evidence that biosecurity is evolving and delivering the outcomes expected. We must all remember that biosecurity is not the dream; it is a set of tools to achieve the dream.

It’s not going to be easy. But it will be far harder, perhaps impossible, if we don’t work towards common goals in a spirit of cooperation and mutual support. Our current system suffers from an inability to reach balanced decisions for the greatest good. That’s why there are so many gaps in the system that are known but not filled. Reaching agreement on priorities often seems like negotiating at Babel.

This strategy proposes a unifying decision-making and prioritisation process that is set out in far more detail in the Cabinet papers. But this strategy can’t be comprehensive in the sense that decisions will become easy. The complexities of varying value sets and perspectives mean it will only work if officials and stakeholders are committed to its success. The decision-making process must learn from accumulated decisions and evolve as our understanding of impacts and interactions grows. It is clear from stakeholder comments that the public will be intolerant of any failure to address this problem now that the opportunity is here.

Today our biosecurity system routinely keeps out many more bugs, and deals quickly with much more of what gets in, that it ever did in the past. The worry is that it isn’t getting better fast enough. The three-year process that has generated this strategy has raised expectations that our biosecurity systems will improve and in some areas improve quickly.

This strategy proposes a direction for New Zealand’s biosecurity, to meet the mounting pressures and society’s growing expectations. This is a very challenging goal, but one to which we should all aspire, for ourselves and for future generations.

It’s been talked about for ages; now it’s time for action.

John Hellström

Boundaries of the Strategy

Biosecurity is inevitably riddled with grey zones – where does it start or end?

In its broadest sense biosecurity covers all activities aimed at managing the introduction of new species to New Zealand and managing their impacts once here. This includes intentional (including illegal) and unintentional introductions and the containment of new and unwanted organisms in laboratories, quarantine facilities and zoos. It also covers the management of weeds and animal pests by central and local government agencies, industry and individual landowners.

The focus of this strategy is on pre-border, border and post-border activities designed to keep out new pests. These are central to the Crown's biosecurity responsibility. Beyond this, the strategy addresses the Crown's role in maintaining and monitoring the framework for pest management under which agencies, industry and individuals take collective actions against pests.

The strategy does not focus on the framework for managing the intentional introduction of new organisms, including Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), because this has been the subject of a separate review process - firstly by the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification, then by the Government in developing its response (which includes the New Organisms and Other Matters Amendment Bill). Nor does this strategy focus on the role and capability of ERMA, which has been the subject of a separate review. The Council is unaware of any scientific basis to treat GMOs as a different class of biosecurity risk, requiring some special approach. The need for appropriate surveillance and response capability to deal with possible GMOs incursions does need to be addressed.

Bioterrorism is not discussed in this strategy. Conceptually, bioterrorism is simply another vector for transmission of unwanted pests and species. The intent, however, is quite different and the scale of damage potential catastrophic. New Zealand needs to remain conscious of the potential risk and use this strategy as firm foundation for any further work. For instance, Foot-and-Mouth disease could be introduced into New Zealand as an act of terrorism, with potentially disastrous results for farmers, business interests, tourism and the nation. Work has been undertaken to understand and mitigate this risk.

Vision & Goals

Our vision – New Zealand ’s biosecurity in 2010

"New Zealanders,our unique natural resources,our plants and animals are all kept safe and secure from damaging pests and diseases "

In 2010 …New Zealand has a high performing,integrated system for managing biosecurity risks to the economy,environment and human health. New Zealanders understand and have confidence in the biosecurity system;committed and playing their vital role,from pre-border through to pest management.

Biosecurity is making a significant contribution to achieving a range of goals for the economy, environment and human health,including:

  • Protecting marine and terrestrial primary industries and facilitating exports and tourism;
  • Protecting New Zealand ’s indigenous biodiversity –our native species,natural habitats, ecosystems and landscapes;
  • Enabling sustainable use of natural resources and protection of the natural environment;
  • Maintaining the relationship between Maori and their culture and traditions with ancestral lands,waters,sites,waahi tapu and taonga;
  • Protecting the health of New Zealanders from zoonotic and pest-borne diseases and from venomous species;and
  • Reducing the damage caused by pests and diseases introduced in the past.

New Zealand ’s biosecurity system is providing evolving protection as risks are identified and change. Decisions are made on a case-by-case basis within a consistent,transparent decision-making framework. Cooperating agencies are clearly accountable and reporting on performance. A comprehensive review of the Biosecurity Strategy has just been completed,with refined goals and adjustments to programmes agreed.

New Zealanders have confidence in the management of biosecurity risks and are satisfied there is strong leadership and commitment at all levels. The biosecurity system is well organised, information is shared and efforts are well coordinated and focused.

Decisions are founded on good information,based on quality science,taking into account the full range of values at stake and with transparent tradoffs. Therere is efficient use of the biosecurity budget and biosecurity risk management (from pre-border to pest management)provides an appropriate and sustainable level of protection for New Zealand.

The impacts of biosecurity are most important in:

  1. New Zealand’s economy;
  2. New Zealand’s biodiversity; and
  3. New Zealanders’ health.

The challenge lies in the implementation.

New Zealand’s biosecurity system leads the world, but it’s under increasing pressure. Ever since humans began travelling, assorted livestock, crops, pets, terrestrial and aquatic pests3 and weeds have tagged along. While our primary production industries are based on valuable introduced species, many other exotic species have become major problems for agriculture and have devastated native species and ecosystems.

Globalisation has seen increasing volumes of goods and people moving at greater speeds around the world. New Zealand’s freedom from the world’s worst pests and diseases is crucial to our success and welfare – as a nation, we rely on trade and travel, so robust biosecurity is fundamental to New Zealanders’ future prosperity and well-being. Performance across the system needs to lift to meet the challenges of the 21st century and deliver the level of biosecurity appropriate to protect New Zealand’s people, environment and economy.

Punga tree damaged by possums
Keith Broome, Crown Copyright: Department of Conservation Te Papa Atawhai (2003)
Punga tree damaged by possums. Possums were introduced from Australia in 1837, for the fur industry. Possums literally eat trees to death, in particular pohutakawa, rata, totara and kowhai. They also spread bovine tuberculosis to cows, cattle and deer.

Biosecurity contributes to achieving wider goals, including those set out in the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, the Government’s Growth and Innovation Strategy and the Government’s principles for sustainable development. Biosecurity is a crosscutting issue, contributing to a wide range of outcomes for the economy, biodiversity, human health, and national identity.

But biosecurity is more than protecting against potentially catastrophic pests and diseases. Our goal is to have the best possible biosecurity system – identifying, assessing and responding appropriately to all pests posing a significant threat to agriculture, forestry, horticulture, fisheries, native biodiversity, and human health. Appropriate responses will include eradication, containment, and on-going control.

Our vision can be broken down into a number of goals for the different activities in biosecurity. These are:

  • Prevention and exclusion: Preventing the entry and establishment of pests and unwanted organisms capable of causing unacceptable4 harm to the economy, environment and people’s health;
  • Surveillance and response: Early detection, identification and assessment of pests and unwanted organisms capable of causing unacceptable harm and, where appropriate, deployment of a rapid and effective incursion response that maximises the likelihood of eradication; and
  • Pest management: Effective management (including eradication, containment and control) of established pests and unwanted organisms capable of causing harm to the economy, environment and people’s health.

To achieve these goals, the biosecurity system needs to have the following elements:

  • Strong global and regional relationships to identify and manage emerging risks;
  • Identification of all risk pathways and high risk organisms, and implementation of pre-border and border measures to prevent pests and diseases entering New Zealand;
  • Comprehensive, competent surveillance programmes and diagnostic services to detect and identify the arrival and spread of pests and diseases;
  • Sufficient capability to conduct timely assessment of the threats from new or expanding species;
  • Rapid response capability to eradicate new pests and diseases before they establish and spread;
  • Seamless integration between the appropriate agencies of central, regional and local government, each with clear roles and accountabilities;
  • Effective strategies in place for eradicating, containing and controlling pests and diseases already established;
  • Effective education and awareness programmes to encourage compliance with biosecurity rules and regulations;
  • Strong enforcement of our biosecurity laws which are reviewed and rationalised as required;
  • A strong input of scientific advice to all levels of policy, planning and decision-making;
  • The support of all stakeholders across the spectrum of biosecurity interests; and
  • A strong culture of continuous improvement.

If Biosecurity is working

Biosecurity is an important issue for a large range of stakeholders, so it is expected this strategy will mean:

  1. Primary producers will know the best efforts are being taken to reduce risks to production, with a well-planned and resourced incursion response capability in place.
  2. The public will understand biosecurity’s importance, comply with its rules, report the unusual and have confidence that dangerous incursions are minimised and managed appropriately.
  3. Environmental groups will know risks to flora and fauna are being minimised, established environmental pests are being managed appropriately, and the biodiversity of our native ecosystems are being protected.
  4. Maori will be involved in biosecurity.
  5. Scientists will know decisions are based on the best scientific knowledge available, gaps in science capability are being closed, and there are incentives for them to work collaboratively across agencies.
  6. Regional councils will recognise central government’s leadership role - facilitating national coordination (where appropriate) and involving regional councils transparently in relevant decisions and actions.
  7. The public health sector will know the risk of zoonotic and pest-borne diseases and venomous species being introduced is being managed effectively.
  8. Industry sectors – such as importers, exporters and the travel industry – are playing a major role in reducing biosecurity risks.
  9. Government will be confident that New Zealand’s biosecurity system is robust.

Expectations - Biosecurity operations

The overall expectation is:

1. That the biosecurity system is fully integrated, operating efficiently and transparently in an environment of continuous improvement (measure, review and refine).

The remains of a Kakapo, after being attacked by a cat
Don Merton,Crown Copyright:Department of Conservation Te Papa Atawhai (2003)
The remains of a Kakapo, after being attacked by a cat on Stewart Island. Cats, and dogs, are natural hunters, so even domestic pets can be very destructive to our native birds. In addition, there are thousands of feral cats – unwanted kittens, strays and, of course, their offspring – in New Zealand. DoC rescued the remainder of Stewart Island’s Kakapo population after this killing. North Island saddleback, pied tit, tui and red-crowned parakeet were eliminated on Cuvier Island, off the Coromandel coast, mostly through predation by cats. Cats were introduced to Mangere Island, in the Chathams, to control rabbits but in addition had also eliminated at least two species of seabirds and most forest birds by 1950. In 1987 a dog was on the loose in the Waitangi State Forest in the Bay of Islands for six weeks. By the time it was caught, as many as 500 of the 900 kiwi living there had been slaughtered. This was not an isolated incident - between 1990 and June 1995, dogs caused 135 (70%) of 194 kiwi deaths reported in Northland. Deaths caused by pets included dogs being taken for day time walks and dogs not tied up at night, at home or camping. In the same period five kiwi were also killed by a feral cat and more by ferrets, stoats and weasels.

What will change

This Strategy will have made a difference if the following have occurred:

  • Clearer accountabilities: Agencies are delivering on their clearly defined roles, strongly aligned to expectations and accountabilities;
  • Strong integration across stakeholders: Efforts of central and regional government are well coordinated and integrated with the efforts of industry groups and Non-Government Organisations;
  • Effective capability: Agencies are developing the necessary capabilities to deliver on their responsibilities;
  • Clear risk profile and priorities: There is a much clearer view of New Zealand's current and emerging risk profile and decision tools are being used to help identify priorities; and
  • Key performance indicators are in place across the biosecurity system, linking the Government's overarching goals for the economy, environment and health.

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Part II

Consistent themes from stakeholders

Just over three years ago, the Government's biodiversity strategy, 'Our Chance to Turn the Tide', highlighted the need to improve the protection of our shores from the damaging effects of invasive species. Consultation began in June 2000, leading to an issues paper sent to nearly 2,000 individuals and groups (including schools, community organisations and environmental groups). This was followed by an extensive round of consultation including hui, meetings and workshops throughout New Zealand. These submissions were collated and analysed, and it soon became clear there were some strong views on the way biosecurity should evolve; even stronger views on the current system's flaws. This work led to the release of the draft biosecurity strategy, 'Guarding Pacific's Triple Star', late in 2002.

Nearly 150 submissions on the draft strategy were received by mid-March 2003 and our website (www.biostrategy.govt.nz) received over 17,000 hits. These submissions were categorised in a 98 page analysis and an 18 page summary; both documents are on the website.

Since the beginning of the year, a group has been working on an implementation plan to support the final biosecurity strategy. Both the strategy and the implementation plan draw substantially on the plethora of biosecurity reviews and reports produced in recent years and listed in the appendix.

The consistent themes from the consultation with stakeholders on the draft strategy have been:

  1. For clearer accountability of biosecurity performance;
  2. To improve the coordination and management of the highly fragmented biosecurity system;
  3. To consider the full range of possible impacts when making biosecurity decisions;
  4. To have a consistent approach to assessing and managing risks across all sectors;
  5. For biosecurity to be run far more strategically; and
  6. For greater levels of funding for biosecurity activities and a consistent approach to funding those activities.

Looking to the future

A series of biosecurity reviews have focused on the system’s faults, looking at short-term fixes and responses, without necessarily looking to the future. This document, New Zealand’s first biosecurity strategy, proposes a fundamental shift in our approach to biosecurity.

Growing threats

Despite constantly improving technology we will have to ‘run harder to stand still’. Over the past 10 years trade volumes have increased by 76%5 and international passengers by 93%; a high level of growth should continue. This pressure on the border increases the chances of known pests and diseases entering New Zealand. It is imperative New Zealand remains free of diseases like Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), Foot-and-Mouth disease and Pine Pitch Canker and pests like fruit flies. Any one of these could cause major economic damage.

Additionally, new threats will emerge across all sectors; nature is not standing still. The past 10-15 years have also seen new biological challenges - BSE, Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Rabbit Calicivirus Disease (RCD) have spread rapidly. We have also seen the arrival of Painted Apple Moth, Guava Moth, Scolliid Wasp and Tropical Grass Web Worm. These particular organisms couldn’t have been predicted on the basis of pest profiles in their home countries.

Changing climatic conditions mean the ranges for certain pests are steadily extending. Invasive pests are an emerging global problem threatening biodiversity everywhere; evolving and adapting as they spread. These emerging pests and diseases are likely to be carried along new and different pathways, and are more likely to be resistant to current treatments.

Meeting the challenge

Biosecurity will need to be adaptable, robust and competent to handle these growing threats. It will need to be built on a solid footing, which means addressing the six key themes identified by stakeholders in the box above (‘Strategy Background’). Currently, these foundations are not complete, as evidenced by the continuing stream of reviews. It is imperative this strategy (and the Government’s consequent decisions) allows biosecurity to address these concerns.

Building a biosecurity system to meet our future needs means an organisational mind-shift to embrace all the values at risk in the definition of ‘biosecurity’ and to deal with them strategically. This will not happen unless there are changes in systems, structures and decision-making processes – along with increased capability and capacity. New Zealand’s ability to manage biosecurity risk needs bolstering, support and challenge. It will require strong leadership from within – and oversight from stakeholders in providing feedback and constructive criticism.

Three key areas need developing:

  1. The ability to prioritise across activities (pre-border to pest management) and sectors (conservation, agriculture and forestry, aquatic and human health);
  2. Establishment of systems and standards to allow monitoring and continuous improvement; and
  3. Building underpinning knowledge and decision support systems.

Biosecurity protects all our biological resources, which contribute to environmental quality, economic prosperity, health and lifestyle. Biosecurity is about controlling living systems, which requires ongoing effort. It is not enough to provide it for one day; it must be provided every day.

At agency level – central and local government – we have significant strengths built through the experience developed to protect primary production. These now need to be built on to address biodiversity and health threats, in a much more integrated manner.

The process has started. The mind shift began with the Biosecurity Council’s formation in 1997; which brought together the chief executives of relevant government departments with representatives from regional councils, primary producers and environmental groups. The policies it developed are now used across agencies.

The mission of MAF’s Biosecurity Authority shows good intent: – "to protect New Zealand’s unique biodiversity and to facilitate exports by managing risks to plant and animal health and animal welfare." But the transformation to match this vision has not been made. In the past four years the Biosecurity Authority has made progress – but challenges appear to be arriving with greater vigour than the current arrangements can manage.

Hindered by a lack of legitimate authority, and insufficiently equipped to deal with the additional challenges, MAF largely continues to work to a vital but more limited mission – protection of primary production and trade. This is demonstrated by priorities still largely determined by risks to agriculture and production forestry. 

Management of pathways where the main risk is to our indigenous flora and fauna and people has not been acted on with the same degree of urgency. There has been confusion in roles and responsibilities for some biosecurity functions relating to human health, for example responses to interceptions and incursions of venomous spiders.

Achieving multiple outcomes

Biosecurity is not an end in itself. Its origins lie in protecting our primary production; that remains vital to our economic welfare with an increasing range of threats to manage. But its scope is expanding. Our biosecurity system must now also embrace the protection of our flora and fauna, both on the land and in the sea; valuing our health; valuing aspects of our lifestyle and national identity and assessing how much we are prepared to pay to protect each of these. Although some submitters argued these values should be set in a hierarchy, the Biosecurity Council does not agree. Our biodiversity, economy and society are inextricably interdependent so all must be considered equally and consistently when making biosecurity decisions.

Outcomes supported by biosecurity activities

  • Environmental - including protecting indigenous & valued introduced species, biodiversity ecosystems & landscapes;
  • Commercial - including primary production, industry, tourism & service sectors;
  • Safeguarding Maori cultural & spiritual values;
  • Human health & well-being; and
  • Social - including lifestyle & historical values.

Building our institutions

New Zealand has an internationally recognised strength in biosecurity because of the strong systems developed to protect our ability to produce and trade.

There is now considerable infrastructure (particularly at the border) to protect our access to international markets. MAF also has a strong reputation and presence in international negotiations – clearly, this needs to be maintained. But these strengths must be extended to protect us and our environment, and MAF needs to utilise the strengths built up elsewhere – within DoC, regional councils, the Ministry of Fisheries (MFish), MoH and with science providers.

This background plays an essential role in understanding our current position and future direction. Many submissions indicated concern about the proposed arrangements for government departments, although there was no consensus over alternative solutions, nor much useful analysis of their relative strengths or weaknesses. One general theme was the need to think about the system as a whole, with many concerns about fragmentation of effort, gaps in accountability and confusion of legitimate authority. These matters must be addressed but, most importantly, there must be a commitment to making decisions; rather than the current tendency to avoid them, simply because the decision faced is outside perceived agency boundaries.

Institutions require supportive legislation. The existing legislation has been heavily amended and remains far from perfect, but not imperfect enough to warrant a full-scale overhaul. Biosecurity is covered in many pieces of legislation, including the Biosecurity Act, Conservation Act, Fisheries Act, Wildlife Act, Wild Animal Control Act and Resource Management Act.

These Acts will all need to be reviewed incrementally in order to achieve this strategy’s expectations.

MAF as lead agency

The new proposal significantly simplifies arrangements. Government agencies have elected, subject to Cabinet approval, for one lead agency to take responsibility for end-to-end biosecurity, taking a whole-of-government and whole-of-New Zealand perspective. This agency will be responsible for pre-border and border activities, incursions and eradications, and the grey zone leading through to pest management.

MAF is the natural agency to take this lead role. The Biosecurity Council, however, recognises MAF needs to develop systems capable of protecting the wider interests in biosecurity and improve its connections with the aquatic, environmental and health sectors. MAF will have to make some big changes, largely to make its responsibilities and accountabilities more explicit and its decisions more transparent.

A number of mechanisms are proposed to support the expansion of MAF ’s biosecurity mandate. The key first steps will be the establishment of a ministerial committee and a chief executives ’ forum to develop the overall strategic direction for biosecurity,and monitor system performance. Other important mechanisms will include a central/regional government forum,and the Biosecurity Council reconstituted as a ministerial advisory group.

MAF will need to delegate (to other departments) where there is specific knowledge and advantage but the need to assume responsibility for that task can not be delegated; the Director-General of MAF will remain accountable. Further, departments will organise themselves into a cross-departmental grouping (a chief executives’ forum), taking collective responsibility across agencies with an interest in all outcomes.

The purpose of the chief executives ’ forum will be to support MAF ’s Chief Executive in the delivery of end-to-end biosecurity,and its members will be accountable for working together to achieve this purpose. This will include,for example, contributing to the preparation of the MAF Statement of Intent as it relates to biosecurity, prioritising biosecurity-related new initiative bids, developing a biosecurity research strategy,and implementing a Maori responsiveness strategy.

As the officer responsible for end-to-end biosecurity, MAF ’s Chief Executive will lead the forum and ensure its effective operation.

This document clarifies the Council’s expectations and provides markers to assess MAF’s performance. There is a real expectation MAF will take its expanded roles seriously by protecting the aquatic and terrestrial environments and human health on behalf of DoC, MoH and MFish, and work with regional councils to ensure better pest management.

MAF is the proposed lead agency – strengthened, collating independent strategic advice for the Minister, and with a mandate for end-to-end biosecurity management in aquatic and terrestrial environments.

The other biosecurity agencies - DoC, MoH and MFish - will work with MAF through chief executives.

The Director-General of MAF will take lead accountability for biosecurity.

Expectations - Institutional arrangements

2. That a single agency (MAF) is accountable for ensuring the full range of biosecurity activities are delivered effectively and efficiently to meet the outcome expectations of agencies with a biosecurity interest.

Maori

Our biosecurity system must respond to the needs and aspirations of Maori. Understanding of Maori interests in biosecurity – the protection, sustainability and management of taonga for present and future generations – is pivotal to any effective relationship between Maori and the biosecurity agencies. Taonga are resources highly prized by Maori - including fisheries, indigenous flora and fauna and traditional food gathering areas on land, in rivers and in the sea.

Maori hold significant economic interests that are focused on primary production (spanning agriculture, horticulture, forestry, fishing, marine farming and tourism) so their interest in robust biosecurity is similar to any other producer. Maori cultural and social values and economic interests may favour particular solutions and disallow others. Maori, for example, may have specific issues with some methods of pest control, or concerns with the management of species such as the kiore (Polynesian rat) or a particular interest in marine biosecurity. The tradition of mahinga kai (food gathering systems) is pivotal to Maori culture so the loss of wetlands, pollution of waterways, introduction of exotic species and control of pests and weeds has particularly significant cultural and economic implications for them, not always adequately appreciated by the biosecurity agencies.

Maori are concerned at the lack of understanding by non-Maori of their customs and the value of traditional knowledge in managing indigenous species. Direct involvement by Maori in biosecurity decision-making processes would inform both biosecurity agencies and the wider community of Maori specific outcomes. Local iwi need to be involved in the protection of taonga. If taonga are threatened by incursions, kaitiaki (guardians) from local iwi can assist. Biosecurity agencies must have an ongoing process of review and responsiveness to Maori.

Expectations - Maori

3. That the Chief Executive of MAF is responsible for developing a Maori responsiveness strategy for biosecurity agencies;

4. That capacity and capability is developed within the biosecurity agencies with specific training (specialist skills and knowledge) to ensure Maori are involved meaningfully;

5. That existing channels (under the Resource Management Act, Fisheries Act, District Health Boards or conservancies) are used in consulting on pest management strategies and during incursions;

6. That kaitiaki are invited to work with central government and regional councils on biosecurity matters;

7. That Maori values are explicitly considered in decision-making criteria.

The Wananga tradition - a way forward

Maori as kaitiaki (guardians) and owners of land and resources have a vested interest in protecting taonga from imported pests and diseases for future generations. Te Whare Wä nanga o Awanuiä rangi, in a marae in Whakatane, offers a three-year Bachelor of Environment Studies degree that incorporates a Maori vision of the environment, together with science. The degree focuses on practical studies, including investigation of the region - mountains, rivers, and wetlands as well as coastal, estuarine and marine environments.

Awanuiärangi has relationships with Maanaki Whenua (Landcare), Te Papa Atawhai (DoC) and various regional councils. For example, students work on Moutohora (Whale Island), a reserve administered by DoC where imported mammals (goats, sheep, rats and mice) had destroyed the plants and bird life. After 20 years of management these mammals have been eliminated and a planting programme has regenerated its landscape.

Now Moutohora is covered with vegetation (mainly pohutukawa, mahoe and kanuka forest) and the birds are returning.

Ngati Awa Research Center
Ngati Awa Research Centre
Nobel prize winner Professor Alan McDiarmid with Pouroto Ngaropo opening the new Te Whare Wananga o Awanuiarangi laboratory at Poroporo Marae in February 2003. The $450,000 science laboratory is the first built specifically for Maori. 

Stakeholders’ voice

It is imperative people trust biosecurity management, confident in its decisions; currently they clearly don’t. Many submitters doubted the ability of MAF and/or MFish to make the culture shift required to deliver an end-to-end biosecurity system.

The new institutional arrangements need to recognise these concerns and ensure there is a means to provide stakeholder oversight of the full biosecurity system: from pre-border through to pest management.

The Biosecurity Council fits this role – partially. It was formed shortly after the ministerial portfolio was established in 1997 to coordinate the four government agencies and the regional councils. The Council’s mix of public servants, regional councils and stakeholders was an attempt at cohesion. The Council has guided this strategy’s development with government agencies and regional councils in order to find a way forward.

A reconstituted Biosecurity Council can continue its vital strategic role, monitoring system performance as new biosecurity measures and systems are introduced. Inevitably, today’s system will evolve as its management becomes more transparent and the needs of biosecurity change. The Biosecurity Council should be the vehicle through which stakeholders can have a voice.

The key objectives of the Biosecurity Council will be:

  1. Providing independent advice to the Minister;
  2. Evaluating the ongoing management of the system to ensure mechanisms work; and
  3. Ensuring stakeholders have a voice in the system’s governance.

Membership of the reconstituted Biosecurity Council will be a decision for Government but an indicative list appropriate for representation is:

  • Primary production;
  • Maori;
  • Regional councils;
  • Environment;
  • Health;
  • Marine;
  • Research;
  • Transport (including ports and airports); and
  • Tourism.

It would also be advisable to appoint individuals with strong strategic skills who are supported by, rather than advocating for, particular interest groups.

Partnership with regional councils

The Biosecurity Council agrees there is a need to establish tangible, ongoing and effective arrangements between central government and regional councils at a number of levels. The major issue is ensuring formal inclusion of regional councils in the strategic decisions responding to an incursion, or handling the new invader within pest management. Regional councils, together with DoC and private interests, often see themselves as the ‘victims’ of biosecurity failure, as they bear the costs of leakage across the border.

A regional council and central government forum needs to be formed to address the issues of pest management with a national perspective. The forum needs to set clear and transparent boundaries, for management of pests between those boundaries, and to facilitate a combined effort to manage pests. DoC must be part of such an arrangement.

Linking with industry

Industry’s role is critical, both as a significant funder of Crown-led activity and a major beneficiary. Industry needs to work actively in surveillance and eradication programmes.

There are considerable other points of connection for a biosecurity authority – indeed, there appear to be too many. Agencies need to look at the myriad committees, decide which ones are most important, then concentrate on making them work; generalised meetings of large groups with diffuse agendas are much less useful.

There clearly needs to be a specific vehicle that pulls together the various industry forums currently lying within the biosecurity agencies, to recognise the nature of their relationships and the need for a cooperative and clear policy environment.

Measuring performance

Biosecurity needs a full performance monitoring system - driven off high quality, published information - and discussed with stakeholders regularly. Government departments will drive its development through their statement of intent process, but ongoing evaluation is needed for daily management and ongoing monitoring.

There is some information on performance measuring in the system. For example, there is a measure identifying border leakage (it may need updating, but at least it exists) but the information is not used for higher-level decision-making. Even more worrying is the lack of activity reporting, and even basic accounting systems are unable to identify activity costs.

A public forum is needed to ensure ongoing monitoring, such as an annual review of biosecurity activity focusing on results. In its early stages, it is likely to comment on necessary developments to bring the system up to speed.

Implementing the next steps

MAF needs to take leadership of the next stage of development and the Biosecurity Council believes the Chief Executive should determine which direction to take. The Council sees its future role as one of giving independent advice and stakeholder comment. Clearly, there is a great deal to be done and the Council expects to be engaged in the process of development as it gets underway.

Expectations - Stakeholders’ voice

8. That the system encourages all New Zealanders to participate and support biosecurity;

9. That there is an annual review with external stakeholders on the performance and development of biosecurity, with an overall review in 2010;

10. That a reconstituted Biosecurity Council monitors this strategy’s implementation on behalf of stakeholders for the Minister;

11. That a central government/ regional council forum is established to address the joint issues of incursion response and pest management;

12. That appropriate links with industry are formed to address priorities and who should pay for what.

Capability gaps

The specialisation of many biosecurity activities makes them hard to replicate. For instance, New Zealand trains biosecurity detector (‘sniffer’) dogs for other countries and some of our science organisations have internationally recognised strengths in risk management – databases, applied technological and other intellectual capital. Risk management, surveillance and incursion responses require particular skills that can be applied across organisms and environments. This strategy focuses on the efficient development, astute deployment and utilisation of these specific skills to achieve the New Zealand most of us want.

Biosecurity faces increasing demands from growing risk and increased volumes of activity, at the same time as coping with high profile incursion responses. The system has been holding together, but at some cost to its core abilities. The system has not become strategic; the identification and management of risks has become increasingly reactive - while the cost escalates. The full consequences can be seen in the recent failure to contain the Painted Apple Moth incursion when it was first discovered.

The fragmentation of biosecurity activities across several agencies makes identifying overall gaps difficult. There has been no attempt, nor incentive, for agencies to assess all the gaps across the entire biosecurity system, nor determine the sequence in which they should be addressed. The system operates in isolated silos designed to address sector interests, with no overview.

Different sectors of the biosecurity system are at different stages of development. In some sectors there are critical gaps in baseline knowledge,in others capabilities are lacking (such as diagnostic and treatment tools),while some need to refine existing programmes to ensure high impact risks are effectively managed.

Gaps in the system

More than 80 gaps have been identified during the strategy and cabinet paper development process. These range from pre-border to pest management activities, affecting environmental, economic and human health outcomes. Some are simple and can be readily addressed (for example, enhanced Saltmarsh Mosquito surveillance), others are complex (for example, management of marine risks) and will take significant resources and time to resolve.

Here are some examples:

  1. Important biosecurity data is stored in a range of information systems run by different groups. This results in gaps and duplication, inconsistency and poor accessibility of information. A coordinated information strategy is needed to ensure this information is shared;
  2. A more proactive approach is needed in assessing emerging threats, to enable identification of potential pests and pathways and implementation of measures to prevent their entry, spread and establishment;
  3. Effective tools are needed to implement responses to a range of pests and diseases. In some areas, such as ballast water testing and treatment, no effective tools have been developed. In other areas existing tools are under threat due to health, environmental and humanitarian concerns; for example, 1080 poison, methyl bromide for fumigation and ‘leghold’ traps for possum control. Some tools are no longer available, for example, effective anti-fouling paints;
  4. There is a major knowledge gap in marine biosecurity, including information about the marine environment’s current status, high value marine ecosystems and potential pest threats (other than a few high impact species);
  5. There is a range of exotic species of animals and ornamental plants held in zoos, private collections, fishponds and even suburban gardens. Some have the potential to become serious environmental pests. There is inadequate knowledge about New Zealand’s baseline – the range of species present and where they are located – yet this information is necessary to develop effective surveillance and response programmes;
  6. There are unresolved regulatory issues which could delay access to imported vaccines in the event of a FMD outbreak;
  7. There are significant knowledge gaps in risk analysis, for example the likelihood of different products carrying pests or viruses and their response to various treatments (such as heat). Such gaps can only be addressed by research that, since the agents are always exotic, could be carried out in research institutes abroad or under suitable containment provisions in this country;
  8. Reference laboratories have coped with a three-fold increase in investigations, primarily related to indigenous biodiversity over the past five years. This trend will continue so increased capability is needed urgently; and
  9. Targeted surveillance systems for exotic pests & diseases,in forests and plant nurseries.

Evolving systems

Technology will create many opportunities for improved management of biosecurity threats; these must be harnessed to ensure an evolving biosecurity system. Rapid improvements in x-ray and luggage tracking technology were adapted to increase border security in the past decade. New technologies (such as automation, sniffer detection, data management systems, improved profiling methods and other anti-terrorism tools) will provide improved border protection. The same will happen with surveillance and incursion response capabilities. New, targeted biological control (possibly using GM technology), improved pesticides and herbicides, and new ecological approaches will add to the pest management toolbox.

Building strategic capability

A strengthened, more strategic and strongly led biosecurity system should be better at coping with emerging threats. Attempts to forecast the future are likely to fail, so foresight and flexibility must be built into all systems. Belief that change can be addressed, and challenges met, is more important than fortune telling.

Much of the operational capability exists but there is a lack of strategic capability to look ahead, identify all the gaps and agree priorities across the system. Investment is needed to integrate the different pieces. then to close gaps through a rational and prioritised process.

New Zealand must do the most important and achievable things first, recognising that lower priorities may not be achievable in the near future.

Standardisation of process

There is a lack of consistency in most activities, sometimes for valid reason with good result; mostly due to the haphazard nature of development. Areas of significant concern are risk management methods and the approaches to surveillance and incursion response by the different agencies. Biosecurity activities have developed reactively, learning only partially from past experience. For instance, a specific team standing to one side of MAF is dealing with the Painted Apple Moth incursion – it has essentially rebuilt incursion management systems.

Beyond the obvious risks of duplication of past effort, the lack of attention to systems and standards is wasteful of scarce time and effort, with inconsistency of lower level management decisions, incursion response processes and surveillance.

The first major point of leverage is to standardise risk management,then ensure the following repeatable processes are much more consistent – diagnostics surveillance, eradication, pest management strategy development, Import Health Standards (IHS), etc.

Developing knowledge systems

The biosecurity system’s fragmentation is reflected in its underpinning knowledge and decision systems. Key information systems for decision-making do not communicate, or are incomplete. People who need access to systems do not have it. One small example of the need for a substantially better approach is the lack of an agreed list of recent incursions.

The processes for evaluating consequences and assessing external impacts (for example, global warming) are either missing, rudimentary, or operating in isolation – hardly what would be expected in such a complex system.

Expectations - Capability gaps

13. That central government is committed to maintaining a clear and effective role as overall steward of the biosecurity system;

14. That funding baselines for biosecurity are increased over the next five years specifically to close the gaps in the system;

15. That immediate funding is provided to ensure sufficient capacity and capability for rational and strategic management of the total biosecurity system;

16. That all significant hitchhiker pathways are controlled where possible;

17. That central government develops a comprehensive set of possible initiatives for increased expenditure each financial year - clearly prioritised across all agencies, sectors, environments and functions;

18. That the IHS for risk management of sea containers is fully implemented; and

19. That pre-border and border measures to reduce risks to the marine environment are being addressed as a high priority.

Science

Science is a critical element underpinning biosecurity; it can have an enormous input to managing the risks and uncertainties, and ultimately the effectiveness of any decision. It can provide key information for many questions and can help determine which questions should be asked. Identifying the right advice is the key to making good decisions so scientific input must be considered, in conjunction with public and stakeholder opinion.

Scientists from the agencies, Crown Research Institutes (CRI) and private science providers are involved in some way in virtually all aspects of biosecurity, from researching the implications of pre-border trade agreements to judging the most acceptable and effective means of eradicating pests. Scientists provide advice at many stages: during incursions, on medium to long-term pathway mitigation and on responses to eradicate or control pests.

Tensions are inevitable at times between the need for rapid decisions (with clear accountability) and the need for adequate information; tension is also likely in managing relations with commercial science providers such as the CRI. Processes are, however, just a means to an end; the goal must always be the best possible decision in a timely manner.

New Zealand's biosecurity is held in high regard internationally but the thousands of biosecurity policy and funding decisions taken every year could be improved through more effective application of scientific techniques.

The following key issues have been identified:

  • Connections: the need to integrate science into biosecurity policy and decision making, not just in the implementation of incursion responses;
  • Capability: the need to protect/develop science capability across the spectrum, from pre-border through to pest management, with proper funding of those involved; and
  • Balance of Investment: the need to move more investment into pre-border (ie: prevention) and to develop whole-of-government priorities for spending.

It is apparent:

  • A Biosecurity Research Strategy needs to contain some overall agreed medium to long-term research priorities to guide Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST) and the agencies;
  • Scientists should be included more actively in a wider range of decisions, not just brought in on a piecemeal basis to help with incursion responses. The ad-hoc and reactive use of science needs to be reviewed, as it risks poorer decisions and reduced science capacity;
  • Work needs to be undertaken to assess the benefits of pre-border and border interventions and related research, and combined with the prioritisation work to ascertain whether a case can be made for more research funding;
  • Greater emphasis is needed on developing long-term partnerships with scientists to build capability and knowledge, although cost control remains important; and
  • There is a need for all parties to be open in exchanging information. Scientific information for biosecurity management is a public good and a critical component in decision-making, yet access to it varies across the spectrum.

Expectations - Science

21. That science is closely involved in the development of biosecurity strategy;

22. That the purchase of science is integrated across providers;

23. That investment in science is long term to ensure maintenance of key capabilities; and

24. That the priority for research to improve biosecurity is understood.

Federated Farmers of New Zealand
Federated Farmers of New Zealand (Inc.)
Despite being a major sheep producer,New Zealand is one of very few countries to have remained free from scrapie, a sheep disease with major trading ramifications. On the rare occasions when scrapie has been detected in imported sheep the animals have been slaughtered immediately,with the carcasses burnt. Infected flocks experience significant production losses,making it impossible to export breeding stock,semen,and embryos to many other countries. 

Addressing priorities

The Biosecurity Council sees the need for central government to ensure significant increases in funding over the next three to five years, based on carefully justified priorities, supported by all biosecurity agencies.

There is considerable concern whether the resource allocation is optimal. Similar concerns exist over funding allocations across agencies, sectors and environments. Often money is spent on known risks and activities, in preference to recognised threats about which we know very little. This disparity may be sensible in minimising the potential damage from incursions or spread of pests and diseases; equally it possibly reflects a tendency to devote resources to areas most understood, or a tendency to repeat what has been done before.

The priority must be to ensure sufficient capacity to enable the system to function as a whole. Capacity is needed to gather information, analyse it and execute change in an orderly manner. As indicated already, some gaps are apparent.

Addressing the gaps will require a broad approach to ensure risk management is commensurate with the level of risk being faced.

Where the Government spends our money

Around $500million is spent annually on biosecurity in New Zealand, with activities undertaken by central government, regional councils, industry and private landowners. It is estimated government agencies are responsible for $304 million of this.

Where the Government spends our money
Other' includes assurance (1%), audit and enforcement (1%) and international (0%). Figures do not add to 100%, due to rounding

It is not clear whether this spending and activity is a good fit with the objectives of biosecurity; most stakeholders strongly believe more resources are needed. The Biosecurity Council agrees but has deliberately stopped short of offering specific recommendations on the necessary level of increase. Experience suggests decisions on overall funding levels are best taken in incremental steps rather than as a single exercise.

Integrating decisions

Lack of agreed, high-level outcomes is an obstacle. Central government biosecurity agencies need to establish priorities and be able to assess the relative contributions of different activities.

The four main central government biosecurity agencies have made concerted efforts over recent years to improve their decision-making practices, but their processes for assessing and prioritising activities are in varying stages of development with considerable inconsistency in criteria and methods. Despite the complexity of decision-making in biosecurity, information limitations can be severe, requiring over-simplification and major assumptions.

This significantly limits the scope for comparison of spending alternatives or different approaches to managing a particular risk. These problems result in inconsistent decision-making that undermines the public’s confidence. Decisions must be robust, consistent and accurately reflect relative priorities, rather than the undue influence of the assessment method chosen. Put bluntly, departments must join together to form a pan-departmental view of biosecurity priorities.

This is still a long way from being achieved – during the development of Cabinet papers to accompany this strategy, for example, officials were unable to agree the table of top priority gaps to plug.

To address these problems, the Council expects a framework for prioritising investments across both the spectrum (pre-border to pest management) and sectors (conservation, agriculture and forestry, aquatic and human health).

This framework must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the required wide range of applications, the complexity of biosecurity decision-making, the inherent uncertainty, and the inevitable trade-offs between risk and benefit.

Benefits and costs are a key consideration, bringing together biological risk analysis with operational capability and effectiveness in assessing measures to manage the risks facing what New Zealanders value.

This field of endeavour is fraught with difficulties. Valuation of environmental and cultural effects is particularly tricky when assessing benefits and costs. Other areas of difficulty include uncertainty, society’s changing risk preferences, long-term effects resulting in discounting of major impacts far off and the impossibility of reversing some decisions. In addition, individual assessments are limited in reflecting the aggregate and cumulative risks posed by multiple pests and pathways. These complex difficulties require progressive improvements to information bases and assessment methods.

Priorities framework

The Biosecurity Council proposes a generic, integrated framework comprising an initial intervention test, followed by prioritisation of activities according to a range of criteria, including benefits and costs.

The intervention test should assess whether activities are:

  • Justified & appropriate - for central government biosecurity agencies;
  • Consistent - with domestic legislation & international agreements (trade, environmental & human health); and
  • Mandatory - under domestic legislation or international agreements.

The proposed prioritisation criteria are:

  • Technical - feasibility, suitability & probability of success;
  • Practicality - logistics, resourcing, timing, opportunities & risks, past achievements & stability;
  • Benefits and costs - encompassing the full range of effects across all sectors;
  • Strategic - contribution to goals & key priorities, long-term benefits, synergy & coverage; and
  • Acceptability - stakeholder concern, international interests, distributional considerations & risk preferences.

The criteria for benefits & costs across all sectors, should be:

  • Environmental - including indigenous & valued introduced species, biological systems & biodiversity;
  • Commercial -including primary production,industry &service sectors;
  • Maori cultural &spiritual values;
  • Human health &well -being; and
  • Social - including personal property.

Expectations - Priorities

25. That there is an integrated framework for establishing whole-of-system priorities and providing greater transparency and accountability in risk management; and

26. That the criteria for assessment of benefits and costs includes the full range of effects across all sectors and in particular consequences for the environment, human health & well-being, economic production, and Maori cultural values.

Who should pay?

The Government has overall responsibility for funding biosecurity, in particular border, surveillance and incursions.

Government agencies are responsible for $304 million of spending on biosecurity; central government responsible for 90% and regional councils for the balance. Taxpayers are not entirely liable, 20% is recovered from third parties and 9% from ratepayers. Industry contributes through fees and levies. There is no clear rationale in the level of third party funding and the allocation is wildly inconsistent - prevention 40%, surveillance 24%, and response 18%. Within these general activities there is further variation. In prevention, for example, there is full cost recovery for cargo and container clearance but no private contribution to costs for aircraft and mail clearance, nor any third party contribution to the funding of research.

Inconsistent funding leads to erratic development of capability to prevent and manage risks. The European Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak, for example, provided the spur to gain additional funding for x-ray machines and sniffer dogs – this provided some reduction in the risk of Foot-and-Mouth disease (by increasing meat interceptions) but the principal (yet unintended effect) was to reduce risks to biodiversity and plant health.

The Privy Council recently ordered MAF to repay passenger clearance charges to Freedom Air, Hamilton and Palmerston North airports. It ruled MAF's charges at regional airports were unlawful because taxpayers funded the cost at the established international airports of Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch. Charges from 1995 to June 2003 totalled $3.296m.

This ruling has implications for other regional airports.

Transparent framework needed

The Council expects central government and regional councils to apply a clear framework for determining who should pay for a particular service, and to review existing activities to ensure consistency with this framework.

The principles of funding have been dealt with over the years with clear policies espoused in different areas of government; the ground has been well trodden. Broadly speaking, it is a cascade principle: charges on exacerbators should be investigated and applied if possible; if not possible, levies on the beneficiaries should be investigated and implemented if they are practical, fairer than taxpayer funding, and capable of implementation at reasonable cost. Finally, taxpayer (in some instances, ratepayer) funding is relevant.

This cascading decision rule, if applied consistently, will ensure the funding source is the best way to ensure consistency with goals such as minimised risk, minimised costs, fairness, consistency with international obligations and ongoing improvements.

There is wide support for the development of a clear and consistent set of funding principles (based on transparency, accountability, equity and practicality) and strong support for the ‘polluter pays’ principle rather than ‘one size fits all’; many feel their sector should not have to pay more.

There is, however, moderate support for recovering the costs of increased activity at the border through charging for passenger and cargo inspection activities – except, unsurprisingly, from the tourism and transport sectors. There will also need to be a set of ongoing discussions with the primary sector about cost sharing (where relevant and fair) on activities around incursion management and surveillance.

The Biosecurity Act has punitive powers, allowing government agencies to pursue individuals and companies who breach it. Individuals may be fined up to $100,000 in addition to possible prison sentences of five years6; companies face maximum fines of $200,000. But enforcement is difficult, as the exacerbator must be identified and intent proven. Investigation and prosecution costs are expensive, and prosecution capacity is limited. The direct costs of an incursion are so high that no punishment reflects the potential damage to our economy and lifestyle. No culprit can be identified for any of the major recent incursions (Painted Apple Moth, Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito or Varroa) yet combined they cost the taxpayer over $150million – with much larger potential costs for primary industry.

The Crown will continue to bear substantial costs for biosecurity, as it must retain responsibility due to the complex components - the crosscutting nature of benefits, the difficulty of identifying beneficiaries and the difficulty of levies.

The Minister of Biosecurity is recommending Cabinet adopt the following ‘cascading decision rule’ for officials to develop recommendations on future funding arrangements for services for which the Government is responsible:

  1. Costs should be recovered from the users of each service, or those whose actions caused the need for the service or function to be provided, where this is practical and cost-effective;
  2. Otherwise the funds required should be raised through the imposition of levies on those who benefit from the provision of the service or function, where they are an identifiable individual or class of individuals and where the cost of doing so is reasonable;
  3. Otherwise taxpayer funding should be used.

Expectations - Funding sources

27. That central government and regional councils are applying a clear and consistent cascading framework for determining who should pay what; and

28. That funding arrangements for all existing activities are progressively reviewed to ensure consistency with this framework.

Biosecurity Council’s first recommended steps

1. Make MAF clearly accountable for overall management of the whole biosecurity system, on behalf of all New Zealanders;

2. Put in place the necessary systems, structures and capabilities within MAF to support its role - starting with strong strategic capability;

3. Establish governance mechanisms (including a reconstituted Biosecurity Council and chief executives’ forum) to support this strategy’s implementation and monitor performance;

4. Encourage all New Zealanders to support and participate in biosecurity through a social marketing programme;

5. Identify ways to involve Maori fully in biosecurity issues and decisions, nationally and locally;

6. Identify, prioritise and review current and emerging risks– from pre-border to pest management and across aquatic and terrestrial environments;

7. Establish national leadership and coordination of pest management;

8. Recognise the contribution of science to biosecurity (strategically and operationally) and fund it properly;

9. Ensure decision-making processes take account of risks to the economy, biodiversity, taonga, human health and lifestyle in setting priorities; and

10. Increase funding over the next five years for priority areas and build organisational capability across the system.

The Biosecurity Council recommends immediate implementation of these steps, in addition to identifying and plugging the most immediate gaps.

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Part III

The Biosecurity system

Effective biosecurity systems rely on information about pests, pathways and capabilities to manage the risks properly.

Risks

New Zealand is threatened by hundreds of thousands of exotic species that could cause harm. Some are well known with recognised impacts; others are not recognised as pests until their impact is discovered. For example, toxic algal blooms in shellfish are examples of native species causing adverse effects on human health.

Potential pests range from tiny microbes (such as the virus that causes Foot-and-Mouth disease), to plants and animals in aquatic and terrestrial environments. New Zealand’s pests nearly all originate from other countries.

New Zealand’s legacy of breaches, including many intentional introductions that became major pests, means we are stuck with expensive ongoing pest control to protect our forests, farms, waterways and coastal environments. Some pests establish quickly while others lie seemingly dormant for a period before spreading significantly; many plants and animals already here have yet to reach their full potential in terms of establishment, spread and impacts.

The sheer number of introduced species and the lag time between species naturalising then showing their full potential for damage means major pest management problems inevitably lie ahead. There are big information gaps. For example, a recent DoC study found 11 species of freshwater plants traded as ornamentals have serious weed potential – and were plants not even known to be present in New Zealand.

Our understanding of aquatic ecosystems and potential pest impacts is even more limited. Poor baseline information means it is often difficult to know whether a species is introduced or native. To address this information gap, MFish is undertaking baseline surveys.

Introduced pests are the biggest single threat to our native species and habitats; they also impact upon recreational, Maori, cultural and health values, plus agricultural production and hydroelectric power.

DC6 aerial spraying
DC6 aerial spraying at dawn to eradicate the white-spotted tussock moth over Auckland ’s eastern suburbs in 1997

How do pests get here?

A large number of species were deliberately introduced during early European settlement of New Zealand. Some rapidly became pests due to favourable conditions or lack of predators and diseases. Many pest plants started off as ornamental plants (wild ginger, for example).

Nowadays strict controls apply to deliberate (legitimate) new introductions so they are unlikely to become pests. The greatest risk now comes from accidental introductions, smuggling of organisms or contaminated goods.

Potential pests can enter New Zealand through many different pathways; as hitchhikers carried by another plant or animal, or inanimate objects such as a backpacker’s tent. Some pathways are targeted very strongly; others less so, for reasons including feasibility, efficiency, and estimates of risk. Although much is known about the pathways through which pests and diseases enter and move about, more scientific research is needed to identify better tools for blocking pathways and detecting pests.

MFish has identified over 20 marine risk pathways, some representing significant risk (ballast water, hull fouling, aquarium trade, aquaculture equipment, live bait for fishing and fish food for aquaculture).

Managing Pathways

Pathways are difficult to manage, as they cut across the various intervention points (pre-border, border, etc). Any one of these pathways can introduce a wide range of pests unless effectively managed. For example, the sea containers pathway has recently been reviewed - pests can be found in the contents, any packaging material, or contaminating the container itself.

Major pathways include:

  • Imported goods
  • Ships and aircraft
  • Ships' ballast water
  • Vessel hull fouling
  • Shipping containers
  • Used vehicles &machinery
  • Passengers' effects
  • Mail & courier packs
  • Smuggling (such as parrots or seeds)
  • Wind & ocean currents

The number of containers arriving in New Zealand has increased by approximately 50% over the past five years, from an increasing range of countries with varying interests in maintaining biosecurity. Potential threats include:

  • Packaging material harbouring wood-boring insects could impact on our forests and cause significant damage to wooden buildings;
  • Pooled water harbouring mosquito larvae could carry serious human diseases; and
  • Contamination of containers with seeds; plant material; insects, spiders and even snakes.

In addition, the products in the containers may be risk goods such as fruit or meat, which can be hosts for a range of pests. It is impractical to check all containers at the wharf; many are transported inland for miles before being unloaded without supervision and many containers are judged low risk – this must be taken into account when managing this pathway.

Mitigating risk

Biosecurity is about mitigating risk, which is done at different points - before the border, at the border or post-border (including pest management). Generally, the cost of mitigation increases as pests move across the border and become established; hence the significant focus on prevention and early detection and eradication (if possible).

Impact of Foot-and-Mouth disease7

Impact of FMD
Stock Image Group
Scenes like this became common in the British countryside two years ago – we don’t want them here. Foot-and-Mouth disease is caused by a virus – it’s one of the biggest biosecurity threat faced by New Zealand. It entered Britain as a result of failed border controls.

Foot-and-Mouth disease is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals; although not very lethal in adult animals it causes serious production losses and devastates trade because no one wants produce from an infected country.

The virus can travel long distances by wind. Animals can be infected through inhalation of virus aerosols, ingestion and through reproduction. The disease is mostly spread through the movement of infected animals; other sources of infection include contaminated vehicles, equipment, people and products.

The virus survives in frozen lymph nodes, bone marrow and viscera, also in salted and cured meats, and in non-pasteurised dairy products. The virus can survive for long periods in fresh, partially cooked, cured and smoked meats.

This hypothetical scenario assumes a Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak initially occurring in pigs (through waste food) then spreading to sheep or cattle. The outbreak is contained within the North Island, allowing trade from the South Island to resume earlier:

  • Dairy exports would face bans from trading partners for perhaps six weeks. Storage restraints would mean some produce was lost permanently, and some trade partners may be slow to resume importing New Zealand dairy products.
  • Meat exports would be affected for longer, possibly up to one year, and export prices would be significantly hit. New Zealand has the capacity to store about one month’s production of meat, so any further production would be lost; much would depend on the season of the outbreak.
  • It could take at least 4 – 5 weeks to get vaccines produced and back to New Zealand.
  • Two-thirds of our export trade would be at risk for at least 4 – 5 months, possibly longer. Export prices of meat would have a long-lasting decline, as loss of reputation would hit the premium currently enjoyed by New Zealand lamb and beef products. Prices wouldn’t return to normal for about four years.
  • Real GDP would be reduced by 4% (relative to its potential) in the first three months of the outbreak. The cumulative loss in nominal GDP would be around $6billion after one year; around $10billion after two years. The loss would continue to increase because potential output would be lowered, and would be exacerbated by slumps in domestic demand for meat and the negative reaction of trading partners.
  • While it is not possible to forecast the effect on exchange rates for this exercise, it was assumed the $NZ would drop initially by about 20% in the first three months, and the recovery of the exchange rate would take around 2½ years.
  • The Government would spend $200million on controlling the outbreak and compensating farmers for animals slaughtered.
  • There would be a significant drop in tourism; in the United Kingdom, the impact on tourism was 10 times greater than on the primary production sector.
  • Unemployment would rise by 1%; 15,000 – 20,000 jobs would be lost although the impact would be greater in vulnerable sectors (and could last longer).
  • Foreign investors would be increasingly reluctant to expose themselves to the New Zealand market and additional overseas borrowing of $8billion would be necessary.
  • Business confidence would plummet temporarily, which would reduce investment; this would mean a permanent decline in the stock of productive capital and the long-term potential output of the economy.
  • Household wealth would be reduced, as would the Government’s tax revenue.

Changing behaviours

Individuals have always played a significant role in New Zealand’s biosecurity – they are responsible for about 40% of our pest management. Alert members of the public have detected many of New Zealand’s biosecurity incursions – including the Painted Apple Moth, Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito, Australian banjo frog, termites, snakes seaweed and fish – providing a crucial, but largely unsupported link in the monitoring of pathways. In addition, people are themselves a significant pathway.

Carrots & sticks

Approximately 25,000 undeclared seizures are made annually at airports, equating to around 500 undeclared seizures each week. The use of heavy fines, supported by public information, sends a strong signal that deliberate or careless flouting of biosecurity rules will not be tolerated. Instant $200 fines were introduced in 2001 for inbound travellers making incorrect biosecurity declarations. An unexpectedly low enforcement rate was attributed to the large number of passengers whose English was inadequate – this language barrier is the most pressing issue.

Airport quarantine seizures -2001/02

  • 8.0 tonnes of meat products
  • 15.9 tonnes of fruit
  • 2.6 tonnes of seeds
  • 3.2 tonnes of dairy products
  • 3.2 tonnes of fish products
  • 5,800 live plants or bulbs 

In 2001/02 there were 219 seizures of live animals, including turtles & live eggs. 28% of the meat & poultry products seized were undeclared, the majority from countries with FMD.

Getting the public to listen

‘Protect New Zealand’ was a two-year $3million campaign, launched in 2000, specifically to educate people about their biosecurity responsibilities in light of the European Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak. Its success highlights the justification for an on-going programme. But it is impossible to run an effective campaign on the current funding of $300,000 per year.

The ‘Protect New Zealand’ team initiated the television series "Border Patrol", now one of the most popular programmes screened8. Since the campaign started, New Zealanders have become more aware of what biosecurity involves (including the risks and consequences) and their personal responsibilities. It is hard to know how much of this improvement can be directly attributed to the campaign because of other factors (for example, the Genetic Engineering debate before the 2002 election and the outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth disease in the United Kingdom).

Individual responsibility and contributions remain vital if we are to continue succeeding. This strategy aims to create a framework that actively encourages private individuals to play their part. This will become even more important as risk grows with increasing trade and climate change.

Public support

Biosecurity is one of the most critical issues in the shaping of our country’s future well-being, so the need for public support cannot be underestimated. The biosecurity agencies will operate more effectively if people support their goals (possibly through incentives, for example to encourage public interest in community surveillance). The long-term implications of biosecurity’s social marketing should be considered on a par with other public education campaigns – drinking and driving, anti-smoking and Accident Compensation.

New Zealand needs to fund research to learn how to make the public listen, get the right programmes operating, and measure the impacts. It needs major funding. The aim is not to make the biosecurity agencies look good, but to increase public cooperation. It is imperative people understand the significance of our stringent quarantine regulations, so everyone can play their part in protecting New Zealand from the unwelcome arrival of pests, weeds and diseases.

Campaign snapshot

Passengers from the Pacific Islands frequently carry:

  • Fresh fruit and vegetables;
  • Meat and fish;
  • Traditional herbal medicines; and
  • Plants and goods made from plant materials.

MAF’s quarantine service had difficulty in getting its message across to people in the Pacific Islands. Initial attempts included using the local quarantine services (unsuccessful), multi-language in-flight videotapes, multi-language arrival declarations into New Zealand and the very successful multi-language ‘Declare it for New Zealand’’ pamphlets. Meetings were held with the Pacific Island church leaders and quarantine staff participated on an Auckland radio station popular with Pacific Island peoples. Then MAF’s ‘Protect New Zealand’’ campaign, launched in September 2000, specifically targeted Cook Islanders, Fijians, Tongans and Samoans living in or visiting New Zealand.

Since June 2001, the percentage of undeclared seizures from the Pacific has dropped. Although Pacific Island peoples continue to bring in a lot of food products, much is now covered by phytosanitary certificates and their compliance is now better than average.

The illegal introduction of the varroa bee mite illustrates the problem of people breaking the very rules designed to protect them; at the same time it illustrates what happens when there’s no post-entry quarantine system in New Zealand.

A beekeeper smuggling queen bees (to enhance a hive’s breeding population) probably imported the varroa mite inadvertently. It only lives for two hours outside its host so must have arrived here on a live bee.

If that’s the case, it was a hugely irresponsible and criminal act by someone who should have known better.

To date the incursion has cost the Government $12million but the ultimate cost could be hundreds of millions of dollars in lost pastoral production.

Camping equipment
Camping equipment is a pathway for insects,weed seeds,disease and fungal spores.That ’s why it must be cleaned before being brought into New Zealand.

Expectations - Changing behaviours

29. That all New Zealanders,and our visitors,are encouraged to support and participate in our biosecurity

Pre-border activities

New Zealand takes a leading role (disproportionate to its relative size) in international organisations working to reduce the risk of importing - or exporting - pests and diseases.

Participating countries are required to notify significant changes in the occurrence or distribution of pests and diseases, including major diseases of wildlife. For example, an outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth disease in one country will usually result in immediate suspension of some trade and rapid and significant changes in the processing of the movement of goods and people by other countries. This type of information allows New Zealand to adjust its pre-border and border controls rapidly.

New Zealand has an obligation to meet its international commitments under multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea that include specific provisions for protection, eradication or management of pest species.

Countries are also expected to prevent aircraft spreading mosquitoes and other pests. New Zealand is also working towards the adoption of international controls on ballast water to reduce the risk of transferring marine species between countries.

New Zealand is also working with small Pacific nations to help them manage biosecurity risks to our mutual benefit.

There are still few international agreements to notify trading partners about environmental pests (such as ants, snakes or highly invasive weeds). A number of informal networks are emerging through organisations such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). New Zealand has been successful in getting the International Plant Protection Convention to start addressing highly invasive weeds.

Pre-border standards promulgated through IHS are the second level of protection from offshore risks; examples include heat treatment of imported foods, disease testing of animals and inspection of used vehicles before shipment. They were established to reduce the risk of harmful species entering the country in traded goods, initially to protect our primary industries from risks associated with the importation of plants and animals and goods such as used cars, old packaging materials or sports and camping equipment which may be carrying living hitchhiker organisms.

IHS have had a strong terrestrial and primary production focus, so have not worked well for aquatic and environmental pests, and they are of limited use with unidentified pests. New approaches may be needed to help address these shortcomings although newer IHS are more balanced.

The IHS process has become increasingly rigorous over the past decade. During their development, extensive consultation is conducted to ensure all risks are identified and covered by pre-entry measures such as testing, inspection, treatment or quarantine. Sometimes additional post-border conditions are imposed, to provide further safeguards.

The IHS procedures are under stress; indeed MAF is unable to provide information on the total number as there is no consistent definition across the agency. Many of the earlier standards need to be reviewed to ensure consistency with more recent ones. MAF states there is a very large backlog of unfinished IHS. Alternative approaches are being studied to hasten the process and meet New Zealand’s trade obligations without increasing biosecurity risks.

Finally there is the requirement for ERMA to take a precautionary approach before approving the importation of any new organism.

Expectations - Pre-border

30. That there is a continuous, targeted programme to move risk reduction measures offshore;

31. That all relevant pre-border regulations and standards are in place - robust, consistent and subject to appropriate review processes;

32. That New Zealand is using wider international - multilateral or bilateral - arrangements to reduce potential threats to indigenous biodiversity;

33. That New Zealand is benefiting from and contributing to international standards to protect production and trade;

34. That New Zealand’s coastal waters are protected from threats carried in ballast water or on fouled hulls; and

35. That New Zealand is helping Pacific countries reduce biosecurity threats to the region.

Borders – marine & terrestrial

Our biosecurity strategy must strike a balance reflecting New Zealand's overall national interests. Our continuing economic well-being depends on our participation in the global economy - trade in goods and services represents significantly more than half of New Zealand's GDP; for example, more than 90% of our dairy and meat production is exported. We trade with more than 200 countries and our long-term economic prosperity depends on access to open global markets, particularly as primary produce exports are particularly vulnerable to unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions.

The global economy is also an essential source of imports for New Zealand, which is necessary to meet New Zealanders' consumer demands. As a nation that wants to survive and prosper, we want world-class imports of quality and at the best prices. So, as a trading nation, New Zealand cannot expect other nations to accept our exports if we are not prepared to apply comparable objective scientific criteria to our imports.

  • The wider importance of such objective criteria is illustrated by the recent World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruling on Japan's quarantine measures against fireblight in apples, which has been a long-running obstacle for New Zealand's horticulture exporters. The WTO ruled in July that scientific evidence did not support Japan's restrictions, which were inconsistent with its international obligations.
  • The current review of our IHS must be demonstrably responsive to legitimate demands from our trading partners for access to the New Zealand market.

Borders - marine & terrestrial

Leakage through borders is inevitable, particularly with increasing globalisation, as sealing of the border is impossible. Aside from the risks presented by trade and tourism, new pests and diseases arriving through wind dispersal pose a constant threat.

Border activity is targeted at ensuring risk goods comply with the requirements of IHS, and preventing the entry of exotic organisms that may imperil agriculture (for example, fruit fly), health (for example, mosquitoes), freshwater ecosystems (for example, piranha) or our indigenous flora and fauna (for example, exotic ants).

Borders have become more diffuse and are no longer only at the point of entry. Containers offloaded at ports may be opened and inspected at hundreds of regional and rural sites around the country. Suitable responses must be considered carefully, such as targeting surveillance activities around sites where containers are opened.

Marine borders are hard to manage, as there is no single physical point of arrival. For example, organisms living on a vessel's hull ('hull fouling') can be reproducing and infecting New Zealand's coastal zone while arriving at port, then continue to infect any area the vessel visits after border clearance.

Growth in border risks

Over the past five years, air passengers and crew arrivals have increased by 40%, container arrivals by 47% and used vehicle imports by 54%. Cruise ship passengers have increased by more than 250%. International mail parcels have increased by 32%, and small parcels shipped with courier companies are a new source of risk. The sources of risk material have also increased, particularly with the growth of Internet mail order as marine organisms are readily available (for example, Caulerpa taxifolia9) - exotic species from such sources have been found in New Zealand.

The risk exposure at Auckland airport was more than halved by the introduction of x-ray machines and detector dogs in 1997, then nearly halved again by the introduction in 2001 of 100% x-raying or searching of baggage.

Similarly, marine border risks have increased substantially. Ballast water volumes have risen nearly 20% per annum and recreational craft visits increased in 2003 due to the America’s Cup. The ballast water of one vessel typically carries over 300 species, of which over 50 are environmental, economic or societal pests in some location around the globe. Their potential impact is significant – about 10 large ships enter New Zealand ports daily. Similarly, one merchant vessel can transport over 100 species through hull fouling.

In 2002, there were over 3,300 international vessel visits – 2,581 merchant vessels, 794 pleasure craft, 34 passenger ships, and 12 barges/tugs. Although each category presents a different hull fouling risk, only merchant vessels and tug/barges additionally present a ballast water risk. Merchant vessels are estimated to have discharged over 3.9million tonnes of ballast water in New Zealand ports in 2002.

Border activities undertaken

New Zealand undertakes a wide range of activities to prevent the introduction of exotic organisms, based around the major entry points for cargo, passengers and mail:

  • X-ray machines and detector dogs were introduced at international airports six years ago in response to the Mt Roskill outbreak of Mediterranean fruit fly;then all luggage was x-rayed and opened following the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom.
  • Instant fines for passengers failing to declare risk goods were introduced in June 2001; more than 9,000 fines were issued in the year ending March 31,2003.
  • The fines,coupled with the 'Protect New Zealand' awareness programme,,appear to have increased compliance at airports.
  • Baggage is periodically searched at the airport,after it has been passed by the airport x-ray machines,in order to validate inspection systems and measure their sensitivity.
  • Cargo clearance occurs at the major international ports and airports to ensure all risk goods conform to import requirements.
  • Manifests for sea containers are screened and risk cargo is processed according to relevant IHS. 24% of containers are sampled to ensure the validity of the cleaning certificate and the absence of exotic species. Non-conforming containers are sent for cleaning or fumigation.
  • X-ray machines, backed up by detector dogs, have screened most international mail since September 1998. Since then,mail seizures have increased by 160%, despite parcel numbers increasing by only 32%.
  • All imported machinery and used cars are now inspected for contamination and hitchhiking pests.
  • Every vessel visiting New Zealand is required to exchange its ballast water before entering our economic zone. MAF inspectors,on behalf of MFish, check the information during their initial boarding procedures, before allowing the vessel to discharge ballast in New Zealand waters. On average,one vessel every six months is refused permission to discharge its ballast.

In the year ending in March 2003, MAF:

  • Checked the luggage of more than 3.7million air passengers and crew;
  • Cleared over 450,000 sea containers;
  • Inspected over 150,000 used imported vehicles;
  • X-rayed over 49 million mail items;
  • Cleared 3,400 international vessels; and
  • Checked over 60,000 consignments of imported risk cargo.

Approximately 139,000 seizures were made from air passengers and mail, including 17 tonnes of fruit fly host material and 8 tonnes of meat (which can host FMD).

Smuggling of risky foods, plants and animals is a serious biosecurity problem. There are regular border interceptions of seeds, plants and birds' eggs that people are trying to bring in illegally.

Serious diseases probably caused by smuggling over the last few years include RCD, varroa in bees and parrot pox. Smuggled grape rootstock, which could cause severe harm to our wine industry, has also been intercepted.

Some people allege this irresponsible and criminal behaviour is encouraged by the lack of post entry ('third level') quarantine facilities – lack of legitimate ways to import bees, parrots and plants means people are tempted to smuggle them, posing a huge biosecurity risk to New Zealand.

MAF assesses the risk of all uncleared goods (based on the item, country of origin, associated potential pests and diseases, degree of processing and end use).

Lack of marine capacity

New Zealand’s marine border controls have been unable to meet the increase in risk. This failure can be attributed to:

  1. A lack of capacity which has forced a triage approach – systems are only treated if an impact is highly likely;
  2. A lack of explicit inter-agency arrangements for comprehensive border management; and
  3. A significant lack of management tools for key pathways (for example, hull fouling).

Pacific oyster
NZ Seafood Council
The Pacific oyster (Crassotrea gigas) may be our best-known marine hitchhiker. It’s believed to have travelled to New Zealand from Hiroshima about 25 years ago, tagging along on the extensions to the Auckland Harbour Bridge (the Nippon Clip-On). It didn’t take long for it to naturalize; now it’s the dominant cultivated oyster in New Zealand.

Continuing progress

Marine biosecurity is in its infancy globally. Although pathways for marine risks have been identified, many are not yet being effectively monitored. It is imperative to improve their management. New Zealand must quickly develop and fund a comprehensive marine biosecurity programme.

Border risk mitigation activities are,however, monitored regularly. For example, the recent review of sea containers, which recommends trained and accredited industry personnel be made responsible for examining all containers (internally and externally) for contaminants - including live organisms - in the approved container inspection ('de-vanning') sites around New Zealand.

Capacity is gradually being added to monitor other pathways, to reduce risk to a manageable level through post-border activities, such as surveillance and response. In addition, the cost and impact of mitigation activities will be determined so scarce resources can be allocated efficiently, achieving the best border protection possible with the funds available.

Biosecurity arrangements are being improved continuously:

  • International standards for the standardisation and transfer of x-ray records will increase the efficiency of scanning luggage. A trial using pre-departure baggage x-rays is planned for early 2004, although full implementation may be 3 -7 years away;
  • Implementation of the new sea container clearance processes should commence in September 2003, rolling out progressively over 12 months; and
  • Certifying of private sector operators at de-vanning sites.

The economic opportunity costs of getting it wrong are enormous, as flow of trade must continue if New Zealand is to prosper. Similarly, it is imperative cost effectiveness – the fine balance between compliance costs and lost opportunities – remains a vital consideration.

It is important to educate biosecurity’s front line by working with industry organisations (such as the Freight Forwarders’ Association) to maintain vigilance about the pests that may be on their way to New Zealand.

Expectations - Borders

36. That clear and transparent measurements of risk mitigation are providing appropriate information about residual risk or ‘leakage’ across the border;

37. That all significant hitchhiker pathways are covered where possible;

38. That all significant pathways are covered;

39. That border compliance is managed cost-effectively;

40. That effective post-entry quarantine facilities are available where appropriate; and

41. That all high-risk entry points for the marine environment are evaluated, with risk mitigation measures in place.

Potential Impact of the Northern Pacific Seastar10

Norther Pacific Seastar
Photo by Jan Haaga, Kodak Laboratory Alaska, AFSC, NMFS, NOAA, US Department of Commerce

  • The Northern Pacific Seastar (Asterias amurensis) is