Strategy Vision Framework

Background paper for Stakeholder Working Groups

Biosecurity Strategy Development Team - April 2001

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

1.1 The Biosecurity Vision

Over the next two years the Government will work in partnership with stakeholders and the community to develop a comprehensive Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand. All those with an interest in protecting New Zealand’s unique biodiversity are called on to participate in the creation of New Zealand’s ‘biosecurity vision’, and the development of goals, objectives and measurable targets that will support it.

The Biosecurity Strategy will set an overall strategic direction for biosecurity in New Zealand, and identify general areas of priority. It will be developed with a clear focus on the future, and participants in the process are encouraged to set aside current debates on specific and topical issues. The strategy will take account of Maori, environmental, primary production, public health, science, and trade and travel sector interests. It will apply to terrestrial, marine, and freshwater environments. It will link where appropriate with the concurrent reviews of New Zealand’s oceans policies and border management systems, both of which have biosecurity components. Once completed, the strategy will provide guidance to all involved in biosecurity as well as raising general biosecurity awareness.

1.2 The Purpose of This Paper

The strategy development process will commence with stakeholder working groups and interested government agencies identifying important biosecurity issues. This paper is designed to help with the issues identification process.

Section 2 of the paper provides an outline of New Zealand’s current biosecurity structures, and an overview of current biosecurity programmes. Section 3 describes the inter-relationships between biosecurity and the wider environment. Section 4 identifies the key outcomes sought by the Government from the Biosecurity Strategy, and poses a series of questions on specific matters the Government would like considered.

For each issue identified, stakeholder working groups and government agencies are encouraged to:

  • provide background contextual information,
  • discuss why the issue is important,
  • accord a relative level of priority,
  • suggest options for resolution,
  • indicate any implications of action or inaction.

Interested parties should remember that the identification of issues is only the first step in the strategy development process. Opportunities for participation will be ongoing, and the strategy development team is willing to discuss issues or concerns directly with interested groups or individuals at any time.

1.3 Why We Need a Biosecurity Strategy

As a small island nation geographically isolated from the rest of the world, New Zealand is well placed to protect itself from the many pests, weeds and diseases that could harm its indigenous biota and primary production systems. The protection of New Zealand’s economy, environment and people’s health from harmful organisms is known as ‘biosecurity’. Biosecurity involves preventing the introduction of harmful new organisms, and eradicating or controlling those unwanted organisms that are already present.

Biosecurity is not new to New Zealand - in fact New Zealand has managed biosecurity risks for many decades. However, liberalisation in the international trading environment, the increasing number of people travelling between countries, and changing environmental and climatic conditions have placed greater pressure on our biosecurity systems. The scope of the biosecurity programme is also expanding rapidly from its traditional focus on primary production, to include human health, and indigenous land, freshwater and marine ecosystems.

Over recent times there has been increasing public and industry concern that New Zealand’s level of biosecurity protection is lagging behind the growth in trade and travel risks. Concerns have also been expressed that our biosecurity systems are not as efficient and targeted as they could be. Although New Zealand is widely acknowledged as a world leader in biosecurity, the number of recent high-profile incursions indicates that our biosecurity systems are indeed under pressure. Recent incursions include the saltmarsh mosquito, varroa bee mite, painted apple moth, frogs and scorpions.

1.4 The Strategy Development Process

In developing a Biosecurity Strategy the Government is seeking to achieve a number of outcomes. It has detailed these, along with some specific matters it would like considered, in terms of reference for the project approved by the Cabinet. The Biosecurity Council will co-ordinate the strategy’s development, and a strategy development team has been appointed by the Council to manage the development process.

The issues identified by stakeholder working groups and government agencies will form the basis of an ‘issues paper’ for public consultation during October to December 2001. A draft strategy will be prepared based on the results of this consultation, and a second round of public consultation carried out during May to July 2002. Both consultation rounds will involve national workshops and hui. A final strategy will be presented to the Biosecurity Council and the Cabinet for approval in August/September 2002. The strategy will be published and launched in December 2002, in time for implementation from 2003.

The strategy development team will ensure that the process is managed in an open and inclusive way, with input actively sought from all stakeholders and the general public. It is hoped that this ‘partnership approach’ will encourage all parties to contribute from the outset, maximising the potential for agreement and commitment to the final outcome.

2. The Biosecurity Programme

2.1 Participants in the Biosecurity Programme

In 1999, the New Zealand Conservation Authority estimated the annual cost to New Zealand of pests and weeds, in terms of lost production and direct management costs, is more than $840 million1. This is around one percent of gross domestic product. Central government, local government, industries and private individuals are all involved in managing pests and weeds problems.

2.1.1 Central Government

Central government biosecurity structures have evolved over time in line with changing biosecurity pressures and priorities. There are currently four government departments with biosecurity programmes authorised by the Biosecurity Act 1993: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF), Ministry of Fisheries (MFish), Ministry of Health (MoH), and the Department of Conservation (DOC). Other departments such as the Ministry for the Environment (MfE) and the Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) contribute directly to the development of biosecurity policy. In an aligned area, the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) controls the intentional importation of new organisms into New Zealand under the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO).

MAF is the largest biosecurity department, and receives over 90% of Crown biosecurity funding. It has responsibility for maintaining animal, plant and forest health. As well as administering the Biosecurity Act, MAF generally leads the development of biosecurity policy, and co-ordinates the implementation of Government’s biosecurity programmes. In 1999, the Government established a Biosecurity Authority within MAF with a mission to “protect New Zealand’s unique biodiversity, and facilitate exports, by managing risks to plant and animal health and welfare”. MAF’s Quarantine Service provides border clearance services under the Biosecurity Act on behalf of all biosecurity departments.

DOC, MFish, and MoH have specific biosecurity responsibilities in relation to their own sectors. DOC advises the Minister for Biosecurity on biosecurity risks to indigenous flora and fauna, MFish is responsible for managing biosecurity risks to the marine environment, and MoH focuses on unwanted organisms of public health significance.

ERMA’s activities under HSNO complement those of the biosecurity departments. Together, the Biosecurity Act and HSNO regimes provide for the comprehensive management of risks associated with the introduction of new organisms. ERMA and biosecurity departments work together closely to ensure risks are managed consistently and to acceptable levels.

The following table provides a summary of central government biosecurity-related expenditure for the 2000/01 year.

Agency $ million (incl. GST) Notes
     
MAF 97.640 includes $22.800 million for the Crown’s contribution to the Animal Health Board’s bovine tuberculosis pest management strategy
DOC 3.473 does not include funding for pest and weed management on the conservation estate, which is funded through Vote Conservation
MFish 2.196  
MoH 0.149 in addition, some health-related biosecurity functions are delivered through Vote Health
ERMA 4.750 funded through Vote: Environment

2.1.2 Local Government

Local government’s primary biosecurity interest relates to the management of endemic pests. Regional councils generally take control over the management of a pest once it is considered to be of ‘regional’ rather than ‘national’ significance. Regional councils can access regulatory powers in the Biosecurity Act by developing pest management strategies 2 (PMSs) or undertaking small scale management programmes. PMSs prescribe responsibilities, procedures and funding arrangements to be followed for specified organisms, and most regional councils have regional PMSs (RPMS) in place for pests of significance within their region. Small scale management programmes are available where eradication or control of an unwanted organism can be achieved within 3 years and at a cost of less than $100,000.

There are no collated figures for local government expenditure on biosecurity. However, the New Zealand Conservation Authority has indicated that, in 1998, Regional Councils spent approximately $24 million on animal and plant pest management3.

2.1.3 Industries

Many industries take direct responsibility for managing organisms harmful to their interests. Industries can access regulatory powers for pest management via the Biosecurity Act’s PMS provisions. Two industry national PMSs (NPMS) are currently in operation – the Animal Health Board’s strategy for bovine tuberculosis, and the National Beekeepers’ Association strategy for American foulbrood. ENZA New Zealand International also has a RPMS in place for the management of fire blight in the Nelson region.

In addition to these formal PMSs, several industries have put in place voluntary pest management arrangements. Examples include the Equine Health Association’s programme for managing equine viral arteritis, and forest owner-funded forest health surveillance of 1.6 million hectares of plantation forest.

2.1.4 Private individuals

Numerous individuals in New Zealand expend considerable effort in controlling pests and weeds on private land. Most private pest control is carried out to protect assets that are yielding a financial return, but some is carried out by individuals or groups with an interest in maintaining biodiversity. Examples of pests and weeds commonly managed by private individuals include possums, rabbits and gorse.

2.2 Biosecurity Co-ordination

The diversity of New Zealand’s biosecurity programme has led to the establishment of several co-ordination mechanisms. The following outlines the main groups and their sphere of interest.

The Biosecurity Council was established in 1997, and is advisory to the Minister for Biosecurity. Its primary functions are to ensure that New Zealand’s biosecurity programme is well co-ordinated, and that the Minister is provided with consistent and robust advice. The Council comprises the Chief Executives of MAF, MoH, MFish, DOC, MoRST, MfE, ERMA and Te Puni Kokiri (TPK). Membership also includes a representative from regional councils, the environmental sector, the primary production sector, and the Group Director of MAF’s Biosecurity Authority. The Council meets four times each year, and has an independent chair. Two forums have been established to advise the Biosecurity Council. A Biosecurity Technical Forum provides technical and policy advice from the agencies represented on the Council, and a Biosecurity Consultative Forum provides advice from external stakeholders.

The Pest Management Strategy Advisory Committee (PMSAC) also advises the Minister for Biosecurity, and was established at the same time as the Biosecurity Council. The purpose of PMSAC is to ensure consistency in the development and resourcing of pest management strategies. Membership includes six representatives from regional councils (one of whom chairs the committee), representatives of national pest management strategy proponent groups, and a representative from DOC. The committee meets about six monthly.

While regional biosecurity programmes are designed to meet the specific needs of individual regions, regional councils have developed their own co-ordinating mechanisms to share expertise and ensure consistency in approach. Regional biosecurity managers meet regularly through the Biosecurity Managers Forum, which develops overarching policy and guidelines for regional pest management. Regional pest management operators co-ordinate their activities through the Biosecurity Institute.

2.3 The Components of Biosecurity

When people think of biosecurity, they often focus on measures applied at the border. However, New Zealand’s biosecurity programme extends well beyond the border, involving a combination of pre-border, border, and post-border components. The following sections provide an overview of the activities involved in each stage of the biosecurity process.

2.3.1 Pre-border measures

The objective of pre-border measures is to reduce the risk of harmful organisms entering New Zealand by managing biosecurity risks offshore.

At a strategic level, New Zealand contributes to the development of multilateral and bilateral international agreements covering trade and environmental issues. This includes negotiating arrangements with trading partners covering market access for our exports, and the management of risks to New Zealand posed by imports and ship-borne organisms. New Zealand maintains close relationships and shares intelligence with other countries interested in biosecurity.

At an operational level, risks associated with accidental or illegal importation of new organisms are managed under the Biosecurity Act, and risks associated with the intentional importation of new organisms, including genetically modified organisms, are managed under the HSNO Act. Officials with statutory appointments (not politicians) are responsible for risk management decision making.

Under the Biosecurity Act, import health standards (IHS) issued by the Director-General of MAF on the recommendation of a Chief Technical Officer (CTO) specify the conditions under which risk goods may enter New Zealand. Such conditions can include the requirement that an exporting country certify goods as free of unwanted organisms prior to export to New Zealand. An IHS is based on scientific risk analysis, and CTOs have a legal obligation to consult interested parties. Under HSNO, ERMA makes decisions on applications in consultation with interested parties and in accordance with detailed criteria. These criteria include requirements to assess the risks, costs and benefits in each case.

2.3.2 Border measures

The objective of border measures is to reduce the risk of harmful organisms entering New Zealand by managing biosecurity risks at the border.

MAF’s Quarantine Service provides operational border clearance services on behalf of all biosecurity departments. All passengers, baggage, cargo, mail and craft entering New Zealand must do so at places approved as ‘ports of first arrival’ under the Biosecurity Act. These include sea ports, airports, and the international mail centre. Clearance can be given at the port, or alternatively risk goods or organisms may be directed to a transitional or containment facility for later action. MAF may direct that risk goods or organisms be held in transitional facilities until biosecurity concerns have been addressed. ERMA may require that new organisms be held in a containment facility until HSNO concerns have been addressed. Transitional and containment facilities are approved under the Biosecurity Act, and standards are set jointly by ERMA and MAF.

In response to increasing passenger and cargo volumes, MAF Quarantine Service has introduced new inspection techniques over recent years. As well as physical inspections, the service utilises intelligence-based risk profiling, x-ray machines that detect organic material, and quarantine detector dogs.

2.3.3 Post-border surveillance

It is not possible to intercept all harmful organisms at the border. The objectives of post-border surveillance are to facilitate the early detection and eradication of incursions, to enable New Zealand to demonstrate freedom from certain organisms to trading partners, and to provide background information on New Zealand’s pest status for use in developing IHSs. Surveillance is also used to track the movement of harmful organisms within New Zealand, and to identify potential habitat for exotic species with similar habitat needs to endemic species. Surveys of the geographical distribution of newly recorded organisms provide the basis for determining the appropriate response.

The Crown and regional councils fund active and passive surveillance programmes in a number of sectors and regions, and in many cases these are complemented by industry surveillance. Concerns have been expressed that New Zealand is under-investing in surveillance, particularly in the marine environment. It is difficult, however, to determine how much surveillance is appropriate and where it should be targeted. A full review of New Zealand’s biosecurity surveillance requirements is planned during 2001/02 to inform the Biosecurity Strategy development process.

2.3.4 Incursion response capability

The objective of this aspect of the biosecurity programme is to ensure that New Zealand has a trained capability and policies for immediately responding to incursions of new organisms.

MAF maintains standards, procedures and service arrangements to ensure a capability to investigate and respond to all suspected incursions of exotic organisms affecting animals, plants and trees. This capability is also utilised for initial responses to organisms affecting conservation and freshwater environments. MoH maintains a response capability for organisms affecting human health through agreements with public health services and other science and service providers. MFish is developing a response capability for organisms that may affect the marine environment.

2.3.5 Incursion response

The objectives of incursion responses differ for each response. Options include eradication, containment, and long-term control.

Approximately 50 new incursions of unwanted organisms are discovered within New Zealand each year, and this number is rising. The Biosecurity Act does not require the Government or any other agency to respond to an incursion, however a number of response options are available. No pest management strategies are currently in place for exotic organisms that have yet to establish in New Zealand, and no funding is appropriated to government departments for the actual cost of responding to new incursions. The Government therefore considers responses to new incursions on a case by case basis. Decisions are based on technical assessments (such as the extent of the infestation and feasibility of eradication) and analyses of the costs and benefits of various response options. Where benefits outweigh costs, eradication is the preferred response. Affected parties are consulted as part of the decision-making process.

Where powers in the Biosecurity Act are exercised for the purpose of managing or eradicating an organism, and this results in verifiable losses, full compensation is payable under the Act. An example of this would be the destruction of livestock as part of an exotic disease response. Compensation is not payable, however, for losses caused directly by an organism (for example damage caused by termites to the interior of a house).

2.3.6 Endemic pest management

The objective of this component of the biosecurity programme is to ensure the appropriate management of organisms that become endemic in New Zealand.

Options for managing endemic pests include control measures to delay the organism’s spread, ongoing management to mitigate harmful effects, and research into biological control measures. Decisions on long-term management programmes are made on the basis of technical assessments and cost-benefit analysis. The Biosecurity Act provides a number of pest management options, ranging from direct use of the Act’s powers by government departments, through to the development of national and regional pest management strategies.

A national pest management strategy (NPMS) may be appropriate where effective action would be impracticable without a national approach. There are a number of statutory pre-requisites that must be met, including that the benefits of national intervention exceed the benefits of regional intervention.

Organisms that are endemic and widespread are generally managed on a regional basis. Most regional councils have developed regional pest management strategies (RPMS) for pests of significance within their region. There are currently 24 RPMSs in place, covering both animal and weed pests. Only two regional councils do not yet have a RPMS – the West Coast Regional Council and the Chatham Islands Council. The one RPMS not managed by a regional council relates to fire blight in the Nelson area, and this is managed by ENZA New Zealand International.

In addition to regulatory pest management under the Biosecurity Act, private individuals expend considerable effort in voluntarily controlling pests and weeds on their own land.

2.3.7 Education and enforcement

The objective of biosecurity education and enforcement is to maximise compliance with New Zealand’s biosecurity laws.

Education can increase public support for biosecurity initiatives, and for many years MAF has operated a quarantine awareness programme focussed on passengers at international airports. This programme is currently being extended into a comprehensive biosecurity awareness programme targeted at travellers, importers, primary industries and the general public. The new awareness campaign will represent all aspects of New Zealand’s biosecurity.

Enforcement measures provide added incentives to comply with biosecurity requirements. Both central and regional government agencies investigate and prosecute individuals and organisations that breach biosecurity regulations. Persons committing an offence under the Biosecurity Act can face severe penalties. For some offences, individuals are liable to imprisonment for up to five years and/or a fine not exceeding $100,000. Corporations face fines not exceeding $200,000. Instant fines of $200 will soon be imposed where travellers make false declarations at the border.

3. The Wider Biosecurity Environment

The biosecurity programme impacts on or is influenced by a number of other sectors and interest areas. Some of these are described in the following sections. The Biosecurity Strategy will need to be integrated with each of these areas to ensure that New Zealand’s overall well-being remains the primary focus.

3.1 Agriculture & Forestry

New Zealand's temperate climate and fertile soil make it ideal for wide-ranging, land-based production. The agriculture and forestry sectors are two of the largest sectors in the New Zealand economy. Together, the sectors contributed 70 percent (NZ$17.3 billion) of New Zealand's merchandise trade in the year ended June 2000. Along with their support and processing components, the sectors currently contribute more than $20 billion per year, or about 20 percent of New Zealand's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The continued contribution of the agriculture and forestry sector to GDP relies in part on the health status of primary production systems. Newly introduced organisms may lead to reduced productivity, and the loss of export markets. MAF is responsible for managing biosecurity risks to the animal, plant and forestry sectors. MAF works closely with primary industries, many of which take direct responsibility for managing organisms harmful to their interests. More information is available at www.biosecurity.govt.nz (offsite link to www.biosecurity.govt.nz)

3.2 Customs / Immigration

The New Zealand Customs Service and the New Zealand Immigration Service are two of the Government’s border protection agencies. As such, they operate side by side at the border with MAF’s Quarantine Service. It is important for the efficient movement of people and goods that all three agencies work closely and co-operatively. As the result of an independent review of border control arrangements in 1999, the Government has directed MAF and Customs (the two primary agencies) to examine opportunities for streamlining passenger flows, eliminating process duplication, making better use of IT systems, and improving stakeholder involvement in decision making. The agencies are working closely with border stakeholders, and will produce a series of reports for Ministers during 2001. More information is available at www.customs.govt.nz (offsite link to www.customs.govt.nz) and www.immigration.govt.nz (offsite link to www.immigration.govt.nz)

3.3 Environment

New Zealand’s indigenous flora and fauna evolved in relative isolation, and are therefore particularly vulnerable to the impacts of introduced pests and weeds. DOC is responsible for advising the Minister for Biosecurity on biosecurity risks to indigenous flora and fauna. It contributes to the development of biosecurity policy, and ensures that biosecurity risks to indigenous flora and fauna are considered when biosecurity measures are designed. A significant proportion of DOC’s activities involves managing pests and weeds on the conservation estate.

MAF Biosecurity, reflecting its mission to protect New Zealand’s unique biodiversity, is building its capability for the protection of indigenous ecosystems. It has recently created a new position to manage responses to incursions of organisms that threaten biodiversity, and will shortly be establishing an indigenous biosecurity group to ensure overall risks to the environment are appropriately assessed and managed.

There are a number of international environmental agreements relevant to biosecurity. Two examples are the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Biosafety Protocol) which falls under the umbrella of the CBD. The CBD came into force in 1993. Its objectives are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the sharing of benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy, through which the development of the Biosecurity Strategy is being funded, was created in part to fulfil New Zealand’s commitments under this legally binding agreement. The Biosafety Protocol was agreed in 2000, and will come into force once 50 countries have ratified it (only Bulgaria and Trinidad & Tobago have ratified to date). The protocol addresses the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (similar to genetically modified organisms) that may have an effect on biodiversity.

More information is available at www.doc.govt.nz (offsite link to www.doc.govt.nz) and www.biosecurity.govt.nz (offsite link to www.biosecurity.govt.nz)

3.4 Maori

The New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy notes that Maori have a holistic view of the environment. All components of ecosystems, both living and non-living, possess spiritual qualities. Maori are guardians of these ecosystems and have a responsibility to protect them. Because people are intrinsically linked with the natural world, the mana of the iwi, hapu or whanau is directly related to the well-being of the natural resources within their rohe, or region. Maori also have a significant interest in the productive capacity of New Zealand’s land and marine environments, and regard human health as a taonga. Effective biosecurity is therefore of crucial and ongoing importance to Maori interests. More information is available at www.tpk.govt.nz (offsite link to www.tpk.govt.nz)

3.5 New Organisms

The Biosecurity Act and the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO) together provide a border control regime for the introduction of new organisms into the country. HSNO controls the intentional importation of new organisms into the country, whilst the Biosecurity Act provides the enforcement regime for illegal or unintentional importation of new organisms. The Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) is the government agency charged with the responsibility for managing the intentional importation of new organisms into New Zealand. ERMA works closely with other border control agencies to ensure that the risks of illegal or inadvertent importation of new organisms are managed to acceptable levels. More information is available at www.ermanz.govt.nz (offsite link to www.ermanz.govt.nz)

3.6 Oceans

New Zealand has some of the least polluted seas in the world. Keeping them this way is important culturally, socially and economically. New organisms can be introduced through natural means, the discharge of ballast water from international ships, or through the scrapings from ship hulls during cleaning. These new organisms can affect the balance of natural ecosystems, and may displace native species.

Marine biosecurity has not received the same attention over the years as terrestrial biosecurity, and marine biosecurity systems are some way behind their land-based counterparts. The Government has recently moved to strengthen marine biosecurity by providing additional funding for the development of marine compliance, surveillance and response activities. Managing biosecurity risks to natural marine life is the responsibility of MFish, which is implementing the marine biosecurity elements of the New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy.

In a broader sense, the Government is working with all interested people to develop an Oceans Policy for New Zealand. The Oceans Policy will identify long-term objectives for managing everything we do to, on, and in the marine environment. The biosecurity strategy will contribute to New Zealand’s overall goals for the marine environment, and the two processes will be managed interactively.

More information is available at www.fish.govt.nz (offsite link to www.fish.govt.nz) andwww.oceans.govt.nz (offsite link to www.oceans.govt.nz)

3.7 Public Health

Biosecurity includes the protection of public health from the adverse effects of unwanted organisms. The MoH’s biosecurity functions are separate from, but complementary to, its wider responsibilities for public health. The MoH contributes to the development of biosecurity policy, and ensures the provision of biosecurity surveillance and response services by public health services and other providers. To date, the only organisms determined ‘unwanted’ under the Biosecurity Act by the Ministry of Health are exotic mosquitoes of public health significance. More information is available at www.moh.govt.nz (offsite link to www.moh.govt.nz)

3.8 Reseach

New Zealand’s biosecurity programme is based on the scientific assessment of risk, and research is therefore an important component of the programme at all levels. From identifying risks to particular ecosystems through to developing new technologies for detecting or managing pests, research can greatly enhance the overall effectiveness of biosecurity measures.

Biosecurity research in New Zealand is funded primarily through the broad portfolio of research managed by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST). Additional research is commissioned by operational biosecurity departments, regional councils, and industry organisations. As the first step in the development of a biosecurity research strategy, the biosecurity strategy development team has commissioned a study to develop a comprehensive picture of biosecurity research in New Zealand.

3.9 Tourism

Tourism is a key sector in the New Zealand economy, contributing over $9 billion annually (or about 10% of GDP), including more than $4 billion in foreign exchange earnings. The sector sustains about 118,000 jobs, and generates $1.5 billion a year in taxes. Tourism is a growth sector, with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) expecting international visitor arrivals to the Australasian region to grow by 7.5% annually in the period to 2020. Increased tourism can, however, result in increased biosecurity risks. New Zealand’s unique natural environment and relative freedom from organisms that transmit disease are core components of its attractiveness to visitors. New Zealand’s tourism and biosecurity policies should be linked to ensure the best possible outcome for New Zealand. More information is available at (offsite link to www.otsp.govt.nz)www.otsp.govt.nz

3.10 Trade

Trade is vital to the New Zealand economy. Relatively limited natural resources, isolation and a small population mean that our farm producers, manufacturers and service providers all need access to export markets. At the same time, New Zealand relies on imports for raw materials and for many of the goods and services that enhance our quality of life.

The WTO, of which New Zealand is a founder member, is the pre-eminent world body responsible for making and monitoring international trade rules. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), established under the WTO umbrella, recognises the legitimate right of a country to maintain the level of protection from risks to plant, animal and human health and life it deems appropriate. To ensure that this right is not abused and does not result in unnecessary barriers to trade, the SPS also requires that measures are transparent, non-discriminatory and based on sound scientific analysis and risk management.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) is the primary agency tasked by the Government with managing external linkages. Because of the importance to New Zealand of its trade in primary products, MFAT works closely with MAF in international fora to promote New Zealand's overall security. More information is available at www.mfat.govt.nz (offsite link to www.mfat.govt.nz)

3.11 Transport

New Zealand’s transport policies - particularly those relating to the development of international air transport links - can directly impact on biosecurity risk management. The objective of New Zealand’s international air transport policy is to maximise economic benefits to New Zealand, consistent with foreign policy and strategic considerations. The opening up of regional airports to international travellers over recent years has provided significant regional and tourism benefits. At the same time it has resulted in increased biosecurity risks. The Ministry of Transport provides policy advice to the Government promoting safe, sustainable transport at reasonable cost. New Zealand’s transport and biosecurity policies should be linked to ensure the best possible outcome for New Zealand. More information is available at www.transport.govt.nz (offsite link to www.transport.govt.nz)

4. Biosecurity into the Future - the Challenge ahead

There are a number of challenges to be faced if New Zealand is to maintain strong biosecurity. New Zealand must decide what priority it places on the protection of its biodiversity, and what trades-off it is prepared to accept in pursuit of its biosecurity objectives. The following sections discuss in general terms some of the key outcomes sought by the Government from the Biosecurity Strategy, and pose a series of questions on specific matters the Government has asked be considered. These are not comprehensive, nor are they intended to be limiting. Rather, they are provided to stimulate thought and discussion.

4.1 An 'Appropriate' Level of Protection Against Biosecurity Risks

It is the sovereign right of any country to determine its own level of biosecurity protection. While the term ‘appropriate level of protection against risks’ is relatively recent (it comes from the WTO SPS agreement) the concept is not. Governments and biosecurity authorities in New Zealand have for many years been making decisions about which biosecurity risks to accept, where to allocate resources, and what measures to apply to mitigate biosecurity risks.

There is currently no overall statement of New Zealand’s desired level of biosecurity protection. In practice the Government reflects this through individual biosecurity risk-management decisions, allocation of biosecurity resources, and policies in related portfolios such as trade, tourism and transport. Agreement on an appropriate level of protection against biosecurity risks will be a key outcome of the Biosecurity Strategy. Such a statement would explain the importance the Government places on the protection of New Zealand’s biodiversity, in order to guide biosecurity practitioners in the development and implementation of biosecurity measures.

Few countries have yet stated their appropriate level of protection against biosecurity risks, and those that have have done so in vague terms only. There are a number of options for how a more meaningful statement could be articulated. A group of government departments with an interest in biosecurity is developing this concept further, and the work of this group will be available as an input to the Biosecurity Strategy.

Questions

  • What might a statement on New Zealand’s appropriate level of protection against biosecurity risks include?
  • How could that statement remain valid given a background of increasing biosecurity risks?
  • To what extent should affordability issues feature?

4.2 A Framework for Biosecurity Decision-making

Biosecurity decisions are made at a number of levels. The Government determines an appropriate level of protection against biosecurity risks, and allocates resources for Crown biosecurity programmes. Regional councils determine regional pest management needs, and develop strategies and funding arrangements accordingly. Both central and local government officials have statutory authority under the Biosecurity Act, and exercise regulatory and operational powers. Industries and groups of individuals are also able to access regulatory powers through the pest management strategy process.

It is important in an environment where there are so many participants that decisions are consistent, co-ordinated and transparent. Mechanisms are in place through which biosecurity decision-makers interact. Mechanisms also exist for informing stakeholders about issues and inviting their participation in decision-making processes. During the course of developing the Biosecurity Strategy, these mechanisms will be reviewed.

Questions

  • Are existing biosecurity decision-making frameworks effective and efficient?
  • How could they be improved?

4.3 Biosecurity Programmes and Areas of Priority

The biosecurity programme touches an increasingly large number of sectors and individuals. The biosecurity environment is evolving from its traditional focus on the protection of the productive land-based sectors, to concentrate increasingly on managing risks to indigenous flora and fauna, the marine environment, and human health. New technology is also playing a part – both in terms of risk presentation and risk management.

To ensure that there is a clear rationale for biosecurity investment decisions, there needs to be agreement on objectives for biosecurity programmes in each biosecurity sector, and priorities within and between sectors. Biosecurity measures will need to keep pace with the risks posed by new technologies, and new technologies must in turn be used to improve risk management techniques. Biosecurity programmes should also be efficiently implemented, thereby ensuring the best use of available resources, and reduced compliance costs for those impacted upon by biosecurity measures.

Questions

  • What are the priority areas for biosecurity, and why?
  • What objectives should guide biosecurity programmes in each biosecurity sector?
  • Should biosecurity programmes be enhanced, and if so, how? (consider pre-border risk management, border risk management, post-border surveillance, incursion response capability, endemic pest management, education & enforcement)
  • What will be the impact of new technology on biosecurity?
  • How could the implementation of biosecurity programmes be made more efficient?
  • What are appropriate roles for New Zealand in relation to minimising the risks that its exports pose to importing countries, and promoting the co-ordination of biosecurity in the Oceania region?

4.4 Responsibilities for Action

Biosecurity is for the overall benefit of New Zealand’s economy, environment and people’s health. Specific biosecurity measures impact on or contribute to many industry, social, environmental and government outcomes. Our biosecurity programme will be more likely to deliver the benefits sought from it at a sustainable cost if organisations and individuals from both the public and private sectors accept a collective responsibility for action.

Within this overall collective, however, the biosecurity programme requires clear direction and leadership. An important outcome from the Biosecurity Strategy will be agreement by all participants in the biosecurity programme of lines of accountabilities and specific responsibilities.

Questions

  • What should be the respective biosecurity roles of central government, regional government, primary production industries, transport and tourism industries, and landowners?

4.5 Structural Arrangements

The current structural arrangements for biosecurity have evolved over time to meet changing biosecurity pressures. The last major review of central government structural arrangements occurred in 1997 with the establishment of a Minister for Biosecurity, the Biosecurity Council, and Votes Biosecurity (through which biosecurity funding is identified separately from other departmental funding). Since that time structural adjustments have continued with the merger of the Ministries of Forestry and Agriculture, the establishment of a Biosecurity Authority in MAF, and the formation of the Biosecurity Technical Forum and the Biosecurity Consultative Forum.

There is no centrally planned structure for local government biosecurity. Regional councils are independently accountable for their own biosecurity programmes, but co-ordinate their activities through a Biosecurity Managers Forum.

Current biosecurity structural arrangements have both strengths and weaknesses. For example, on the one hand the separation of biosecurity responsibilities between a number of departments and councils creates the need for administrative and co-ordination mechanisms. On the other hand, it enables close linkages to be developed between biosecurity programmes and the sectors/regions they are designed to protect.

The Biosecurity Strategy will include a review of current structural arrangements, and recommendations for the future.

Question

  • What is an appropriate structure (or structures) for delivering strong biosecurity?
  • Is a sector focus appropriate?

4.6 Resource Needs

The assets being protected by the biosecurity programme are considerable in both social and economic terms. It is therefore important that an appropriate level of resource is allocated to protect those assets. Resource allocation decisions will to some extent follow decisions on appropriate levels of biosecurity protection, biosecurity programme objectives, priorities within and between biosecurity sectors etc. However, affordability will also be a factor.

The biosecurity strategy will consider what resources are required to meet desired levels of biosecurity protection in each of the biosecurity sectors, and priorities for the allocation of these resources. Decision-makers can then determine the extent to which individual programmes will be funded. Principles will also be developed to guide decisions on the allocation of costs amongst participants in the biosecurity programme.

Questions

  • What principles should guide decisions on the allocation of resources to biosecurity programmes?
  • What principles should guide decisions on who should meet the cost of biosecurity programmes?

4.7 Legislative Framework

The Biosecurity Act 1993 is the primary piece of biosecurity legislation. It covers the exclusion, eradication, and effective management of pests and unwanted organisms. The Director-General of MAF is responsible for exclusion activities, and may issue import health standards and enforce biosecurity requirements at the border and elsewhere. Pest management options in the Act are comprehensive, and regulatory powers are variously available to Ministers, government departments, regional councils and groups of individuals.

The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996 (HSNO) operates alongside the Biosecurity Act in providing for the exclusion of harmful new organisms. Whereas the Biosecurity Act’s exclusion powers relate to the illegal or unintentional importation of new organisms, HSNO controls the intentional importation of new organisms. The Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) is the government agency responsible for implementing HSNO.

Other legislation relevant to biosecurity includes the Forests Act 1949, the Wild Animal Control Act 1977, the Health Act 1956 and the Resource Management Act 1991.

An important objective of the Biosecurity Strategy is to obtain agreement on an appropriate biosecurity legislative framework for the future.

Questions

  • What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Biosecurity Act 1993, and where are improvements needed?
  • Are there any inappropriate gaps or overlaps between the Biosecurity Act and other biosecurity-related legislation?
  • How could compliance with biosecurity regulatory requirements be enhanced?

4.8 Biosecurity Research Requirements

In 2000 the Biosecurity Council endorsed guidelines aimed at ensuring that an integrated and consistent approach is taken to biosecurity-related research. These guidelines establish principles and objectives for biosecurity research, and note some specific areas in which research would be useful. They do not, however, identify priority areas or funding levels.

During the course of developing the Biosecurity Strategy, an effort will be made to determine an appropriate level of investment for biosecurity research, and priorities for research programmes. Consideration will also be given as to how biosecurity research should be managed within the overall portfolio of government-funded research carried out through Vote Research, Science & Technology and departmental operational research.

Questions

  • What are the priority areas for biosecurity research, and why?
  • What and where are our knowledge gaps?

4.9 Biosecurity Awareness

The education component of New Zealand’s biosecurity programme aims to increase public support for biosecurity initiatives. Education can change behaviours that cause risk at the border, encourage the public to report potential new incursions, and increase compliance with pest management programmes. Independent research carried out for MAF in 1999 indicated that New Zealand was not achieving the full benefits available from raising biosecurity awareness. Responding to this, the Government recently approved funding for the development of a comprehensive biosecurity awareness programme targeted at travellers, importers, primary industries and the general public. The programme will aim to raise biosecurity awareness both at the border and within New Zealand. It will be linked closely with the Biosecurity Strategy as it is developed.

Questions

  • Where should the Government target its biosecurity awareness programmes?

Glossary of Terms

Unless the context indicates otherwise, terms in this paper have the same meaning as those in the Biosecurity Act 1993. Additionally:

  • ‘Biosecurity’ means protection from the risks posed by organisms to the economy, environment and people’s health, through exclusion, eradication and control (Biosecurity Council 2000).
  • ‘Endemic’ means established throughout or in any part of New Zealand (other than in containment) and includes native and introduced organisms.
  • ‘ERMA’ means the Environmental Risk Management Authority
  • ‘Established’ means perpetuation, for the foreseeable future, of an organism within an area after entry.
  • ‘HSNO’ means the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996.
  • ‘Incursion’ means an occurrence of an organism not previously known to be established in New Zealand, and does not include interceptions.
  • ‘Interception’ means the detection of an organism in a transitional facility or a biosecurity control area, on or in risk goods.
  • ‘NPMS’ means a national pest management strategy under the Biosecurity Act.
  • ‘RPMS’ means a regional pest management strategy under the Biosecurity Act.
  • ‘SPS’ means the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.

1 New Zealand Conservation Authority (Hackwell K & Bertram G), 1999, Pests & Weeds, A Blueprint for Action, page 45

2A pest management strategy is a legally binding agreement under the Biosecurity Act that sets out management and funding arrangements for a specific pest or group of pests. National pest management strategies can be developed by central government, regional councils or groups of affected people. Regional pest management strategies are generally developed by regional councils for widespread endemic pests of regional significance.

3New Zealand Conservation Authority (Hackwell K & Bertram G), 1999, Pests & Weeds, A Blueprint for Action, page 55

Page last updated: 17 December 2008