The Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand

• The Biosecurity system
• Impact of Foot-and-Mouth disease
• Changing behaviours
• Pre-border activities
• Borders – marine & terrestrial
• Potential Impact of the Northern Pacific Seastar
• Surveillance
• Impact of Pine Pitch Canker
• Incursion response
• Eradication success in the Chatham Islands
• Pest management
• Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito
• The growing weed problem

The Biosecurity system

Effective biosecurity systems rely on information about pests, pathways and capabilities to manage the risks properly.

Risks

New Zealand is threatened by hundreds of thousands of exotic species that could cause harm. Some are well known with recognised impacts; others are not recognised as pests until their impact is discovered. For example, toxic algal blooms in shellfish are examples of native species causing adverse effects on human health.

Potential pests range from tiny microbes (such as the virus that causes Foot-and-Mouth disease), to plants and animals in aquatic and terrestrial environments. New Zealand’s pests nearly all originate from other countries.

New Zealand’s legacy of breaches, including many intentional introductions that became major pests, means we are stuck with expensive ongoing pest control to protect our forests, farms, waterways and coastal environments. Some pests establish quickly while others lie seemingly dormant for a period before spreading significantly; many plants and animals already here have yet to reach their full potential in terms of establishment, spread and impacts.

The sheer number of introduced species and the lag time between species naturalising then showing their full potential for damage means major pest management problems inevitably lie ahead. There are big information gaps. For example, a recent DoC study found 11 species of freshwater plants traded as ornamentals have serious weed potential – and were plants not even known to be present in New Zealand.

Our understanding of aquatic ecosystems and potential pest impacts is even more limited. Poor baseline information means it is often difficult to know whether a species is introduced or native. To address this information gap, MFish is undertaking baseline surveys.

Introduced pests are the biggest single threat to our native species and habitats; they also impact upon recreational, Maori, cultural and health values, plus agricultural production and hydroelectric power.

DC6 aerial spraying at dawn to eradicate the white-spotted tussock moth over Auckland ’s eastern suburbs in 1997

How do pests get here?

A large number of species were deliberately introduced during early European settlement of New Zealand. Some rapidly became pests due to favourable conditions or lack of predators and diseases. Many pest plants started off as ornamental plants (wild ginger, for example).

Nowadays strict controls apply to deliberate (legitimate) new introductions so they are unlikely to become pests. The greatest risk now comes from accidental introductions, smuggling of organisms or contaminated goods.

Potential pests can enter New Zealand through many different pathways; as hitchhikers carried by another plant or animal, or inanimate objects such as a backpacker’s tent. Some pathways are targeted very strongly; others less so, for reasons including feasibility, efficiency, and estimates of risk. Although much is known about the pathways through which pests and diseases enter and move about, more scientific research is needed to identify better tools for blocking pathways and detecting pests.

MFish has identified over 20 marine risk pathways, some representing significant risk (ballast water, hull fouling, aquarium trade, aquaculture equipment, live bait for fishing and fish food for aquaculture).

Managing Pathways

Pathways are difficult to manage, as they cut across the various intervention points (pre-border, border, etc). Any one of these pathways can introduce a wide range of pests unless effectively managed. For example, the sea containers pathway has recently been reviewed - pests can be found in the contents, any packaging material, or contaminating the container itself.

Major pathways include:

• Imported goods
• Ships and aircraft
• Ships' ballast water
• Vessel hull fouling
• Shipping containers
• Used vehicles &machinery
• Passengers' effects
• Mail & courier packs
• Smuggling (such as parrots or seeds)
• Wind & ocean currents

The number of containers arriving in New Zealand has increased by approximately 50% over the past five years, from an increasing range of countries with varying interests in maintaining biosecurity. Potential threats include:

• Packaging material harbouring wood-boring insects could impact on our forests and cause significant damage to wooden buildings;
• Pooled water harbouring mosquito larvae could carry serious human diseases; and
• Contamination of containers with seeds; plant material; insects, spiders and even snakes.

In addition, the products in the containers may be risk goods such as fruit or meat, which can be hosts for a range of pests. It is impractical to check all containers at the wharf; many are transported inland for miles before being unloaded without supervision and many containers are judged low risk – this must be taken into account when managing this pathway.

Mitigating risk

Biosecurity is about mitigating risk, which is done at different points - before the border, at the border or post-border (including pest management). Generally, the cost of mitigation increases as pests move across the border and become established; hence the significant focus on prevention and early detection and eradication (if possible).

Impact of Foot-and-Mouth disease⁷

Stock Image Group
Scenes like this became common in the British countryside two years ago – we don’t want them here. Foot-and-Mouth disease is caused by a virus – it’s one of the biggest biosecurity threat faced by New Zealand. It entered Britain as a result of failed border controls.

Foot-and-Mouth disease is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals; although not very lethal in adult animals it causes serious production losses and devastates trade because no one wants produce from an infected country.

The virus can travel long distances by wind. Animals can be infected through inhalation of virus aerosols, ingestion and through reproduction. The disease is mostly spread through the movement of infected animals; other sources of infection include contaminated vehicles, equipment, people and products.

The virus survives in frozen lymph nodes, bone marrow and viscera, also in salted and cured meats, and in non-pasteurised dairy products. The virus can survive for long periods in fresh, partially cooked, cured and smoked meats.

This hypothetical scenario assumes a Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak initially occurring in pigs (through waste food) then spreading to sheep or cattle. The outbreak is contained within the North Island, allowing trade from the South Island to resume earlier:

• Dairy exports would face bans from trading partners for perhaps six weeks. Storage restraints would mean some produce was lost permanently, and some trade partners may be slow to resume importing New Zealand dairy products.
• Meat exports would be affected for longer, possibly up to one year, and export prices would be significantly hit. New Zealand has the capacity to store about one month’s production of meat, so any further production would be lost; much would depend on the season of the outbreak.
• It could take at least 4 – 5 weeks to get vaccines produced and back to New Zealand.
• Two-thirds of our export trade would be at risk for at least 4 – 5 months, possibly longer. Export prices of meat would have a long-lasting decline, as loss of reputation would hit the premium currently enjoyed by New Zealand lamb and beef products. Prices wouldn’t return to normal for about four years.
• Real GDP would be reduced by 4% (relative to its potential) in the first three months of the outbreak. The cumulative loss in nominal GDP would be around $6billion after one year; around $10billion after two years. The loss would continue to increase because potential output would be lowered, and would be exacerbated by slumps in domestic demand for meat and the negative reaction of trading partners.
• While it is not possible to forecast the effect on exchange rates for this exercise, it was assumed the $NZ would drop initially by about 20% in the first three months, and the recovery of the exchange rate would take around 2½ years.
• The Government would spend $200million on controlling the outbreak and compensating farmers for animals slaughtered.
• There would be a significant drop in tourism; in the United Kingdom, the impact on tourism was 10 times greater than on the primary production sector.
• Unemployment would rise by 1%; 15,000 – 20,000 jobs would be lost although the impact would be greater in vulnerable sectors (and could last longer).
• Foreign investors would be increasingly reluctant to expose themselves to the New Zealand market and additional overseas borrowing of $8billion would be necessary.
• Business confidence would plummet temporarily, which would reduce investment; this would mean a permanent decline in the stock of productive capital and the long-term potential output of the economy.
• Household wealth would be reduced, as would the Government’s tax revenue.

Changing behaviours

Individuals have always played a significant role in New Zealand’s biosecurity – they are responsible for about 40% of our pest management. Alert members of the public have detected many of New Zealand’s biosecurity incursions – including the Painted Apple Moth, Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito, Australian banjo frog, termites, snakes seaweed and fish – providing a crucial, but largely unsupported link in the monitoring of pathways. In addition, people are themselves a significant pathway.

Carrots & sticks

Approximately 25,000 undeclared seizures are made annually at airports, equating to around 500 undeclared seizures each week. The use of heavy fines, supported by public information, sends a strong signal that deliberate or careless flouting of biosecurity rules will not be tolerated. Instant $200 fines were introduced in 2001 for inbound travellers making incorrect biosecurity declarations. An unexpectedly low enforcement rate was attributed to the large number of passengers whose English was inadequate – this language barrier is the most pressing issue.

Airport quarantine seizures -2001/02

• 8.0 tonnes of meat products
• 15.9 tonnes of fruit
• 2.6 tonnes of seeds
• 3.2 tonnes of dairy products
• 3.2 tonnes of fish products
• 5,800 live plants or bulbs

In 2001/02 there were 219 seizures of live animals, including turtles & live eggs. 28% of the meat & poultry products seized were undeclared, the majority from countries with FMD.

Getting the public to listen

‘Protect New Zealand’ was a two-year $3million campaign, launched in 2000, specifically to educate people about their biosecurity responsibilities in light of the European Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreak. Its success highlights the justification for an on-going programme. But it is impossible to run an effective campaign on the current funding of $300,000 per year.

The ‘Protect New Zealand’ team initiated the television series "Border Patrol", now one of the most popular programmes screened⁸. Since the campaign started, New Zealanders have become more aware of what biosecurity involves (including the risks and consequences) and their personal responsibilities. It is hard to know how much of this improvement can be directly attributed to the campaign because of other factors (for example, the Genetic Engineering debate before the 2002 election and the outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth disease in the United Kingdom).

Individual responsibility and contributions remain vital if we are to continue succeeding. This strategy aims to create a framework that actively encourages private individuals to play their part. This will become even more important as risk grows with increasing trade and climate change.

Public support

Biosecurity is one of the most critical issues in the shaping of our country’s future well-being, so the need for public support cannot be underestimated. The biosecurity agencies will operate more effectively if people support their goals (possibly through incentives, for example to encourage public interest in community surveillance). The long-term implications of biosecurity’s social marketing should be considered on a par with other public education campaigns – drinking and driving, anti-smoking and Accident Compensation.

New Zealand needs to fund research to learn how to make the public listen, get the right programmes operating, and measure the impacts. It needs major funding. The aim is not to make the biosecurity agencies look good, but to increase public cooperation. It is imperative people understand the significance of our stringent quarantine regulations, so everyone can play their part in protecting New Zealand from the unwelcome arrival of pests, weeds and diseases.

Campaign snapshot

Passengers from the Pacific Islands frequently carry:

• Fresh fruit and vegetables;
• Meat and fish;
• Traditional herbal medicines; and
• Plants and goods made from plant materials.

MAF’s quarantine service had difficulty in getting its message across to people in the Pacific Islands. Initial attempts included using the local quarantine services (unsuccessful), multi-language in-flight videotapes, multi-language arrival declarations into New Zealand and the very successful multi-language ‘Declare it for New Zealand’’ pamphlets. Meetings were held with the Pacific Island church leaders and quarantine staff participated on an Auckland radio station popular with Pacific Island peoples. Then MAF’s ‘Protect New Zealand’’ campaign, launched in September 2000, specifically targeted Cook Islanders, Fijians, Tongans and Samoans living in or visiting New Zealand.

Since June 2001, the percentage of undeclared seizures from the Pacific has dropped. Although Pacific Island peoples continue to bring in a lot of food products, much is now covered by phytosanitary certificates and their compliance is now better than average.

The illegal introduction of the varroa bee mite illustrates the problem of people breaking the very rules designed to protect them; at the same time it illustrates what happens when there’s no post-entry quarantine system in New Zealand.

A beekeeper smuggling queen bees (to enhance a hive’s breeding population) probably imported the varroa mite inadvertently. It only lives for two hours outside its host so must have arrived here on a live bee.

If that’s the case, it was a hugely irresponsible and criminal act by someone who should have known better.

To date the incursion has cost the Government $12million but the ultimate cost could be hundreds of millions of dollars in lost pastoral production.

Camping equipment is a pathway for insects,weed seeds,disease and fungal spores.That ’s why it must be cleaned before being brought into New Zealand.

Expectations - Changing behaviours

29. That all New Zealanders,and our visitors,are encouraged to support and participate in our biosecurity

Pre-border activities

New Zealand takes a leading role (disproportionate to its relative size) in international organisations working to reduce the risk of importing - or exporting - pests and diseases.

Participating countries are required to notify significant changes in the occurrence or distribution of pests and diseases, including major diseases of wildlife. For example, an outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth disease in one country will usually result in immediate suspension of some trade and rapid and significant changes in the processing of the movement of goods and people by other countries. This type of information allows New Zealand to adjust its pre-border and border controls rapidly.

New Zealand has an obligation to meet its international commitments under multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity and the United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea that include specific provisions for protection, eradication or management of pest species.

Countries are also expected to prevent aircraft spreading mosquitoes and other pests. New Zealand is also working towards the adoption of international controls on ballast water to reduce the risk of transferring marine species between countries.

New Zealand is also working with small Pacific nations to help them manage biosecurity risks to our mutual benefit.

There are still few international agreements to notify trading partners about environmental pests (such as ants, snakes or highly invasive weeds). A number of informal networks are emerging through organisations such as the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). New Zealand has been successful in getting the International Plant Protection Convention to start addressing highly invasive weeds.

Pre-border standards promulgated through IHS are the second level of protection from offshore risks; examples include heat treatment of imported foods, disease testing of animals and inspection of used vehicles before shipment. They were established to reduce the risk of harmful species entering the country in traded goods, initially to protect our primary industries from risks associated with the importation of plants and animals and goods such as used cars, old packaging materials or sports and camping equipment which may be carrying living hitchhiker organisms.

IHS have had a strong terrestrial and primary production focus, so have not worked well for aquatic and environmental pests, and they are of limited use with unidentified pests. New approaches may be needed to help address these shortcomings although newer IHS are more balanced.

The IHS process has become increasingly rigorous over the past decade. During their development, extensive consultation is conducted to ensure all risks are identified and covered by pre-entry measures such as testing, inspection, treatment or quarantine. Sometimes additional post-border conditions are imposed, to provide further safeguards.

The IHS procedures are under stress; indeed MAF is unable to provide information on the total number as there is no consistent definition across the agency. Many of the earlier standards need to be reviewed to ensure consistency with more recent ones. MAF states there is a very large backlog of unfinished IHS. Alternative approaches are being studied to hasten the process and meet New Zealand’s trade obligations without increasing biosecurity risks.

Finally there is the requirement for ERMA to take a precautionary approach before approving the importation of any new organism.

Expectations - Pre-border

30. That there is a continuous, targeted programme to move risk reduction measures offshore;

31. That all relevant pre-border regulations and standards are in place - robust, consistent and subject to appropriate review processes;

32. That New Zealand is using wider international - multilateral or bilateral - arrangements to reduce potential threats to indigenous biodiversity;

33. That New Zealand is benefiting from and contributing to international standards to protect production and trade;

34. That New Zealand’s coastal waters are protected from threats carried in ballast water or on fouled hulls; and

35. That New Zealand is helping Pacific countries reduce biosecurity threats to the region.

Borders – marine & terrestrial

Our biosecurity strategy must strike a balance reflecting New Zealand's overall national interests. Our continuing economic well-being depends on our participation in the global economy - trade in goods and services represents significantly more than half of New Zealand's GDP; for example, more than 90% of our dairy and meat production is exported. We trade with more than 200 countries and our long-term economic prosperity depends on access to open global markets, particularly as primary produce exports are particularly vulnerable to unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions.

The global economy is also an essential source of imports for New Zealand, which is necessary to meet New Zealanders' consumer demands. As a nation that wants to survive and prosper, we want world-class imports of quality and at the best prices. So, as a trading nation, New Zealand cannot expect other nations to accept our exports if we are not prepared to apply comparable objective scientific criteria to our imports.

• The wider importance of such objective criteria is illustrated by the recent World Trade Organisation (WTO) ruling on Japan's quarantine measures against fireblight in apples, which has been a long-running obstacle for New Zealand's horticulture exporters. The WTO ruled in July that scientific evidence did not support Japan's restrictions, which were inconsistent with its international obligations.
• The current review of our IHS must be demonstrably responsive to legitimate demands from our trading partners for access to the New Zealand market.

Borders - marine & terrestrial

Leakage through borders is inevitable, particularly with increasing globalisation, as sealing of the border is impossible. Aside from the risks presented by trade and tourism, new pests and diseases arriving through wind dispersal pose a constant threat.

Border activity is targeted at ensuring risk goods comply with the requirements of IHS, and preventing the entry of exotic organisms that may imperil agriculture (for example, fruit fly), health (for example, mosquitoes), freshwater ecosystems (for example, piranha) or our indigenous flora and fauna (for example, exotic ants).

Borders have become more diffuse and are no longer only at the point of entry. Containers offloaded at ports may be opened and inspected at hundreds of regional and rural sites around the country. Suitable responses must be considered carefully, such as targeting surveillance activities around sites where containers are opened.

Marine borders are hard to manage, as there is no single physical point of arrival. For example, organisms living on a vessel's hull ('hull fouling') can be reproducing and infecting New Zealand's coastal zone while arriving at port, then continue to infect any area the vessel visits after border clearance.

Growth in border risks

Over the past five years, air passengers and crew arrivals have increased by 40%, container arrivals by 47% and used vehicle imports by 54%. Cruise ship passengers have increased by more than 250%. International mail parcels have increased by 32%, and small parcels shipped with courier companies are a new source of risk. The sources of risk material have also increased, particularly with the growth of Internet mail order as marine organisms are readily available (for example, Caulerpa taxifolia⁹) - exotic species from such sources have been found in New Zealand.

The risk exposure at Auckland airport was more than halved by the introduction of x-ray machines and detector dogs in 1997, then nearly halved again by the introduction in 2001 of 100% x-raying or searching of baggage.

Similarly, marine border risks have increased substantially. Ballast water volumes have risen nearly 20% per annum and recreational craft visits increased in 2003 due to the America’s Cup. The ballast water of one vessel typically carries over 300 species, of which over 50 are environmental, economic or societal pests in some location around the globe. Their potential impact is significant – about 10 large ships enter New Zealand ports daily. Similarly, one merchant vessel can transport over 100 species through hull fouling.

In 2002, there were over 3,300 international vessel visits – 2,581 merchant vessels, 794 pleasure craft, 34 passenger ships, and 12 barges/tugs. Although each category presents a different hull fouling risk, only merchant vessels and tug/barges additionally present a ballast water risk. Merchant vessels are estimated to have discharged over 3.9million tonnes of ballast water in New Zealand ports in 2002.

Border activities undertaken

New Zealand undertakes a wide range of activities to prevent the introduction of exotic organisms, based around the major entry points for cargo, passengers and mail:

• X-ray machines and detector dogs were introduced at international airports six years ago in response to the Mt Roskill outbreak of Mediterranean fruit fly;then all luggage was x-rayed and opened following the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom.
• Instant fines for passengers failing to declare risk goods were introduced in June 2001; more than 9,000 fines were issued in the year ending March 31,2003.
• The fines,coupled with the 'Protect New Zealand' awareness programme,,appear to have increased compliance at airports.
• Baggage is periodically searched at the airport,after it has been passed by the airport x-ray machines,in order to validate inspection systems and measure their sensitivity.
• Cargo clearance occurs at the major international ports and airports to ensure all risk goods conform to import requirements.
• Manifests for sea containers are screened and risk cargo is processed according to relevant IHS. 24% of containers are sampled to ensure the validity of the cleaning certificate and the absence of exotic species. Non-conforming containers are sent for cleaning or fumigation.
• X-ray machines, backed up by detector dogs, have screened most international mail since September 1998. Since then,mail seizures have increased by 160%, despite parcel numbers increasing by only 32%.
• All imported machinery and used cars are now inspected for contamination and hitchhiking pests.
• Every vessel visiting New Zealand is required to exchange its ballast water before entering our economic zone. MAF inspectors,on behalf of MFish, check the information during their initial boarding procedures, before allowing the vessel to discharge ballast in New Zealand waters. On average,one vessel every six months is refused permission to discharge its ballast.

In the year ending in March 2003, MAF:

• Checked the luggage of more than 3.7million air passengers and crew;
• Cleared over 450,000 sea containers;
• Inspected over 150,000 used imported vehicles;
• X-rayed over 49 million mail items;
• Cleared 3,400 international vessels; and
• Checked over 60,000 consignments of imported risk cargo.

Approximately 139,000 seizures were made from air passengers and mail, including 17 tonnes of fruit fly host material and 8 tonnes of meat (which can host FMD).

Smuggling of risky foods, plants and animals is a serious biosecurity problem. There are regular border interceptions of seeds, plants and birds' eggs that people are trying to bring in illegally.

Serious diseases probably caused by smuggling over the last few years include RCD, varroa in bees and parrot pox. Smuggled grape rootstock, which could cause severe harm to our wine industry, has also been intercepted.

Some people allege this irresponsible and criminal behaviour is encouraged by the lack of post entry ('third level') quarantine facilities – lack of legitimate ways to import bees, parrots and plants means people are tempted to smuggle them, posing a huge biosecurity risk to New Zealand.

MAF assesses the risk of all uncleared goods (based on the item, country of origin, associated potential pests and diseases, degree of processing and end use).

Lack of marine capacity

New Zealand’s marine border controls have been unable to meet the increase in risk. This failure can be attributed to:

1. A lack of capacity which has forced a triage approach – systems are only treated if an impact is highly likely;
2. A lack of explicit inter-agency arrangements for comprehensive border management; and
3. A significant lack of management tools for key pathways (for example, hull fouling).

NZ Seafood Council
The Pacific oyster (Crassotrea gigas) may be our best-known marine hitchhiker. It’s believed to have travelled to New Zealand from Hiroshima about 25 years ago, tagging along on the extensions to the Auckland Harbour Bridge (the Nippon Clip-On). It didn’t take long for it to naturalize; now it’s the dominant cultivated oyster in New Zealand.

Continuing progress

Marine biosecurity is in its infancy globally. Although pathways for marine risks have been identified, many are not yet being effectively monitored. It is imperative to improve their management. New Zealand must quickly develop and fund a comprehensive marine biosecurity programme.

Border risk mitigation activities are,however, monitored regularly. For example, the recent review of sea containers, which recommends trained and accredited industry personnel be made responsible for examining all containers (internally and externally) for contaminants - including live organisms - in the approved container inspection ('de-vanning') sites around New Zealand.

Capacity is gradually being added to monitor other pathways, to reduce risk to a manageable level through post-border activities, such as surveillance and response. In addition, the cost and impact of mitigation activities will be determined so scarce resources can be allocated efficiently, achieving the best border protection possible with the funds available.

Biosecurity arrangements are being improved continuously:

• International standards for the standardisation and transfer of x-ray records will increase the efficiency of scanning luggage. A trial using pre-departure baggage x-rays is planned for early 2004, although full implementation may be 3 -7 years away;
• Implementation of the new sea container clearance processes should commence in September 2003, rolling out progressively over 12 months; and
• Certifying of private sector operators at de-vanning sites.

The economic opportunity costs of getting it wrong are enormous, as flow of trade must continue if New Zealand is to prosper. Similarly, it is imperative cost effectiveness – the fine balance between compliance costs and lost opportunities – remains a vital consideration.

It is important to educate biosecurity’s front line by working with industry organisations (such as the Freight Forwarders’ Association) to maintain vigilance about the pests that may be on their way to New Zealand.

Expectations - Borders

36. That clear and transparent measurements of risk mitigation are providing appropriate information about residual risk or ‘leakage’ across the border;

37. That all significant hitchhiker pathways are covered where possible;

38. That all significant pathways are covered;

39. That border compliance is managed cost-effectively;

40. That effective post-entry quarantine facilities are available where appropriate; and

41. That all high-risk entry points for the marine environment are evaluated, with risk mitigation measures in place.

Potential Impact of the Northern Pacific Seastar¹⁰

Photo by Jan Haaga, Kodak Laboratory Alaska, AFSC, NMFS, NOAA, US Department of Commerce

• The Northern Pacific Seastar (Asterias amurensis) is native to the northwest Pacific (Japan, Korea and the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia). It is a voracious predator of a vast range of other species including clams, mussels, sea urchins (‘kina’) and paua.
• Northern Pacific Seastar populations can become extremely dense. In Port Phillip Bay, Victoria the population reached approximately 30 million within two years.
• The impacts of the Seastar on biodiversity and the environment are profound. It can eliminate all clams and mussels in an area; in Tasmania, densities of one Seastar per square metre were enough to eliminate over 90% of the native biomass.
• The Seastar is a major pest of shellfish farming and wild harvest industries. In New Zealand, they would have a significant economic impact on aquaculture and fishing industries as well as on shipping. Scallop, mussel, paua, cockle and kina industries could be devastated. In Australia, industry viability has been threatened.
• The New Zealand shellfish industry is worth $315million¹¹ in export earnings. If the Northern Pacific Seastar became widespread in New Zealand, stock could be reduced by 10 – 50%, with commensurate economic and social impacts.
• Any biosecurity response to Northern Pacific Seastar would entail domestic and international controls to limit further spread.
• Incursion response and subsequent control activities could cost $1million annually per incursion.
• Costs to international shipping industry could be $2million annually in management costs to reduce spread.
• Increased surveillance would cost $500,000 – $1million annually.
• Maori interests would be significantly impacted by a widespread Seastar incursion. The cost to customary harvest values cannot be quantified.

Surveillance

The four biosecurity agencies undertake a wide range of surveillance activities directed at both detecting new species (which cross the border through inevitable gaps) and monitoring the health and pest status of plants, animals and ecosystems. Some monitoring supports health status declarations for trade; some assists pest control; some is species specific (based on high impact risks such as fruit flies, FMD and toxic algae); some targets pathways.

Surveillance is not a latent capability waiting for the big one; there are many alerts every year. MAF’s reference laboratories receive about 1,000 calls each month to their freephone number from observant members of the public, a volume for which the system was not designed nor funded. These lead to several hundred investigations each month, including one or two for suspected Foot-and-Mouth disease outbreaks. Almost 40% of the calls relate to potential environmental pests; many of the others relate to horticultural threats.

There are about 10 new species incursions in New Zealand each year (a partial list of those found since January 2000 is in the appendix).

A major review of biosecurity surveillance systems conducted in 2002 noted a number of key issues:

• Some programmes appeared to be working well; for example, fruit fly and mosquitoes at ports;
• There has been major progress in establishing a rational approach to marine surveillance programmes;
• Many surveillance activities had very little technical support;
• There were many gaps in the system;
• There was significant under-investment in some areas, particularly on new threats to indigenous biodiversity;
• Surveillance activities are poorly defined and some need substantial review;
• Growth in border risks is increasing demands on the surveillance systems; and
• Investment in terrestrial surveillance has reduced substantially over the past 10 years.

Continuing progress

A series of recommendations and a work programme is under way. Within the next 3 – 5 years the Council would expect:

• A consistent policy for the development of surveillance programmes across all sectors;
• Discussion and integration between central and regional councils over surveillance needs and programmes;
• Explicit surveillance objectives, designed and resourced to ensure delivery;
• A programme responsive to changes in risk profiles as new pests and diseases emerge and others decline; and
• Programmes based on the best available science, technology and sampling methodologies.

Expectations - Surveillance

42. That there is a consistent policy for developing surveillance programmes across all sectors, based on the overall goals for biosecurity;

43. That explicit surveillance objectives and performance standards, are based on these and are resourced to ensure delivery;

44. That there is strong coordination of, and wide access to, the set of databases supporting surveillance activities;

45. That quality information is available to the public to help them identify new or emerging pests;

46. That the surveillance programme responds to changes in risk profiles as new pests and diseases emerge and others decline; and

47. That the programmes are based on the best available technology and sampling methodologies.

Impact of Pine Pitch Canker

James Lawson, Rural Images
New Zealand’s forestry industry is dominated by the exotic conifer Pinus radiata. Our forestry exports were worth $NZ3.7 billion in 2002 (12.5% of New Zealand’s total merchandise exports) and their importance is growing rapidly. Forestry products could become one of our largest export earners, so New Zealand is increasingly vulnerable to any timber disease.

The most striking symptom of Pine Pitch Canker is ‘pitching’, causing large amounts of white pitch (sap) to seep from the cankers caused by the fungus. Cankers effectively ring bark tree trunks, which kills them. The fungus that causes Pine Pitch Canker can survive in the soil or infected timber for over six months. Pine Pitch Canker is a significant fungal disease of conifers; Pinus radiata is particularly susceptible. An outbreak of Pine Pitch Canker in New Zealand would have a significant impact:

• Nurseries (probably the first affected) could suffer 80 – 100% seedling mortality. Substantial investment in above ground seedling nursery systems would be required to reduce the seedling loss to manageable levels.
• Young tree mortality (50–80%) in new or rotation plantations could require substantially higher initial planting densities and necessitate later re-planting.
• Established plantations could suffer tree mortality rates as high as 80%.
• Substantial investment would be required to hybridise Pinus species resistant to the disease.
• Australia, China and Korea are amongst our top five export destinations for unprocessed wood exports (logs, timber & wood chips). They don’t have Pine Pitch Canker so could require our wood exports to be heated before export to protect their own forests.
• The extra cost of heat-treating would substantially reduce the profit margin, especially on products that would not gain added value from the treatment; for example, wood chips. It is not considered economically feasible to heat treat Pinus radiata logs. Around 50% of New Zealand’s harvested wood is exported as logs, of which approximately 70% goes to China and Korea.

Incursion response

New Zealand regularly responds to incursions by a wide range of exotic species, including mosquitoes capable of carrying human or animal diseases, new pests and diseases of plants and animals, hitchhiker organisms such as ants, snakes and scorpions (which can enter in imported goods) through to GMOs that have contaminated imported seeds.

Once an organism has been detected, an incursion response is initiated to stop or restrict the spread of the organism, identify it and define its distribution (‘delimitation’), followed by an assessment of management options - including control or eradication.

Response plans have been prepared for major threats such as exotic mosquitoes, Foot-and-Mouth disease, fruit flies, the Northern Pacific Seastar and gypsy moth. The full range of threats to New Zealand is too broad to be covered by specific programmes, but generic programmes cover most threats.

The main capability for managing an incursion response sits within MAF – its Biosecurity Authority is responsible for planning, setting priorities, managing high-level incursion responses and maintaining contracts. Its capabilities are tested many times every year, in addition to annual simulation exercises (run from the Biosecurity Authority).

MFish and MoH manage marine and mosquito incursions respectively, although both agencies contract out most of the field activities. Exotic threats to biodiversity are managed by MAF for DoC. Contractors provide most of the field activity during an incursion response.

Internationally, successful marine responses are rare – effectiveness depends on early detection and a commitment to eradication.

Incursion funding

Money for incursions needs to be found quickly. The Crown bears the ultimate responsibility; so it needs to make the decisions, then find the funding. ‘Guarding Pacific’s Triple Star’ did not support establishing a dedicated fund for rapid initial response to incursions, although some submitters argued it was important. After further analysis, the Biosecurity Council remains unconvinced. It can remain on the wish list, but there are already funds available for incursion management - the problems appear to lie elsewhere.

“New Zealand primary producers are well aware of the threats posed by the introduction of unwanted organisms. Weeds such as ragwort (Senecio jacobaea), gorse (Senecio jacobaea), gorse (Senecio jacobaea Ulex europaeus ), blackberry (europaeus ), blackberry (europaeus Rubus fruticosus agg), argentine pampus grass (Cortaderia jubata and Cortaderia selloana), nodding jubata and Cortaderia selloana), nodding jubata and Cortaderia selloana thistle (Carduus nutans ) and Hieracium and Carduus nutans ) and Hieracium and Carduus nutans diseases such as Bovine TB have involved significant losses in productivity or required major costs to control. The impact of exotic pests, weeds and diseases on the economy has been estimated at about 1% of GDP, per year, plus intangibles." – G Bertram, 'The Impact of Exotic Pests on the NZ Economy'

Expectations - Incursions

48. That there is sufficient access to expertise and enough operational capacity available to respond immediately to high impact incursions;

49. That specific response plans are in place and routinely updated for an agreed set of high impact pests and diseases;

50. That generic response capability is maintained for all other incursions;

51. That financial restraints do not delay the implementation of rapid responses to high impact incursions;

52. That all initial incursions are controlled until decisions about future actions can be made; and

53. That explicit expectations are established for marine incursion management.

Eradication Success in the Chatham Islands

The remoteness of the Chatham Islands has helped protect it from exotic species, including undaria, an unwanted seaweed already established in New Zealand. So it was a potential disaster in March 2000, when a fishing boat sank with undaria on its hull.

MFish ordered the vessel to be moved (using its powers under the Biosecurity Act) but weather prevented salvage attempts. MFish then decided to use new treatment techniques to eradicate the seaweed from the hull. The hull was heat-treated (effectively, the vessel was ‘cooked’) to kill the microscopic stages of undaria, which can’t survive high temperatures.

Plywood boxes with foam seals were attached to the hull by magnets. Electric elements (powered by a diesel generator on the surface support vessel) inside the boxes heated the seawater to 70C for 10 minutes, with a flame torch used for inaccessible areas.

It took divers four weeks to complete the treatment, but a monthly monitoring programme over three years indicates the eradication has been entirely successful. The Chatham Islands’ shoreline has been surveyed regularly for undaria and no plants have been found.

Pest management

Controlling established pests and weeds represents over half biosecurity’s total expenditure.

DoC spends $53million on managing pests and weeds (mostly under Vote Conservation), and regional councils $26million. Pest management is now showing examples of sound strategic thinking, particularly by DoC and some regional councils which are focusing on eradicating or containing potential pests, and on controlling pests at priority sites to protect particular values.

DoC is developing decision tools and supporting databases for pest management, including ‘Pestlink’ to monitor pest management operations, and identify trends and best practice approaches. As a major landowner, it is imperative the Crown, through DoC, meets its obligations in managing pests and weeds on its property.

Pest management also includes ‘internal biosecurity’ strategies for long-term containment of species already here, either in captivity or in the wild. Examples of internal biosecurity undertaken under a range of legislation includes:

• Movement restrictions on bees and hives to manage varroa bee mite;
• Movement restrictions on marine farming equipment and spat to prevent spread of undaria seaweed;
• Restricting the farming of deer and other wild animals to specified areas;
• Controls on transferring freshwater fish to new areas;
• Prohibition on the movement and sale of live koi carp;
• Restrictions on introduction of new species into the coastal marine environment;
• Designating some garden plants as ‘unwanted organisms’ which prohibits their sale and distribution; and
• Bans on releasing caged birds and domestic animals into the wild.

Despite these advances, many decisions are being made in isolation – or not at all. The pest management roles of central and local government are at times muddled, with a lack of communication and coordination. This means pest management lacks strong national leadership and overview:

• Roles and responsibilities remain unclear with overlaps and gaps;
• Inconsistency in managing pests at national level;
• Pest problems remaining unmanaged, or falling to individual agencies such as DoC and regional councils;
• Lack of proactive and strategic pest management;
• Specific pest management tools such as National Pest Management Strategies are not being used;
• Little monitoring of the system or of the toolkit for managing pests; and
• Regional councils remain concerned the Biosecurity Act is preventing effective pest management, including surveillance within the context of pest management.

MAF, as the agency in charge of managing the biosecurity system, will have to be more active in ensuring agencies have specific areas of responsibility, with clear communications between central and regional government and appropriate legislative tools.

The Biosecurity Council is not suggesting MAF should take on the pest management responsibilities of agencies such as DoC, or the responsibilities of industry or individual landowners. MAF should, however, have an overview of the whole biosecurity system.

The Council expects a review and rationalisation of legislative tools for pest management over time, eventually bringing powers for long-term containment of pests under the Biosecurity Act where appropriate. This is consistent with the overall expectation that New Zealand’s biosecurity system will be integrated and continuously improved.

Expectations - Pest management

54. That there is clear and effective national leadership and coordination of pest management activities within central government, local government and the private sector;

55. That there are transparent and effective performance measures to monitor and forecast the establishment of pest and weed impacts and pathways;

56. That the Crown meets its obligations as a landowner; and

57. That there is a routine programme of national and regional communication and coordination including ongoing assessment and review of both individual programmes and the overall system.

John Hellström
Captain Cook noted the striking bird life and plant biodiversity at Snake Point,in Queen Charlotte Sound. In the past 80 years,it has become a monoculture of self-seeded wilding pines,now spreading as weeds through the Marlborough Sounds. Wilding pines have become a problem throughout New Zealand,especially in the Sounds and tussock lands.

Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito

The Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito (Ochlerotatus camptoryhnchus) is a known vector for the debilitating Ross River Virus disease and has a high nuisance value because it bites during the day and is very aggressive. Ross River Virus disease (epidemic polyarthritis) is endemic in Australia. It causes inflammation of the joints, with symptoms ranging from pain and tenderness in the muscles and joints to flu-like symptoms; most people fully recover within a month. No locally acquired cases of the disease have been reported in New Zealand to date.

Tourists and returning travellers can carry the disease but it cannot be transmitted from person-to-person, the disease can only be spread through the bites of certain mosquito species, including the Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito. Animals - possums and horses, for example - are known reservoirs for Ross River virus.

Establishment of the Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito could impact on native birds and possibly act as a host for other wildlife diseases. The mosquito has many intangible costs – mainly impacts on lifestyle, tourism, and outdoor workers.

The Napier incursion was initially detected in 1998 through complaints of nuisance biting. The Ministry of Health led the eradication programme, because of the human health impacts. The Southern Saltmarsh Mosquito was eradicated from the Napier area by June 31 2002; no adults have been found for 28 months, and no larvae for 24 months. This local eradication of the speciesa world-first and the same approach is now being used to eradicate the species in other parts of New Zealand.

The eradication programme included:

• Habitat modification and elimination - including clearing drains to remove weed and ensure water flows instead of ponding, completely drying out other drains during drier periods of the year so they didn’t need treatment, filling depressions to eliminate ponding, removing dense vegetation, aerial surveillance and liasing with landowners and stakeholders to ensure any land modification which could produce new habitat was notified;
• Use of control agents - Bti and s-methoprene, maintenance of lethal concentrations of s-methoprene in all wet habitats for at least two summers and use of Bti for spot treatments;
• Surveillance - ongoing surveillance, enhanced at wet habitats after each water event, any live larvae or pupae collected and returned to the laboratory for screening identification;
• Consultation with local communities, landowners, territorial authorities, environmental groups, Maori and other interested parties; and
• Public information including newsletters,public notices,media statements,fact sheets about the control agents,a freephone queries number and daily updates on areas being treated with control agents.

The growing weed problem

• Over 70% of new ecological weed problems are 'garden escapes' - introduced ornamental species that have naturalised. Around Auckland alone there are four garden escapes annually, adding to the more than 200 seriously invasive weeds managed by DoC.
• 10% of plants will naturalise; 10% of these will become serious pests. There are currently 25,000 exotic plant species in gardens and nurseries in New Zealand.
• The number of naturalised exotic plants now exceeds the number of native vascular ones.
• Tourists bring new weeds to New Zealand's remote areas where they thrive in disturbed areas around tracks and huts. Mt Cook has wild cherries, raspberries, gooseberry and conifers.
• Humans = weed problems. People bring in new plants that escape; rubbish is dumped in bush reserves; and the expansion of coastal subdivisions and lifestyle blocks exacerbates the spread of pests.
• If left uncontrolled, pest problems expand exponentially. The estimated cost of controlling wilding pines in the South Island high country increases 10 times every six years. It costs $3 per hectare per year to control young wilding pines compared to $1,500 for 25-year-old trees.
• Botanic gardens harbour many potential plant pests. Christchurch Botanic Gardens has a plant called Celastrus that, although not established as a weed in Canterbury, is a serious new weed in the central North Island, East Coast, and Nelson where DoC is spending $55,000 annually to attempt to eradicate or contain it.
• Hydrilla - one of the world's most noxious waterweeds - is established at four Hawke's Bay sites. In Florida $US20million is spent annually to control it. In New Zealand, little funding has been allocated to warn owners that powerboats must be clean before entering lakes.
• Many weeds grow more vigorously in the warm, moist Northland district compared to other parts of New Zealand. Climate change means weeds further south will become problems.
• In South Australia olive trees are rated as one of the worst 20 weeds. Olives have been in New Zealand for a long time without becoming a problem, but the olive industry's importation of new varieties and climate changes means olives may become a weed pest.
• Weeds are an international problem, Australia now has Siam weed, one of the world's worst, which has seeds that hook into clothing.
• A serious sand dune weed 'sea spurge' (Glyphorbia paralias) has invaded South Australia and Tasmania and now has a high chance of reaching New Zealand through ocean currents and ballast discharge.