



Report from

New border system workshop

22 and 23 April 2010

Wellington and Auckland

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Introduction

1. This report covers two workshops where MAF Biosecurity New Zealand officials met with border system stakeholders, on 22 April 2010 in Wellington and 23 April in Auckland. The follow-up actions and participants are at the end of the report.
2. This round of workshops was the third in a series to engage stakeholders early and hear their suggestions for building a new border system that is fit for purpose in a biosecurity sense and also meets the needs of stakeholders who businesses cross it. A further round of workshops is planned for August 2010.
3. The morning session looked at the macro picture, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand's proposed border direction for the next five years and progress on developing the new border system.
4. The afternoon session looked at key operational parts of the new border system in more detail. What profiling will and wont be, at a conceptual level, was introduced. Then participants were invited to suggest improvements to some of the tools MAF intends for managing passengers, cargo and craft under the new border system.
5. All the comments from the workshops are treated as submissions and passed on to the relevant MAF Biosecurity New Zealand work streams for consideration.
6. The summary take-home messages for MAF Biosecurity New Zealand were tested with the participants at the close of the workshops.
7. The body of the report is the comments made by stakeholders from both workshops, sorted into topic areas. The comments may have come from discussion group flip charts, when discussion groups reported back or from discussion in the workshop as a whole.

Take home messages for MAF Biosecurity New Zealand

Wellington workshop

8. You are reasonably comfortable that MAF Biosecurity New Zealand is on the right path at the macro level but the devil is in the detail. You have asked for more detail, such as case studies, to increase your confidence in the new system.
9. Communications: MAF Biosecurity New Zealand needs to keep our communications fit for purpose, not over done or underdone. We will do our best.
10. Risk areas you are particularly concerned about are MAF Biosecurity New Zealand's ability to do what we say we want to do, and especially our ability to change our culture, elements of the macro environment over which we have no control and also the risk of something going wrong as the change is in progress and unwinding our work.
11. You have asked us to be more specific about what we mean when we talk about, for example, verification, rewarding compliant and non-compliant importers and how we will hold non-compliant importers accountable. We have heard that message clearly.
12. For outcome based standards, you asked us not to lose the detail, so the transparency remains and people have confidence in the requirements and what needs to happen. The additional information could be part of the guidance material accompanying standards.
13. Today Carolyn Whyte outlined how we are approaching risk profiling. At the next workshop, you would like more about how we will use profiling and case studies.
14. Peter Silcock reminded us that New Zealand is part of an international system and how important it is that we align with other countries, especially the ones we trade with. New Zealand is leading the way in some areas but other countries lead in other areas.
15. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand also needs to get clear segments for managing in the new system. From there we can identify the opportunities and options for influencing towards compliant behaviour. Again, the theme for today, detail will lead to confidence.
16. The next opportunity to see the bill to amend the Biosecurity Act will be on the Parliamentary website after the bill has been tabled in Parliament. However, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand will be able to talk about the implications for implementation earlier than that.
17. This form of communication is valued for the cross discussion, richness of information and quality of the feedback compared to the written submissions process. Discussion at the system-wide level, e.g. is the system correct, are efforts being directed to the right parts of the system, is valued and should continue but there will also need to be more specific communications as we move forward. It was noted that this approach is resource intensive and some organisations simply don't have the resources to participate.

Auckland workshop

18. The general direction of the new border system is OK but you want to see and understand the detail. That is where the devil is.
19. Communications: ongoing engagement is important to build that confidence and understanding. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand is committed to that.
20. It will be important to build into the new system a mechanism to assess the practicality of what MAF Biosecurity New Zealand is proposing in standards. Thank you for reinforcing that to us.
21. Who is liable when things go wrong is an area that MAF Biosecurity New Zealand needs to do more thinking about.
22. The clear message about IT was get systems in place that are forward looking and use currently accepted standards.
23. I sensed good support and encouragement in the profiling and intelligence area and working more closely with Customs.
24. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand needs to factor supply chain logistics into our thinking, especially the practicality of and tools for managing biosecurity risk.
25. Hardening up on non-complying importers and enforcement was also a theme today. We hope to see change in this area in the future.
26. Alignment with our key trading partner countries, and especially Australia, continues to be really important. Many are facing the same challenges and it is better to work together than in isolation.
27. You have engaged with the material presented today and support the approach. We hope you will see us using these tools to drive into the future.
28. The process used for today's workshop has been good.

Comments from workshop participants

	<i>MAF's border direction for next 5 years</i>
1.	Principles OK but more detail please, e.g. case studies
2.	High level support but concern about some of the detail. Direction good
3.	Overall direction OK. Language high level.
4.	Support at high level. Interested to see the detail.
5.	Overall good.
6.	Detail needed. Good to know what is going on
7.	Often overlooks details where real issues found, e.g. sea containers
8.	Very high level generalities that you can't argue with
9.	Details?
10.	Sounds good, devil in the detail.
11.	What is the detail?
12.	Clarifies at this level for MAF but not for industry.
13.	Long term goals for the border system still unclear.
14.	Purpose is to stop the stuff getting here
15.	How will we know if the new system is successful
16.	Will we ever reach [the new state]?
	<i>Risks</i>
17.	Overseas authorities reaction to New Zealand having a more stringent system. Our exports getting a harder time from import authorities.
18.	Costs going up for importers and exporters.
19.	Risk of getting a biosecurity problem during the change that makes people assume that the change has failed.
20.	Risks to change ably described. Some risks lead to incursions and then blame game occurs. If during implementation of change get an incursion and changes blamed even if not related. "Changes not working."
21.	Discussion and concern about the cost of mistakes if something slips through. Everyone in business needs to make a profit. Tension in managing the changes. What impact will the target passenger processing times have on risk management? Will we still catch the dirty tramping boots?
22.	What is acceptable risk? Or the optimum level of risk? 500 establishments? Changing patterns of trade bring different risks.
23.	Reaction to change of people already in the border system a significant risk.
24.	Loss of talented MAF people.
25.	Centralised IT falling over. JBMS will have a bigger impact if it stops working than the current multiple systems.
26.	Don't want a \$921million mistake. Want \$921million in sales.

27.	Government and industry agreements post border – need discussion between them and this group.
28.	Mutual implications financially of meeting the new requirements.
29.	May choose not to manage a disease because it has a small impact on the economy. However it may impact NZ Inc through our clean green brand. Suggest that it may be worth working out what our biosecurity brand is worth to NZ in trade.
30.	Are these changes vulnerable to the funding cuts in government? MAFBNZ: Biosecurity hasn't been asked to make any cuts to our Crown funding although it has been made very clear that there wont be any funding increases either. We must drive improved efficiency into the system.
	<i>Legislation changes</i>
31.	Felt not a huge influence on the Biosecurity Act amendment. Will be interested to see what comes out.
32.	Will there be more opportunity to comment of the draft biosecurity amendment bill? MAFBNZ: The next opportunity to comment on the amendment to the Biosecurity Act will be at the Select Committee stage of its passage through Parliament. However, MAF will be able to talk about the underlying policy and implementation of the layers below the Act earlier.
33.	The Food Bill is also nearly ready to go into the House. Will the merger of MAF and NZFSA affect the timing of the changes to legislation? MAFBNZ: The advice we have received is to carry on business as usual.
	<i>Working with other departments</i>
34.	Fresh approach of working with Customs sensible.
35.	A potential fish hook: NZ Food Safety Authority has tough inspection levels but biosecurity's are not so tough.
36.	Are we likely to see Customs officers doing biosecurity inspections of ships and MAF inspectors doing Customs inspections of ships? MAFBNZ: Not yet. There is a Ministers group overseeing the changes to the border sector but the change isn't at a point where workload sharing can be discussed.
37.	Is there a possibility that Customs and MAF will be merged? MAFBNZ: A merger sounds simple but it isn't. MAF operates deep up and down the relatively narrow band of biosecurity and both off and on-shore. Customs has a very broad area of interest but operates mostly at the border. Some functions may come together. Ministers are very keen to drive efficiency.
	<i>Targeting resources to the most important risks</i>
38.	Interventions need to be targeted
39.	Make sure the current resource is utilised to the maximum.
40.	Importance of communication to manage perceptions. This is not revolutionary change but evolutionary change. We will be keeping what is working well and improving the others.
41.	It would be useful for stakeholders to understand the relative risk of pathways, that nil risk is not an option. More explanation of why we do it a particular way would be welcome.

	People
42.	Need to do more work on New Zealanders being informed and involved in the system. The TV show is good but more work is needed. One example is to compare the Australian and New Zealand in flight videos.
43.	For border biosecurity communications there may be two levels of New Zealand: the general public and then another level up for the industry, ports and airline people involved. More information is needed on the importance of biosecurity.
44.	A key fishhook is MAF's ability to deliver changes on the ground. This is related to the ability of MAF people to make the change contemplated; away from inspection and towards looking at things with a systems based approach. This is a significant change and many MAF people have been in quarantine a long time and were employed for certain qualities.
45.	Training will be critical.
46.	MAF / PSA collective review
47.	Change in operating culture and attitude for both MAF staff and industry.
48.	MAF cultural change
49.	Staff uncertainty
	Information
50.	The idea of a central database that brings information to border agencies is a good idea. Well overdue.
51.	Build forward looking technology into the new systems. Don't replace the current archaic systems with more backward looking systems.
52.	Need electronics systems to support (one system)
53.	It is important that intervention is supported by actual information. If you don't have the information, get it, rather than wholesale lockdown of the existing system. But look at any existing data as well.
54.	When moving to a centralised database, be confident that the information moved across is relevant to biosecurity and enough is imported and is in electronic form.
55.	Put pressure on everyone to have electronic information flows.
56.	Don't put archaic systems in place to replace old systems, e.g. some email systems.
57.	How will inspectors manage on-site access of 10 years information? MAFBNZ: we are looking at how to push information to inspectors when they get the job sheet.
58.	How will MAF get the information for profiling? MAFBNZ: MAF is using a lot of information from Customs. Information from many years of sea containers and cargo inspections is held in the Quantum database. For passengers, we screen using the P and R data that airlines give Customs.
59.	Will historical data be transferred to the common database? What sort of information will be transferred? MAFBNZ: We will want to use the information that we already have, and are doing this already. There is a legal question about having access to data that was collected under another Act. Also, there will be a lengthy transition period as the new system builds up.

60.	<p>Does MAFBNZ have access to the full information that Customs has?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Yes. The MAF passenger targeting team is located in the Customs National Targeting Centre and there is liaison with for cargo targeting.</p>
	<p><i>Rules, standards and systems design</i></p>
61.	<p>Set reasonable thresholds.</p>
62.	<p>Reducing the time taken to develop import health standards and the complexity changes are supported.</p>
63.	<p>Standards with just an outcome statement, rather than being prescriptive, could be seen as being a bit loose. How to get comfortable with having options when there is a diversity of opinion. Using the example of genetically modified organisms, some are saying that New Zealand needs a very prescriptive approach and others want an outcome approach.</p>
64.	<p>For import health standards, some companies may want the import requirements to be very specific.</p>
65.	<p>If the standard is an outcome statement, the accompanying guidelines need to be very clear.</p>
66.	<p>Directions need to be very clear for importers and other people in the import chain.</p>
67.	<p>When contemplating changes to import requirements, involve stakeholders early so we can make suggestions and also prepare our supply chain for the change.</p>
68.	<p>As early as possible in the development of an import health standard include consideration of how the requirements might be met in practice. The implications for one e.g. air or sea terminal, might be quite different from the implications for others. Let us work together to develop equivalent systems.</p>
69.	<p>Working out the practicalities to implement import health standards are opportunities to engage. In the area of sea containers we are still seeing too much risk.</p>
70.	<p>It will be important for stakeholders to be able to comment on the veracity of achieving the outcome statement in a standard.</p>
71.	<p>The import health standard request area is messy. New Zealand has a big list of requests that are not being progressed. Other countries must have similar request lists. Feel a different approach to developing standards is needed worldwide. Could we not seek international agreement to standardise how we manage different pest / disease / country / industry combinations. Then New Zealand wouldn't have to re-litigate. Methyl bromide is an example of an outcome based standard as it kills nearly all quarantine pests.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: MAF Biosecurity New Zealand certainly intends to change the way we deal with the backlog, using existing information. This is part of the new approach we are proposing.</p> <p>Australia, Canada and USA all have backlogs and we talk to each other about how we plan to respond. New Zealand's approach is well regarded. Australia is talking about the risk return concept, the rules of implementation to get the best return for taxpayers.</p> <p>Animal imports already have many off the shelf standards; their international standard setting body has have been going much longer than plants'. Expecting plants' to work towards having agreed standards but hasn't got there yet. However, New Zealand can't wait for international standards to be developed, we must deal with the challenges we face now.</p>
72.	<p>It is very hard for people at the border, especially inspectors, to implement the many different standards and option.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: we intend to have a lot less standards.</p>

73.	<p>How do the people who write import health standards get their information? I have been talking to a MAF person who was asking very basic questions about food technology. This is a concern because you need to understand the effect requirements are going to have in practice when writing the standard.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: MAF doesn't have all our experts in house and it might be that we are not strong in food technology. Science in our core focus and we use a range of experts from around the world. However, we also use information about what is happening in practice to develop requirements.</p>
74.	<p>Legal issues with guidelines?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: MAF wont be saying guidelines are mandatory and we will working with groups to develop them. The aim is to provide visibility and make clear why a solution is likely to be acceptable. That is why guidelines fall into the rules area rather than operations.</p>
75.	<p>For transitional and containment facilities and post-border containment, will MAF be moving more towards the ACC / Dept of Labour model using codes of practice? Inspectors and auditors develop a really good feel for what works and develop codes of practice so operators can be confident that what they develop in their facilities will meet the requirements.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: This is getting back to having outcome standards with guidance attached. The Food Safety Authority is very much in that mode, setting the rules at a high level and then providing a model that most practitioners can meet. It's a form of co-management.</p>
76.	<p>How does biosecurity work in government to government agreements?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Most free trade agreements that NZ is party to have an SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary) chapter which set out the rules trade will occur under and mechanisms to resolve disputes. We have similar arrangements with CER and the Quads.</p>
77.	<p>Are we confident that this new approach is SPS compliant and will be accepted by our trading partners? WE need to be clear what measures are used to meet an outcome, so there is confidence it has been met, not just 95%. How can effectiveness be assessed. The outcome approach might not be compatible with clarity.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Where a standard has only an outcome statement, then that outcome must be clearly measurable. We have already realised that some standards need to have more than just an outcome statement. However, we do think it will be a good discipline for all standards to state the outcome sought.</p> <p>Outcome standards will be accompanied by guidance for how to meet the standard. If offshore measures are important and a formal agreement is required, our intention is to share the picture with stakeholders.</p>
<p><i>Accredited systems</i></p>	
78.	<p>This approach has already been done with imported motor vehicles. However, what is proposed here is more systematised.</p>
79.	<p>Accreditation schemes will need to be aligned.</p>
80.	<p>Managing risk off-shore can be practical and operationally desirable.</p>
81.	<p>How to manage so as to achieve equivalent systems that meet the requirements in the import health standard.</p>
82.	<p>MAF and stakeholders work together to develop equivalent systems.</p>
83.	<p>Recognise that off-shore compliance / risk management depends on New Zealand's relative influence. We can do more in the Pacific than in Singapore.</p>
84.	<p>For [accrediting] international [overseas based?] exporters and importers, use current resources already there rather than new resources.</p>

85.	Can we use accredited systems in place overseas as part of New Zealand interventions?
86.	<p>New Zealand has a range of programmes for off-shore. Most approaches are targeted to specific pests. Other countries are concerned about different pests from New Zealand.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: There is a definite principle that trade is a two-way street. If we expect other countries to do a measure for imports to New Zealand, we must be prepared to live with that measure for our exports also.</p>
87.	<p>Compliance measures off-shore. Scrutiny of our exports by off-shore authorities. This is the future that we see - management of risk across the system. The issue is how do you build trust?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: New Zealand is proud of our systems. We don't see building trust as a major issue but we do want to line up with trading partner countries. The biggest issue is the actual measures imposed.</p>
	<i>Profiling and intelligence</i>
88.	Support profiling approach, although concerned about access to biosecurity relevant information.
89.	This reverses the strategy of a few years ago, for inspection at transitional facilities. Now the emphasis is back on the ports and their capacity to inspect.
90.	Profiling and intelligence are becoming more important. What will replace 100% inspection? There are too many assumptions about current practices, including what happens off-shore.
91.	A potential fishhook: explaining the move from 100% inspection at airports to profiling. The concept is hard to explain simply and 100% inspection has become a sacred cow. Even if can show profiling improves detection rates, likely to get, "Why don't you do both?" Recognise that the stats may be political but suggest that you provide real examples of groups where more risks and targeting works.
92.	Provide real examples of profiling effectiveness compared to 100% screening to give confidence in the new approach.
93.	Dynamics of profiling and targeting. How to achieve? Quality assurance will be a challenge for all involved. Another big issue will be communicating the changes. 6-7 years ago, 100% x-rays were the big thing. Why not now? Message about doing biosecurity off-shore not getting through to industry and the broader public who are our strongest advocates.
94.	Need to use intelligence to build a picture of the risks to target. Have to be flexible and able to change quickly.
95.	<p>Will MAFBNZ be feeding back to industry when profiles have been developed, e.g. which geographical areas have higher risks and compliance costs so we can target less risky ones?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Profiles that do not identify specific companies or individuals could be shared. That is already happening for containers from the Pacific.</p>
96.	<p>Does Customs know how long a barge or oil rig has been stationary?</p> <p>Simon Williamson, Customs: The data submitted to Customs includes origin and duration of voyage. MAF will probably want to expand on that information and the field can easily be adjusted.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: At a recent meeting with AQIS, we agreed that Australia and New Zealand could work more closely together, e.g. recognising the screening work done by each other and sharing databases about vessel and ports visits.</p>
97.	<p>Moving to evidence based profiles risks moving intuition out of the system?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: The profile will be evidence based. Then inspectors use the full information available to them at the time, including the profile and their human intuition, for example where to look for patterns of information. Profiles will change over time. If we keep targeting something even if the information tells us there is no risk, everyone loses.</p>

98.	<p>Build up experience using profiles? The Police, IRD and Customs already use profiles.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: From December more profilers will be co-located with Customs. Customs has more experience with using intelligence to drive inspection activity while they are interested in our experience managing in pathways.</p>
99.	<p>Will it be clear to recipients who is being focussed on? It would be helpful to know who are the good guys to go to, to get our imports.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: If a profile identifies a compliant product, yes, people would know about it. If non-compliance is associated with a specific company, then privacy means we won't be naming and shaming.</p> <p>The Inland Revenue Department identifies pockets of industry where they think there are issues and focus their compliance probes on those pockets. They publicly announce the areas in advance and get major shifts in voluntary compliance with just the announcement. Applying that behaviour to MAF, e.g. if we saw a problem with a particular segment, we might publicise it. This would address some issues such as where published lists are wrong.</p>
	<p><i>Operations at the border</i></p>
100.	<p>General agreement that the new system will give more opportunities to manage one-off and unusual circumstances.</p>
101.	<p>Need to find practical ways to meet import health standard requirements, e.g. using logistics chains and inland terminals.</p>
102.	<p>Need to work with industry closely to effect operational change.</p>
103.	<p>Standardise practices of MAF inspectors around the country</p>
104.	<p>Put in place systems to check that decision-making is consistent around the country to combat capture of inspectors by stakeholders.</p>
105.	<p>Although there is government financial pressure in all areas, some of the border is funded by cost recovery from industry. We have seen reduction in staff when there was a downturn in trade. If trade increases, we should see an increase in staff. However, there are other pressures to increase efficiency and effectiveness.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Inspection at the border is not necessarily the best place to prevent biosecurity risks. We want to consider other parts of the system that might give a better result for biosecurity.</p>
106.	<p>Logistics – MAFBNZ will need capacity ramp up.</p>
107.	<p>Increased inspection could result in slower and slower response times. Potential to add another day to delivery time.</p>
108.	<p>MAF inspectors observation of public holidays when New Zealand is now a 24/7 operation.</p>
	<p><i>Compliance and enforcement</i></p>
109.	<p>Get messages through.</p>
110.	<p>Are we spending enough time on the bottom of the compliance triangle, those already on board? What is the balance with addressing intentional non-compliance?</p>
111.	<p>Language used to talk to people, and the diversity of importers, travellers and public groups.</p>
112.	<p>What do we mean by the role of the public? Voluntary compliance decisions and being our eyes and ears, reporting backyard finds so we can respond.</p>
113.	<p>Need the system of rewards and consequences to be clear.</p>
114.	<p>Still being too nice around legal penalties</p>

115.	Changes to compliance. Getting tougher and need to communicate with passengers that the aim is to get compliant people and stop stuff reaching New Zealand in the first place, as opposed to collecting fines for the consolidated fund.
116.	Cargo importers are not legally bound if a cargo is not compliant, compared to the infringement finds for passengers e.g. if apple doesn't comply.
117.	Additional audit / verification for non-compliance is a good thing.
118.	Identifying when intervention or prosecution is more appropriate is the trick. If an import is non-compliant, prosecuting importers and retailers would be a much stronger lever.
119.	Operationally, the really powerful tools are to hit the non-compliant in the pocket and in time to cross the port. The consequences up and down the chain are big. Shipping companies are also hurt. Delay is a much more effective tool than getting the lawyers together.
120.	There should be collective accountability in an import chain (as opposed to an individual traveller).
121.	How would collective accountability work? If there is a weak link in a chain, should focus on that link. For example, there is an AQIS certificate that a treatment has happened but it wasn't done. Collective indicates that both the importer and the grower would be held responsible. Suggest use peer pressure rather than ping everyone for the failure of one. On the other hand, if a crate is dirty and several people in the chain could have fixed it, that a time to apply collective responsibility.
122.	Penalties for supply chain responsibility compared to travellers who come here. At the moment the importer is charged. We should make it harder for people who send the non-compliant stuff and keep the responsibility overseas.
123.	Disappointment that importers would not be legally bound by "unknowingly" importing.
124.	Segmentation strategy – segments will need to go quite deep into the system. Some elements of a pathway will be compliant. One importer may play a role in compliant and non-compliant commodities. You can't automatically penalise them if just one programme slips up. MAFBNZ: Agree, don't want to tar a whole industry. Target because there are issues. But a good guy should be experiencing the benefits of compliance as well as the consequences of non-compliance. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand has been told that we fail in both ways because we treat all importers the same. This group has told us to get tougher on those we know are knowingly / recklessly / deliberately non-compliant.
125.	How will the new system address non-compliance offshore, e.g. the importer has done all they can, the meat certificate looks OK but isn't accurate? MAFBNZ: In the new system, when a non-compliance is identified, we will be able to address irrespective of where the product is going to, i.e. the non-compliant exporter will be identified so they can't keep sending product to other people.
126.	At a previous meeting, MAF said you are unable to make non-compliant importers pay [for post border response costs and impacts]. MAFBNZ: If you change the language slightly, we can make non-compliant imports pay. For example an importer with a bad track record will experience a higher rate of audit, inspection and treatment, and have to pay for them. And that doesn't take into account the biggest cost, which is time
127.	Spin off to compliance could be increased costs to exporters.

128.	<p>If New Zealand becomes more stringent, will our exporters get caught, e.g. having been made to clean an oil rig before it arrived in New Zealand and then having to clean it before it leaves, and where would you do that?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: That risk is part of international dynamics. But if your exports comply with the import requirements, you should still be OK. Exports that don't comply might not be OK. Other governments have means to ping imports but maybe they aren't as transparent as New Zealand.</p>
	<i>Communicating change</i>
129.	There is always change
130.	This change evolutionary not revolutionary
131.	Diverse groups of importers and the public
132.	Increased education to raise the biosecurity awareness of the public and industry
133.	Important for communication to continue throughout the change to manage perceptions
134.	Challenge around giving clear communication about changes to those involved (include multiple languages)
135.	Main thing is to communicate early with stakeholders with a clear and precise implementation plan. If left late stakeholders wont be informed enough. On MAF's past performance, not confident.
136.	Overseas reactions
137.	Communications have spin offs for exporters credibility
138.	Potential fishhook: Communicating about profiling to stakeholders and gaining their confidence in this technique. For example, the current perception is that 100% screening results in close to 100% detection.
139.	Credibility of MAF is at stake – implementing 100% blanket interventions will hurt MAF's credibility as a risk manager. Interventions need to be targeted.
	<i>Implementation</i>
140.	Promising things – standardised practice, unified IT system, national targeting rules and centre.
141.	Good idea – communicate early so can participate, want implementation plan that is clear and precise.
142.	Direction good but may be a gap in implementation.
143.	Time needed to implement change
144.	Implementation timeframes for changes in pathways do not give confidence in MAF communicating with stakeholders.
	<i>Sea containers</i>
145.	Sea container standard is an example of devil in the detail – need to be sure that change is operationally feasible, e.g. quarantine declaration for empty containers.

146.	<p>Proposed approach to sea container compliance will be too resource intensive for MAF.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ More empties will be captured by container inspections ○ Inaccurate quarantine declarations for empties / full (external) ○ More cross contamination ○ More fraudulent declarations ○ Changes in container origins, .e.g. more from China and India.
147.	We don't have adequate information on empty containers
148.	Reality check – can't expect to get quarantine declarations on all empties
149.	Containers are an example of fishhooks when putting new systems in place. Be careful about what threshold chosen – implications for resources, ours and yours. Requirements not always available and other countries not interested in supplying. Impacts. Industry solution not considered acceptable.
150.	Important for risk management cycle to identify the specific risk pathways containers (or other items), not doing 100% of everything.
151.	<p>MAF is more consultative but when get to operational problem there are still problems. For example, with shipping containers we have been told that our equivalent systems are not acceptable. We anticipate major problems with our importing. These documents are too high level to pick up problems like that.</p> <p>Empties are especially problematic. The standard is totally impractical. Can't see MAF services being able to meet demand. Haven't even worked through the process of going through port and the practicality of the numbers involved.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: We definitely want to engage so we understand. However, sea containers is a very challenging area with real risks. Currently, the balance is not quite right. New Zealand needs to strengthen our controls to protect. MAF is committed to that approach and past workshops have told us to toughen up on sea containers. MAF is keen to hear how we can achieve what needs to be achieved.</p> <p>We realise there is a problem and some things wont work. This is why there was a lag between the standard being issued and coming into effect. Please send us information to quickly so we can identify what can be complied with and focus on what is going wrong.</p>
<i>Passengers: suggestions for MAFBNZ pathway management model</i>	
152.	Ramp up communication messages to travellers
153.	Will we still capture the dirty tramping boots with Smartgate and passenger profiling?
154.	For cruise ships, the crew is between 35 and 40% of the people on board. Might be a good place to start communications.
155.	Are we (MAF?) considering resource requirements for cruise ships as well as airports?
156.	Less work has been for cruise ship passengers than air passengers. Ships have been held up because of MAF interventions but not the passengers.
157.	<p>Communications research into why non-compliant. Knowing there will be 100% x rays and believing, rightly or wrongly, that they will find anything has the biggest impact on behaviour.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Largest group accidental non-compliers. Don't want to bring risk goods. But agree really strong power 100% x-ray and sniffed by dog. Frequent travellers know will be really embarrassing if caught with something. Individual passenger may have heard of the exit lane but wont know if they will be selected by a profile. Quicker exit will also be a strong incentive for regular travellers to do right.</p>

158.	<p>Tour guides missed off.</p> <p>Food courts and bars. Kiddies packs include a biosecurity game. Website hyperlinks or one stop so information really quickly.</p> <p>Media – before intending to travel and before travelling. Govt departments as a party before travel.</p> <p>Before intending to travel – best use of Tourism NZ and promote NZ and need to protect.</p> <p>Preparing to travel – id embassies where have to apply for visa to come to NZ and give out biosecurity requirements when apply and receive visa.</p> <p>If businesses have visitors– could be proactive advising rules – link what to do not do.</p> <p>Point of travel – when checking in especially Australia to NZ – opportunity biosecurity risks.</p> <p>Declaration cards in local language at point of departure.</p> <p>Air NZ quiz</p>
159.	<p>Arrival inspectors be a little more proactive providing advice.</p> <p>Visibility of detector dogs very use. Enhance.</p> <p>Some regulatory review of questions on declaration card to ensure optimal order.</p> <p>Accommodation providers</p> <p>Telecom providers. When you turn on phone – include in welcome message.</p> <p>Motor-homes.</p>
160.	<p>Good, comprehensive break down. 1st how can MAF do the job better behind the scenes without have to stop people as arrive. Find as much info as possible. Eg profession through visa application. Passport application – info sources already existing. But big brother concerns. Customs can access by statute to do job.</p>
161.	<p>Travel industry has much info re their people. One basis to provide communication. Service to clientele. Need to work closely with them. MAF likewise preparing, travelling and post. Often travel operator knows more than anyone than anyone else. MAF need to be informed to take mitigation steps.</p> <p>Messaging help technology. Is it possible to get advanced [transmitted in advance of arrival] X-ray images from Australia? Know available. Customs does with USA for cargo. Possible – baggage transferred and vice versa.</p> <p>Interventions especially on arrival - make compliance more voluntary. Videos on aircraft, quarantine bins and encourage compliance but at end of day – if need to enforce, do it and people need to understand not just a game - serious.</p> <p>Cruise ships – big plus – current practice to send inspectors offshore to pre-clear. Very positive initiative to stop queues greater efficiency and compliance.</p> <p>Arrival card - options only yes or no, add don't know option or if not sure, ask.</p> <p>People domiciled outside NZ - when book ticket - pop up NZ biosecurity rules. Book tickets - parts of travel separately so target multiple points to give out message.</p> <p>Interventions -- groups travelling together.</p> <p>DVD compulsory.</p> <p>Ports security compared to biosecurity. Inspectors resource intensive and take cabins</p> <p>Nothing in here how to id people and do interventions – another whole area.</p> <p>Item 4 - Arrival form - re-arrival, entry. Definitions.</p>

162.	<p>Encourage New Zealanders to work with friends and family overseas coming here to visit. Tour groups, companies, events, e.g. farm visits workers, student exchanges On route – airlines do videos and announcements. Airline staff with language skills to assist with messages. Arrival card – people with less knowledge of biosecurity or ESOL -at different place or more specific messaging. Post entry – 0800 number linked to passenger arriving if find something after arrive.</p>
163.	<p>Events - communicate with organisers. Before intending to travel, Tourism NZ website biosecurity link. Travel videos. Difficulties with different languages pre-travel and also with video. LAGs – only pictures worked but so many biosecurity things. Tying in to clean and green and your help to keep. Airlines can give assistance, e.g. filling in card but cabin crew can be busy especially when coming into land. Can't expect to help at that point. Interventions – under travel – Utilise instead of consider. Video – MAFBNZ follow along Air NZ skin video! Need something to catch attention. Interventions and risk mgmt – also separate Aus NZ returning residents from the rest. Post entry – washing gear, fishing gear, border patrol, prosecutions.</p>
	<p><i>Cargo: suggestions for MAFBNZ pathway management model</i></p>
164.	<p>B4 intending import or export – industry point of view – communications on search engines associated with business that offshore companies might want to interact with eg pop ups regulatory information MAFBNZ site to act as information portal – provide industry lists of brokers and forwarders – may be ranked – good guys and bad guys. MAF communications emphasise the benefits of compliance e.g. financial, times etc. Search on website – want to import from somewhere or export to NZ - information clear concise and useable. E.g. instead of IHS – just key points requiring to be met, certain steps and links for guidance. In transit – especially containers – be able to trace movement further than last port, to port of origin or even further back. GPS for profiling. Can get for individual. JBMS looking at whether can get last 10 ports. Entry – using interacting with large retailers re their responsibility post border. E.g. if not a transitional facility – education and who to talk to.</p>
165.	<p>Cargo handlers involved. Departure appropriate? Shipped.</p>
166.	<p>Need vets everywhere! (and the vet didn't say it) Entry and for transit. Could cluster some for presentation. For example, regulatory agencies. Chamber of Commerce missing. Step import licences / permits – are they the same thing, Entry – Min of Health. Contractors of pest mgmt and surveillance, growers, farmers, transporters, public and researcher and vets. Why lawyers so prominent and crossed them out. Containment <i>facility</i> under entry – never intend to clear and clearance under transitional facility.</p>

167.	<p>Import / exporter behaviours – see importers to be confident re their exporters. Also opportunity to levy charges onto their exporter. Incentive to get it right.</p> <p>MAF – influence people re biosecurity.</p> <p>Offshore mitigation measures and preclearance options. In transit – MAF working with companies to find barriers and break down.</p> <p>Clearance – to be included? Open question whether clearance by other industry organisations.</p> <p>Stronger response in light of non-compliance. Not being afraid to be bold. Send clear messages.</p> <p>Post clearance – fall out from contentious decisions. Some missed out.</p>
168.	<p>May be not nailed domestic layers. Post entry distribution, networks and risk communications. Compensation claims. Post clearance issues mgmt may be another stage.</p> <p>Other areas – insurers – insurance companies – charge fees to drive behaviours. If could hook up with them re expectations.</p> <p>All people before export require letter of credit that can pay, opportunity also.</p>
169.	<p>Looking at contractual terms importer with exporter – terms of engagement – any financial obligation re supplying compliant containers in 1st instance. Then, how do you determine non-compliant and financial recourse – how do you determine whose fault. Cross contamination – bigger ships, transhipped cargo. Pack point, export, trans-ship, on vessel. Where responsibility sit.</p> <p>Australia – penalise everyone along the chain. Not popular with targets.</p> <p>Differences between countries how apply and how strict; NZ compared with Australia. Australia emerging as dominant force how they apply. NZ relatively soft how we apply. Inspect, wash to make compliant, other countries just say no. Also – this process here – strengthens our import health standard.</p> <p>A key point – interventions – MAF needs to communicate that getting tough. Australia during the week – getting just sending it back (to New Zealand) to be cleaned.</p> <p>Exporting to USA – regardless if stuff ok, if paperwork not ok, then sent away. Huge costs. Works for them.</p> <p>Post entry – logistically not hard to provide solutions for most things, depending on problem and resource can put it through, but adds cost \$ and time. Think about NZ volume x 2 days – a lot of containers sitting waiting – costs direct and indirect.</p> <p>Inland terminals?</p>
170.	<p>Intending to import or export – have a MAF system recognise people who are new to this game so give more help / information.</p> <p>Internet – on line ordering, Google etc more steps in there. E.g. linkages from MAFBNZ site to industry groups. Recognise increased use of internet.</p> <p>Parties – before importing – logistics – 3rd party, 4th party e.g. order goes to USA company but goods come from Singapore and have to hope company has managed logistics of how to comply. Ship to 30 – 40 countries with different standards to meet.</p> <p>In transit – what did we mean re share experiences re improvement – how might that happen.</p> <p>Reporting to MAF Biosecurity - id trends and things happening and how feedback to information.</p> <p>Intention to address issues on non-compliance by adjusting processes - win - win and then share learning.</p> <p>Post entry needed on cargo as well. And 0800</p> <p>Other people in the supply chain exporters etc, also where important for exporter to send stuff to NZ – more likely to comply to get market access. Others not concerned re NZ requirements because other markets but we want the stuff.</p>

171.	<p>Differences between air and sea and possibly to commodity e.g. containerised compared to logs. Standardised forms. E.g. BACC similar task and info but different. Mutual recognition.</p> <p>Trans-shipment cargo – whether coming in and going out. May be Auckland to Tauranga.</p> <p>Brokers and shipping line? Talk to all parties – used more effectively, e.g. logs – specialists lines. Could get to check before loaded.</p>
172.	<p>Timing of documentation. Customs have 1 timeframe and more rapid than MAF have at the moment. Suggest both same e.g. 48 hours.</p> <p>Codified info. Customs along this path already. Much info for revenue purposes. MAF access at the moment and can drill down.</p> <p>Customs also check out purpose of company – may be useful to build profile of company.</p> <p>Having codified standard of info for biosecurity. International standard.</p> <p>85% consignments meet requirements 15% issue. Many people getting right!</p> <p>Costs of getting it wrong huge, e.g. the ship that was turned around on crews call that its cargo of timber had been contaminated. Trapping to detect on ship? Monitoring.</p> <p>Empty containers. Electronic ?...? desirable. Issues – discharging some at different ports from same ship.</p>
173.	<p>Common border? Customs has a unique id time code. MAF? Currently profiling by company name.</p> <p>MAFBNZ: Idea is to use Customs code. Can target for MAF purposes. Use already. Trade Single Window will have to use the same code.</p>
<p><i>Craft (air and sea): suggestions for MAFBNZ pathway management model</i></p>	
174.	<p>Discharge and inspection and contingency actions, disinfected.</p> <p>At next stage after entry – secondary movement e.g. coastwise or onward flight. Compliance at subsequent ports.</p>
175.	<p>Sea craft – oil rigs. NZ owned fishing vessels compared to chartered. Parties involved – fishing owners and NZ exploration companies.</p> <p>In transit interventions – vessel tracking compared to container tracking.</p> <p>When is something in New Zealand? When it crosses the EEZ, the 12 mile limit or arriving in port? Depending on hazards carried – risks.</p> <p>Risk mgmt – location of oil rig clearance.</p> <p>Steps before travel: Why funding arrangements in here? Depending on what they mean. ?Departure tax? Chartering? In the air also.</p> <p>Parties involved – Military compared to air force and navy.</p> <p>Recruitment companies for crew.</p> <p>Media – air before intending to travel.</p> <p>IATA – air for intending to travel.</p> <p>Preparing to travel – disinsection. Disinfection should it be in there?</p> <p>Weather forecasters especially for sea. Why weather forecasters? Communications option. Able to assist with risk management communications. E.g. private yachts. Regroup into communicators.</p> <p>Clearance for sea – last bullet point – Opuia quarantine clearance by shipping agents?</p>
176.	<p>Parties at sea – charter companies, supply vessels and ship owners.</p> <p>Refuelers – parties involved in preparing – bunkering etc.</p> <p>Entry – Vessels – Quarantine exempt – plant removal as well as food waste.</p>

177.	Variety of vessels – group e.g. private yachts compared to oil rigs. Add fishing boats.
178.	<p>Also group aircraft.</p> <p>Ports: biosecurity awareness training for contractors.</p> <p>Post entry – Tauranga – often last port before leave – dispose of waste. – offsite.</p>
179.	<p>500 small craft a year –</p> <p>Much MAF work not cost recoverable and no compliance fines or punishments. But if want to punish – hold in port very effective.</p> <p>Profiling – historically – every vessel met and treated the same way. Waste of resources? Will be looking to profile. Starting from scratch. Overseas intelligence available to use. E.g. vessel ownership. Crewing and standards kept to.</p> <p>Other intelligence – fisheries eyes out on the water. Can notify events they see. Airforce Orions also. Hooking in with their systems as well.</p>
180.	<p>AQIS common point of entry – clearance covers NZ – Trans-Tasman free running.</p> <p>Split vessels into commercial and private. Cruise and cargo.</p> <p>Profiling vessels for regular callers with high standards and to trans-ship.</p> <p>Vessels that trade through NZ waters, don't stop in a port but chuck waste off. National Maritime Coordination Centre (including Orions) tracks vessels in New Zealand waters so if a ship through Cook Strait, would be noted. Surveillance out there but huge area. Specific info can put specific patrols out there and MAF could bid for a patrol.</p> <p>Hull fouling. New IMO agreement and standards being developed for New Zealand and also Australia. Shipping lines involved? Different vessel classes. Some easier for biosecurity intervention than others. A hull fouling standard for yachts is about to come out for consultation. Owners workshops about what is possible.</p> <p>Discussions been happening with overseas companies. Looking at international framework.</p> <p>Discussions going on, cruise liners.</p>
181.	<p>Who accountable for what in quarantine waste coming off ships and its disposal? Who signs off what? Requirements for particular kinds of waste?</p> <p>MAFBNZ: MAF's direct concern is that the garbage system is good and that it is being operated well. On vessel. Then port – places of arrival and transitional facilities – disposal – incinerators. Authority to move if being taken off port for disposal – has to be tracked and MAF takes the lead. Regional Councils and local health officer approve techniques that disposal companies may use e.g. incineration meet council pollution standards. MAF main concern is that waste is either dealt with on the vessel or tracked to its end point.</p>

Follow-up actions

a.	<p>Where does the \$921m in Border Directions Statement came from and over what period? (ref: <i>Border Directions Statement</i>, version 9 April 2010, para 6)</p> <p>D.J. Kriticos, C.B. Phillips and D.M. Suckling (2005) Improving border biosecurity: potential economic benefits to New Zealand <i>New Zealand Plant Protection</i> 58: 1-6 www.b3nz.org/public/pub_detail.php?id=81</p>
b.	<p>MAF Biosecurity New Zealand advise whether it would be worth working out what our biosecurity brand is worth to New Zealand in trade. To take into account when deciding whether or not to manage a disease that has a small impact on the economy but could be of concern to NZ Inc and our clean green image.</p>
c.	<p>One pager summarising MAF Biosecurity New Zealand's border direction for the next five years.</p>
d.	<p>Follow-up off-line about issues surrounding the introduction of the new sea container standard.</p>
e.	<p>Send an update to Douglas Colaco about what is happening about hull fouling (and quarantine waste)</p>
f.	<p>For the August workshop, detail about</p>
g.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • examples of profiling effectiveness compared to 100% screening to give confidence
h.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • how the border system is going against the strategic performance measures. A one pager high level report.
i.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • how offshore arrangements will work
j.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • verification systems
k.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rewards for compliance
l.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • accountability, consequences and liability for non-compliance
m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • import commodity segments to be used for managing imports
n.	<p>[Communications] so that stakeholders can understand the relative risk of pathways, why we do things a particular way and that nil risk is not an option.</p>
o.	<p>Discussion between this group and post border government and industry agreements people.</p>

Participants

<i>Wellington, 22 April 2010</i>	
Wellington Zoo	Simon Eyre
Port Companies of NZ	Barrie Saunders
Pork Industry Board	Sam McIvor
Petroleum Exploration and Production Association	John Pfahlert
NZVA	Wayne Ricketts
Meat Industry Assn	Dan Coup
Horticulture NZ	Peter Silcock
Heinz Watties	Karen Riddell
Federated Farmers	John Hartnell
Federated Farmers	Mark Ross
Dept of Conservation	Philip Bell
Dairy NZ	Fiona Hutchinson
Centreport	David Hagen
AWE Ltd	Simon Knapman
AsureQuality Limited	Chris Carter
AsureQuality Limited	Andrea Murray
MAFBNZ	Steve Stuart
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MAFBNZ	Christine Reed
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MAFBNZ	Debbie Beer
MAFBNZ	Carolyn Whyte
MAFBNZ	Kevin Kennett
MAFBNZ	Jeremy Lambert
<i>Auckland, 23 April 2010</i>	
Tomorrow's Cargo Logistics Grp	Garth Wylie
Rural Women of NZ	Wendy McGowan
Port of Tauranga	Martyn McColgan
Plant and Food Research Ltd	Barbara Waddell
Plant and Food Research Ltd	Philippa Stevens
PIANZ et al	Michael Brooks
NZ Forest Owners Assn	Bill Dyck
NZ Flower Growers Assn	Jacco uit de Bosch
NZ Customs Service	Simon Williamson
Mitsui OSK Lines (New Zealand) Ltd	Mark Worsley
Jevic	Euan Philpott
ISS-McKay; NZ Manager / Cruise Services	Douglas Colaco
Hapag Lloyd Shipping	Peter Turley
Hamburg Sud New Zealand Limited	Michael Beck
Federal Express	Bob Neilson
DHL NZ	Reg Kissun
Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders	Dev Dhangee
Board of Airline Representatives	Stewart Milne
MAFBNZ	Steve Stuart
MAFBNZ	Douglas Birnie

MAFBNZ	Tim Knox
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MAFBNZ	Carolyn Whyte
MAFBNZ	Jeremy Lambert
MAFBNZ	Charlotte Davies
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MAFBNZ	Victoria Allison
MAFBNZ	Christine Reed
MAFBNZ	Kerri-Ann O'Neil
Apologies	
Waikato-Tainui Claims and Environment Unit	Cheri van Schravendijk
Summerfruit NZ	Marie Dawkins
Rural Women New Zealand	Noeline Hold
Premium Flowers NZ Ltd	Lance Straker
Ports of Auckland	Perry d'Souza
Pipfruit NZ	Mike Butcher
PipFruit	Mike Butcher
PIANZ et al	Vanessa Wintle
NZ Forest Owners Assn	Glen Mackie
NYK Line (New Zealand) Limited	Lucia Martinez
MAFBNZ	Barry O'Neil
IMVD	Malcolm Yorston
IMVD	David Vinsen
Hoegh Autoliners (NZ) Ltd	Neil Lay Yee
Hamburg Sud New Zealand Limited	Niel Arnesen
Fonterra	Lindsay Burton
ESR	Dave Slaney
ESR	Don Bandaranayake
Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders	Rosemarie Dawson
Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders	Trevor Duxfield
Conference of Asia Pacific Express Carriers	Denise McCamish
CMA CGM & ANL (NZ) Lte	Peter Trent
CAPEC NZ	Sean Murphy
Beca	Peter McGregor
AgResearch	Glyn Francis