

DEVELOPING A
BIOSECURITY STRATEGY
FOR NEW ZEALAND

REPORT ON
REGIONAL WORKSHOPS
ON THE BIOSECURITY STRATEGY
'ISSUES PAPER'

1. Scope of this report

This report summarises the main outcomes of 20 regional workshops held during October and November 2001 as part of nation-wide consultation on the *'Issues Paper: Developing a Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand'*.

2. Development of a *Biosecurity Strategy* for New Zealand

The Biosecurity Council, the Minister for Biosecurity's advisory group, is co-ordinating the development of a comprehensive national *Biosecurity Strategy* by December 2002. A Biosecurity Strategy Development Team is managing the process for the Biosecurity Council. The strategy is intended to ensure that New Zealand's primary production, natural environments and people's health are adequately protected in the future from unwanted pests and diseases.

Many people and organisations with an interest in biosecurity are involved in the strategy development process, which is intended to obtain agreement on goals and objectives for New Zealand's future biosecurity programmes. Public consultation is an important aspect of the strategy development process. It gives people with an interest in biosecurity an opportunity to have their say and to contribute their ideas directly to the strategy team.

3. Public consultation on the 'Issues Paper'

The Minister for Biosecurity released a *Biosecurity Strategy: Issues Paper* on 27 September 2001. It was contributed to from April to July 2001 by a wide range of biosecurity stakeholders, including government agencies and nine specially convened 'common interest' Stakeholder Working Groups. The *Issues Paper* has since been used as the base document for a nation-wide series of

public meetings (15), regional workshops (20) and hui (7). All participants were invited to make written submissions by 31 December 2001.

The main purpose of the 20 regional workshops was to confirm and add to the issues outlined in the *Issues Paper* and to develop ideas for dealing with them. The workshops were run as 'inter-active working sessions' using a specifically designed workshop process.

The consultation process was designed to:

- inform biosecurity stakeholders and the public about biosecurity and some of the challenges ahead;
- identify all biosecurity issues;
- identify a wide range of strategic approaches to deal with the issues;
- encourage discussion and debate on ideas being considered;
- identify areas and approaches on which there is general agreement;
- identify areas and approaches on which there is disagreement.

4. Format for the regional workshops

The regional workshops were for invited participants from a wide range of organisations with biosecurity interests. The workshops were independently facilitated with assistance provided by Biosecurity Strategy Development Team members. Local biosecurity officials (e.g. Regional Council Biosecurity Officers or regional Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry staff) helped to organise and support the workshops.

The agenda for the workshops consisted of:

- (i) Welcome and Introductions.
- (ii) A presentation on the strategy development process, including:
 - why we need a strategy;
 - what the strategy will cover;
 - where the public meetings fit into the strategy development process; and,
 - what the strategy development team wants the meeting to achieve.
- (iii) A series of exercises to establish:
 - what biosecurity means;
 - specific things that are recognised or protected;
 - what biosecurity may look like in the future (e.g. after the biosecurity strategy has been successfully implemented).
- (iv) An exercise to establish the desired features for developing a statement on New Zealand's 'appropriate level of protection' (ALOP).
- (v) A series of small group exercises to:

- explore ideas and options for dealing with biosecurity issues under the following headings:
 - 'Policy, Directions and Relationships for Biosecurity'.
 - 'Systems and Procedures for Biosecurity'.
 - 'Biosecurity Operations'.
- discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each idea or option;
- agree on and record the findings of each group.

(vi) A report-back session.

(vii) Summary and concluding remarks.

The workshop approach provided participants with an opportunity to discuss their ideas with others, debate options and contribute their ideas to the strategy development process.

5. Attendance

About 340 people attended the 20 regional workshops (average 17; range 14 – 22). Table 1 gives the registered attendance details by location and Table 2 gives the 'sector' coverage.

Table 1: Regional Workshop Attendance

Date	Location	Number Attending
10 October 2001	Hamilton	17
11 October 2001	Tauranga	19
16 October 2001	Whangarei	16
17 October 2001	Auckland (Takapuna)	20
18 October 2001	Auckland (Mangere)	18
23 October 2001	Blenheim*	18
24 October 2001	Nelson	21
25 October 2001	Greymouth*	15
30 October 2001	Wellington	22
1 November 2001	Palmerston North	20
5 November 2001	Gisborne*	19
6 November 2001	Napier	14
7 November 2001	Rotorua	16
8 November 2001	New Plymouth	16
13 November 2001	Dunedin	14
14 November 2001	Queenstown*	12
15 November 2001	Invercargill	13
20 November 2001	Christchurch (Group A)	22
20 November 2001	Christchurch (Group B)	20
21 November 2001	Timaru*	8
TOTAL		340

* Indicates combined workshop/public meeting

Table 2: Regional Workshop ‘Sector’ Coverage

‘Sector’ interest area	Total number attending	Percentage
Land based primary production	91	27%
Regional/District Councils	47	14%
Environment/Conservation	40	12%
Science & research	38	11%
Other*	27	8%
Port/airport/transport interests	27	8%
Commercial biosecurity operators	22	7%
Public Health	19	6%
Importers	14	4%
Marine industries	9	3%
Tourism	5	1%

* ‘Other’ includes the media, biosecurity consultants, members of the public and those workshop participants from unknown interest areas.

6. Workshop outputs

The workshop outputs have been reported under two broad categories as follows:

- Full group activities; and,
- Small group activities.

This report summarises the common themes that were generated from the regional workshop activities. It does not minute all the outputs from all 20 workshops.

6.1 Full group activities

The four topics covered with the full workshop group were:

- What biosecurity means;
- The things that are recognised or protected;
- What biosecurity may look like in the future (e.g. after the biosecurity strategy has been implemented); and,
- An appropriate level of (biosecurity) protection (ALOP).

What does biosecurity mean?

- Maintaining our clean and green image.
- Effective border controls.
- Partnerships (local government, agencies, industries).

- Protecting cultural and spiritual values.
- Protecting primary production.
- Protecting biodiversity and eliminating threats to native flora and fauna.
- International trade.
- Managing risk.
- Education and awareness.
- Legislation.
- Protection against unwanted organisms.
- Protection against creating new (genetically modified) unwanted organisms.
- Official controls.
- Internal borders.
- Early detection of new organisms.
- Eradication of unwanted organisms.
- Controlling existing pests.
- Freedom from unwanted pests.
- Science and research.
- Good co-ordination of biosecurity activities.
- Protecting other countries' biosecurity interests.
- Two-way trade.
- International responsibilities.

What things are recognised or protected?

- Primary production.
- People's health.
- The environment.
- Aesthetic values.
- Taonga and mauri (spiritual life force).
- Biodiversity.
- Our way of life.
- New Zealand's economic security.
- New Zealand's unique lifestyle.

The biosecurity strategy has been successfully implemented – what aspects do you like or see?

General

- Equal partnership with Maori.
- Internationally harmonised biosecurity agreements and standards.
- New Zealand's 'pest-free' competitive advantage maintained or enhanced.
- Multi (political)-party agreement on the importance/'ranking' of the biosecurity portfolio.
- Multi-agency and community involvement in biosecurity.
- An independent biosecurity 'watch dog' is in place.
- Sustainable funding to meet 'appropriate level of protection' expectations.
- Clear and sustainable biosecurity objectives have been agreed.
- Better co-ordination of biosecurity policies, systems and approaches.
- A well-resourced Biosecurity Authority.

- New Zealand still free from major pests (e.g. foot and mouth disease, fruit flies, venomous spiders, snakes, scorpions and invasive marine and environmental pests).

Risk management

- New Zealand is recognised as the world leader in risk analysis.
- Advanced knowledge of all exotic pests that threaten New Zealand.
- Pro-active risk management systems that recognise, and adapt to, changing risk patterns.
- Marine and environmental risks adequately managed.
- Predictive 'what-if?' models available to assist with risk management decisions.
- Science and research is at the forefront of biosecurity risk management.
- Precautionary approach sensibly implemented into decision-making.

Legislation

- Core biosecurity responsibilities are defined in statute.
- Key biosecurity objectives are included in the Biosecurity Act.
- NZ's biosecurity programme underpinned by an effective and seamless legislative framework.
- The Biosecurity Act reflects fishing and aquaculture interests.

Border controls

- Enhanced offshore measures implemented to mitigate biosecurity risks.
- Better targeting of resources for control of high-risk import pathways.
- More emphasis on border controls to reduce new incursions and emergency responses.
- Effective inter-island and regional 'border' controls in place.
- Available technology is fully integrated into border control programmes.

Education and awareness

- High levels of awareness.
- Broad ownership of biosecurity by all New Zealanders.
- A 'biosecurity ethic' recognised at all levels including politicians and incoming visitors.
- National pride in New Zealand's 'clean and green' image.

Surveillance and response

- A biosecurity incursion and response fund is in place.
- Surveillance systems based on risks and not funding limitations.
- Rigorous surveillance and response programmes implemented.
- Visible progress on eradication measures for existing unwanted pests.
- National response teams available.
- Seamless transition from detection through to effective response.

What factors should be considered when developing New Zealand's appropriate level of protection (ALOP)?

- A single 'appropriate level' is difficult to define.

- Recognise that 'full' protection is not achievable.
- Separate ALOPs should be considered for each major risk pathway.
- Different approaches may be required for each 'sector' (e.g. production, environment, marine).
- Flexibility is required to recognise changing situations and new information.
- Prohibition should be considered for the highest risk pathways.
- The current situation should be used to 'benchmark' future ALOPs.
- Funding and resources need to match ALOP expectations.
- Recognise that trade-offs are required.
- Consider reciprocal application of New Zealand's ALOP (e.g. by trading partners).
- Need to be realistic and sustainable.
- Measures and indicators are important for successful implementation.
- Internal biosecurity systems also need to be based on prescribed ALOPs.
- Need to underpin ALOP statements with risk analysis, supporting data and cost/benefit analysis.
- Important to 'weight' and 'benchmark' organisms.
- Significant and real threats with high consequences require most attention.

6.2 Small group activities

At each workshop, small breakout groups were organised to discuss options and approaches for dealing with the following topics:

(i) *Policy, Directions and Relationships (the 'red' group):*

- Options for improving biosecurity risk management.
- Options for improving biosecurity co-ordination and leadership.
- Options for strengthening offshore measures.
- Options for improving biosecurity legislation.

(ii) *Systems and Procedures for Biosecurity (the 'blue' group):*

- Options for improving stakeholder involvement in biosecurity.
- Approaches for improving the integration of science and research.
- Options for policies to guide the funding of biosecurity in the future.
- Options for improving the quality and consistency of biosecurity decisions.

(iii) *Biosecurity operations (the 'green' group):*

- Options for improving biosecurity border management.
- Options for improving biosecurity surveillance.
- Options for improving incursion response capability and response.
- Options for guiding decisions on the management of established pests.
- Options for education, awareness and enforcement to improve biosecurity risk management.

6.2.1 Policy, Directions and Relationships (the 'red' group):

Red Group, Topic 1: Options for improving biosecurity risk management

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status Quo 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recognised authority already exists within MAF Agencies already exist Neutral cost Utilises existing structures, linkages and networks Current systems generally working well 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Minister without a Ministry Accountabilities still dispersed across agencies Responsibility overlaps/gaps still remain Funding inadequate Inconsistent application of risk management principles and policies Duplication of roles Transition from national to regional responsibilities still unresolved Biosecurity Council has no 'teeth'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Status quo – with increased funding and improved co-ordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthens existing systems Increased resources for key activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perception that sector inequities or bias will exist Source of funding?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish a stand alone 'one stop shop' agency for biosecurity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More accountability Overarching leadership Biosecurity empowerment Dedicated biosecurity focus Biosecurity can start with a 'clean slate' Better co-ordination and utilisation of resources National consistency Centre of biosecurity excellence Less confusion between agencies Less duplication Clearer lines of responsibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk of increased bureaucracy Possible loss of specialist 'sector' skills and focus Re-structuring costs and hassles May need 'enabling' legislation Institutional knowledge may disappear Potentially inefficient Increased risk of political interference

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consistent application of policies • Internal and external credibility • Better opportunities for professional development • Ability to get more funding 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take a strong precautionary approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improves security • Reduces current risk exposure 	Potential trade conflicts

Red Group, Topic 2: Options for biosecurity co-ordination and leadership

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish an over-arching, non-political biosecurity agency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See comments under section 6.2.1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See comments under section 6.2.1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand focus of MAF Biosecurity Authority and provide the Biosecurity Council with more powers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broadens sector coverage • Builds on existing stakeholder relationships • Cost-effective • Builds on existing infra-structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires better definition of current roles • Some cost increases (but less than new agency)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen role of the Biosecurity Council, including a fulltime independent technical advisory committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Biosecurity more independent of agencies • Improves sector focus • Technical group is focussed on biosecurity full time • No significant re-structure required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing Biosecurity Council not well known • Biosecurity Council seen as a 'MAF vehicle' • May need new people appointed to the Biosecurity Council • 'Sector' access may be more difficult
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional biosecurity approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resources closer to the problem areas • Better local 'buy-in' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fractionated responses • Duplication of effort • Regional 'competition'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hybrid system involving national and regional biosecurity 'agencies' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maintains both national and regional focus • Better targeting of resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structures and lines of accountability difficult to create without significant change

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance regional council biosecurity roles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Builds on existing field expertise Opportunities to cross-skill biosecurity inspectors in councils and MAF Existing 'standing army' of inspectors Improves national/regional biosecurity interfaces Efficiencies Better utilisation of 'biosecurity' officers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agency roadblocks Increased training costs
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Red Group, Topic 3: Options for strengthening offshore measures

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen international trade and environmental agreements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Raises biosecurity awareness in other countries Rationalise trade vs environmental agreements Brands 'biosecurity' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time, costs Difficult to change entrenched positions Trade vs environment conflicts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Educate trading partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pro-active Assists trade through mutual understanding of requirements Reduces costs in NZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Language/cultural hurdles 'Ownership' difficulties Cost/benefit Difficult to reach target audiences
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen offshore protocols and programme audits 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moves risks offshore Facilitates trade Strengthens biosecurity 'identity' Partnership approach 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not every country interested Possible trade barrier Extra costs Who bears costs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve standards and communication of requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishes clear ground rules No surprises Consistency Facilitates safe trade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Could be difficult to communicate effectively with all countries
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assist third world countries to develop biosecurity standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased awareness Strengthens biosecurity internationally 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cost/benefit Look after NZ first

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase offshore inspections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces border risks • Partnership approach • Better ownership • Increased awareness • Facilitates border access 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs increase • Requires co-operation
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Red Group, Topic 4: Options for improving biosecurity legislation

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combined Biosecurity and HSNO Acts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can better define underlying principles • Removes conflicts • Consistency in application • Better co-ordination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time • Costs/benefit
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make Regional Pest Management strategies mandatory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consistency • Less wasted effort • Fewer boundary issues • Better co-ordination of effort 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost/benefit
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Define the core responsibilities and objectives in the Biosecurity Act 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved accountability • Enhanced transparency • Common goals • Clear objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local issues may get ignored • Legislative amendments required
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop 'fast' / 'slow' / 'no-go' lanes for HSNO applications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More certainty re time, cost and likely outcome • Reduces non-compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Could overlook unknown risks

6.2.2 Systems and Procedures for Biosecurity

Blue Group, Topic 1: Options for improving stakeholder involvement in biosecurity

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a database of all major stakeholders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased awareness • Faster access to participants • Ability to target consultation • Comprehensive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost • Time and resources

	information base	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop technical liaison or advisory committees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allows stakeholder input Clear lines of communication Allows contingency planning Can better target appropriate groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Burden on organisations time Time consuming Resource intensive
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create umbrella body to co-ordinate (eg. Using AHB model) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AHB model useful 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Entity can be hi-jacked Not truly representative Relies on stakeholder input
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Target major events (eg. Field Days) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Receptive audience 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Difficult to 'engage' target audience
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish an 'Ethics Council' working across policy and implementation levels 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increases representation of different views Independent body 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Willingness to compromise Requires new entity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Involve stakeholders at all levels of policy and operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Builds stakeholder confidence Ownership of outcomes Increased awareness of complexities involved Reality checks included early on Officials and stakeholders working together 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risk of 'capture' Practicality What stakeholders to involve Sector representation difficult to achieve Difficult to manage large numbers Difficult to get answers

Blue Group, Topic 2: Approaches for improving the integration of science and research

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tag specific funding for biosecurity research 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Allows for good quality and specific information Maintains scientific expertise for biosecurity Easier to track funding pathways Avoids duplication and overlaps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Source of money? May require a separate Biosecurity Ministry to administer

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a contingency fund for post-incursion research purposes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Allows early development of intervention strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces pool of funding for other uses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encourage use of scientific expertise when developing policies (eg. Via Biosecurity Council) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Builds on status quo • Enhances co-ordination • Better, practical policies • Scientists aware of policy issues • Policy Managers aware of science contributions • Industries benefit 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Practicality • Resourcing • Agency relationships
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a single science umbrella body 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stabilises funding streams • Better co-ordination • Improves networks • Avoids duplication • Priorities easier to establish • Reduces competition • Shared information (databases) • Attracts high quality staff, including graduates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Removes competitive edge • Empire building • Easier access to information may create difficulties • Fundamental shift from status quo • New institutional arrangements required
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make science careers more attractive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'NZ incorporated' investment • Ensures adequate technical expertise available • Sustainability of specialist knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create biosecurity 'Centres of Excellence' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides co-ordination • Facilitates strategic planning • Forward looking • Leadership • Pro-active • Less fire-fighting • Better links to policy-makers • Can develop within existing institutional structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Possible dilution of effort • Potential loss of stakeholder involvement • Reluctance to share intellectual property • Vested interests in other research priorities

Blue Group, Topic 3: Options for policies to guide the funding of biosecurity in the future

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government pays total cost of biosecurity (eg. via a dedicated biosecurity "fund") 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public good recognised Public ownership Speedier response to incursions Should ensure consistency Facilitates establishment of emergency fund for responses 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> No individual responsibility to fund Increased taxes Decisions based on politics Reduces consultation with stakeholders Difficult to separate national/regional funding Treasury resistance Potential to divert from 'fund' biosecurity Funding may not match protection expectations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement user pays (eg. via passenger taxes and cost recovery for all biosecurity activities) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exacerbators bear costs Risk generators take more responsibility Guaranteed income stream Partnership approach better recognised 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Difficult to identify and 'target' users Fluctuating income Collection costs can be high Government can avoid responsibility for action Can result in inequities (eg. Cross-subsidisation)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Apply user pays for activities up to and including the border and government funding for post-border incursions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spreads cost burden Importers still responsible for share of costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Blurred lines

Blue Group, Topic 4: Options for improving the quality and consistency of biosecurity decisions

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Create a single body with overall biosecurity responsibilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> See Section 6.2.1 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> See Section 6.2.1

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constantly review and revise all technical and operational standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All activities match risk pathways • Consistency • Completeness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time • Cost • Procedural difficulties
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6.2.3 Biosecurity operations (the 'green' group):

Green Group, Topic 1: Options for improving biosecurity border management

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish an integrated 'Super-Ministry' for biosecurity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Section 6.2.1 (Q1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Section 6.2.1 (Q1)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase resources and improve stakeholder involvement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Section 6.2.1 (Q1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Section 6.2.1 (Q1)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen offshore risk management activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Section 6.2.1 (Q3) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See Section 6.2.1 (Q3)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrate border agencies into one unit/agency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Easier to deal with a single border agency • Reduces agency overlaps • Efficiencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of biosecurity focus • Possible 'dilution' of biosecurity expertise • Restructuring hassles
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement new technical innovations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved detection and auditing capacity • Less invasive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs • Time to develop and implement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concentrate resources on high risk pathways 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Optimal targeting of energies • Pro-active 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase instant fines and channel into programme costs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deterrent factor • More funding • Can build intelligence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negative message
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduce number of entry points (eg. ports of entry) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can focus resources • Easier traceability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces commercial options
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish internal borders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slows spread of new incursions • Uses natural geography to our advantage (eg. Cook Strait) • Limits damage in pest-free areas • Increases eradication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs political commitment • Needs additional funding • Responsibilities for implementation not covered • Needs industry buy-in and partnership

	prospects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal movement of freight and people impeded
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Place more responsibilities on container de-vanners and importers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase chances of detecting unwanted pests Increases biosecurity ownership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Slows down clearances Difficult to police
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Wash six sides of all containers entering NZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All contaminants are removed More controls on high-risk pathway 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase costs Practicality Delays in cargo movement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fumigate all personal effects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removes health risks (eg. spiders) Controls a wide range of nasties Practical to implement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ozone hole Limited fumigation options Tourist resistance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Irradiate passengers' bags 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Controls a wide range of pests 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technology not available in NZ High costs Technology resistance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen marine biosecurity activities eg. Hull-cleaning facilities and improved ballast water rules 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduces marine invasions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High costs Delays ship movements
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve security for cruise ship visitors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consistency with air passenger standards 'Casual' risks better managed Practical to implement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential inconvenience Time constraints Costs (eg. X-ray machines)

Green Group, Topic 2: Options for improving biosecurity surveillance

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop an international and national tracking system for ballast water discharges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can target resources Identifies high-risk import pathways Raises awareness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Costs Responsibilities to maintain data
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrate surveillance programmes between central government, local government and industries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cost savings Better targeting of resources National consistency Avoids duplication/omission Flexibility 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Loss of sector focus Possible loss of specialist skills Administration difficulties

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase resources (funding and people) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improves detection rate • Better compliance • Increased public confidence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs • Will increase pressure on eradication and responses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilise new technologies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better detection rate • Better use of resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs • Availability of 'tools'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target specific pests (and/or specific areas) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective use of resources • Faster response times • Strategic and focussed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What pests to target • Some will still be missed
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen surveillance standards and capabilities (eg. diagnostics) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pro-active • Better early warning systems • Improves skill base in NZ • Consistent specifications • Better protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Costs • Time to develop standards

Green Group, Topic 3: Options for improving incursion response capability and implementation

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-ordinate agency response plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased capability • Faster responses • Improves team work • Lower costs • Better outcomes • Industry 'insurance' • Increased trading partner confidence • Better use of knowledge and resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs strong leadership • High initial effort • Major liaison responsibilities between agencies • Patch protection • Loss of 'sector' focus
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish a contingency fund with associated contingency plans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guaranteed funding available • Public benefit • Faster responses • 'Insurance' • Plans ready to be implemented • Accountability for action clear 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Administration problems • Fund could be used for other purposes • Possible 'knee-jerk' responses because funds guaranteed • Patch protection • Source of funds (equitable etc)?

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires budget commitment • Requires target of priorities • Endless 'refresher courses'
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase awareness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More surveillance 'eyes' on the ground • Increased awareness • Better reporting of incursions • Increase acceptance of control strategies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More reports to deal with • Increased paranoia • Unrealistic expectations • Costs
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve consultation in advance of incursion response 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ownership • Pro-active • Consideration of all view points • Robust decisions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult to reach consensus • Time and costs

Green Group, Topic 4: Options for education, awareness and enforcement to improve biosecurity risk management

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More TV adverts, including an 0800 number 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Powerful medium • Contributes to long-term attitudinal shift • Population becomes more accepting of biosecurity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diluting target audience • Expensive • Infrastructure for incoming calls • Takes time
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Target campaigns to end users (eg. Importers of goods) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Targeted messages • Increases interception capabilities • Encourages ownership • Partnership approaches possible • Can link with training initiatives • Spreads vigilance • Engenders self regulation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need greater capacity to react • Requires specific messages and campaigns • Expensive to maintain
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have a 'buy local' campaign 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduces import volumes and risk exposure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Against trade
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have 'biosecurity' as a school subject 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receptive audience • Biosecurity message becomes in-grained • Future politicians etc carry message 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Takes time • Needs sustained effort and commitment

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attitudinal shifts over time 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement biosecurity endorsements/awards for good practice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positive • Emphasises benefits • Improved 'buy-in' • Improves compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost • Administration • Saturation may lead to complacency
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raises the bar • Demonstrates seriousness • Revenue-gathering option 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal costs • Burden of proof • Possible negative messages

Green Group, Topic 5: Options for guiding decisions on the management of established pests

Options	Pro's	Con's
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expert panel to make decisions (not CTO's) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More diverse input • Better decision-making process • National and regional issues included 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Takes time • Legal accountabilities diffused • Administrative complexity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve risk assessment process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Money goes where needed • Cost benefit analysis approach better incorporated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time • Requires specialists
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase community involvement in pest control activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better understanding of desired outcomes • Long-term cost effectiveness • Better coverage • Wider community ownership • Viable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Challenging to get participation • Costs • Sustainability (long term) • Training

7. Did the regional workshops serve their intended purpose?

Feedback to the strategy team from the workshop participants was generally positive. People were supportive of the 'workshop' approach and appreciated being given the opportunity to contribute and debate their ideas. The workshops provided genuine opportunity for regional biosecurity stakeholders to contribute directly to the strategy development process. The broad regional coverage also ensured that local biosecurity concerns, as well as national issues, were considered. All attendees participated actively in the meetings and provided useful contributions to the strategy development process. The nature of the process used also ensured that maximum benefit was gained

from an education and awareness perspective through presentations, active discussion and debate.

8. Where to from here?

During February and early March 2002, four specially convened 'Issues Groups' will provide expert analysis and interpretation of the consultation outputs and written submissions.

The Biosecurity Strategy Development Team will use the results from the regional workshops, other consultation activities and the written submissions to prepare the (draft) *Biosecurity Strategy* in early April 2002. A second round of consultation will then follow the release of the draft strategy around June and July 2002.