Biosecurity Strategy Implementation - Stakeholder Information Pack Further Design Decisions

May 2004

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Table of Contents

• Introduction – From Murray Sherwin
• Biosecurity Strategic Unit (BSU)
• New Biosecurity Agency (NBA)
• Roles and Responsibilities

Introduction – From Murray Sherwin

What we want to achieve and why

MAF is being challenged, at a time when the biosecurity system is stretched, to build the Biosecurity System that New Zealand will need in the 21st century to protect the many economic, environmental, and social/cultural aspirations of all New Zealanders. What we have built is regarded highly by those who do the same work elsewhere in the world. It ought to be, we are an isolated island state heavily reliant on our natural resources for our wellbeing. We are being entrusted with the task of using that capability as the foundation to build the future.

Meeting the 57 expectations in the Biosecurity Strategy cannot be done with our existing structures, systems, processes and culture (no matter how well they have served us in the past). The reality is we need to change to meet the challenges.

We need to demonstrate that we:

• integrate all the aspirations referred to above into our risk analysis, prioritisation and management processes;
• operate an effective and efficient system that results in consistent, coherent, holistic risk management decisions and that we systematically learn from its success and failures.
• operate in a supporting culture that values high performance, collegiality, professionalism, sharing of information, working smarter, ethically and with integrity;
• act in a collaborative, inclusive and professional manner (internally and externally) to consider the interests of all stakeholders in providing oversight of the Biosecurity system so that we harness the support, and participation of all our stakeholders in the work we do.

Decisions

The key issue for us has been the move to managing on the basis of the interventions we make – essentially managing on the basis of what we have to do to achieve the things expected of the biosecurity system. This move raises both risks and opportunities. The opportunities relate to integration, consistent and coherent processes, systems, decisions and prioritisation. They also include the ability to use the undoubted skills and expertise that already exist to form the foundation of what we will need in the future. 

The risks relate to the loss of sector based teams focussed on the system end-to-end with strong links internally and externally. The final issue relates to the recognised need to build capability. 

We have decided that the move to an intervention based system provides the best foundation to achieve what we need to achieve. That said, I acknowledge the need to manage the risks that have been identified and we will need to put considerable effort into capability building, systems and process improvement, providing support to managers and staff to work effectively in the new environment and to ensure we develop and maintain strong links with our many stakeholders. 

In short I want us to be:

• focused on risks and what we do to manage them;
• a cohesive organisation consistently and transparently managing risk where we can make a difference;
• working smarter, rather than harder.

You can find out more about the Biosecurity Strategy at http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/bio-strategy/index.htm .

Murray Sherwin

Director-General, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Biosecurity Strategic Unit (BSU)

Issues

The key issue with respect to the BSU was clarity of role and accountabilities between the BSU, the New Biosecurity Agency’s (NBA) policy capability and MAF Policy. Issues were also raised about the relationship between the science functions of the BSU, NBA and MAF Policy.

Decision

The focus and prime accountability of the units (from a biosecurity perspective) will be:

• BSU – supporting the leadership and governance of the biosecurity system. Primarily accountable for the development and refining of the Biosecurity Strategy and supporting strategies (eg. research), prioritisation, the frameworks and legislation that underpin the effective implementation of the Strategy, supporting the CEs’ Forum and other governance fora, and monitoring and evaluating performance;
• NBA – contributing to strategy development. Primarily accountable for implementation decisions and biosecurity operations;
• MAF Policy – contributing, from the perspective of the agriculture and forestry sectors, to the work of the BSU and NBA and providing second-opinion advice.

The BSU and NBA will need to work together to support the effective development and implementation of the Strategy and will call on each others knowledge and skills and those that exist in MAF Policy in their work.

The NBA (and MAF Policy and NZFSA) needs to identify and prioritise its operational research requirements. All need to develop and maintain links with the science community. There is a need for MAF internally, and externally with agencies such as DoC, MFisheries, ERMA and MoH, to share these identified requirements to look for synergies and avoid duplication. This can be dealt with by good business practices. The BSU will be responsible for strategic biosecurity science input and for relationships with MoRST and FoRST on science strategies.

New Biosecurity Agency (NBA)

Points of Intervention

The key issue was – should we significantly re-organise the way MAF manages its biosecurity functions or could the same outcomes be achieved by a less drastic incorporation of new functions into existing structures with some modification of those structures.

Decision

The basic points of intervention structure has been adopted.

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The key benefit of the proposed structure is that it focuses management attention and resources on the things that need to be done to effectively manage risk end-to-end and side-to-side. It supports the need to build a consistent, coherent and learning system. Managing the risks of loss of relationships internally and externally will require the development of systems and processes and behaviours that integrate and reinforce effective teamwork across the system and information sharing. The decision to create an “Office of the Chiefs” (see discussion below) will support these risk mitigation strategies.

In considering these issues consideration was given to the proposal to create an Office of the Chief Technical Officer and whether there should be directorates established to undertake the Border Administration function and the Exports function.

CTOs, Office of Chiefs and stakeholder engagement

The fundamental issue - given that currently in MAF the roles of senior manager, CTO, and domestic and international stakeholder management are combined – was should this continue and, if not, how should the functions be split.

This gave rise to a proposal for an Office of the CTOs (undertaking the latter three functions) or an Office of the Chiefs (undertaking the latter two functions).

Decision

CTOs or Deputy CTOs will be appointed at points in the system/structure where there is a need to exercise the statutory powers.

We have decided to establish a directorate of sectoral technical advisors (Office of the Chief Technical Advisors [CTA]) who will overview the system from the perspective of the end-to-end implications for their sectors. Their role will be to inform, and facilitate an integrated approach end-to-end. To do this job they will need to maintain a very strong understanding of their sectors, what those sectors are seeking to achieve and their expectations of the biosecurity system. They will be the logical first point of contact for sector representations. They will also need a strong understanding of the international standard setting and risk environment and will be the logical first point of contact with international standard setting organisations.

It should be noted that while the CTA Directorate will be primarily accountable for stakeholder relationships – this will (to a greater or lesser extent) be the responsibility of all managers and staff.

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Border

The border functions will continue to be managed within the Pre-clearance Directorate as proposed.

The rationale for the points-of-intervention approach suggests that all similar functions should be grouped together. Consequently risk analysis whether related to particular organisms, vectors or pathways should be undertaken by the same team. The design of interventions whether related to pathways, vectors (animate or inanimate) or organisms at the border should also be undertaken within the same team.

Exports

There have been a number of suggestions that there should be an Export Directorate, recognising the significance of the export industries whose ability to export is underpinned by the biosecurity system and the activities of the NZFSA and the NBA. The current Biosecurity Authority undertakes export assurance functions related to live animals and plants. Currently those functions are undertaken within the Animals, Plants and Forestry teams. A new function relates to assurances to foreign governments about the potential invasiveness of exports.

Consideration was given to three options for Exports:

• A separate Directorate;
• Inclusion with the “Office of the Chiefs”;
• Inclusion in the Pre-clearance Directorate.

The decision was to manage exports within the new ‘pre-clearance’ Directorate.

The final determinants were:

• the need to maintain a balance between New Zealand’s interests in exporting and its need to protect itself from the risks inherent in the “importation” of goods and people – SPS consistency); and
• the desirability of maintaining close links with those involved in analysing risks and designing pre-clearance and border protection measures, while recognising the differing focus of interventions (protection of domestic interests on the one hand and facilitating exports on the other);
• location in the Office of the CTAs Directorate was inappropriate given that groups facilitative and integrative functions. 

Pre-Clearance (Imports and Exports)

A high-level issue related to whether to continue the points-of-intervention approach within this directorate or to structure within the directorate on a sectoral basis.

A modified Option 1 has been chosen. The Directorate would have four Teams:

• Risk Analysis
• Import Standards
• Border Administration
• Exports

The risk analysis team would be expected to contribute to the analysis of risk whether related to organisms, vectors (including inanimate vectors) or pathways for the purposes of both this Directorate and the Post-clearance Directorate.

Import Standards would cover matters related to Import Health Standards.

Border Administration would be expected to establish border and related standards, manage the relationship with MAF Quarantine Service and monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of border services.

This Directorate will have responsibility for the development of risk analyses and measures to ensure compliance with the import restrictions contained in the HSNO Act.

As discussed, this Directorate will also have responsibility for biosecurity related export functions.

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The concept of the CTA Directorate addresses both the end-to-end focus and the need to ensure that stakeholder engagement is factored into decisions and responses.

Post-Clearance/Surveillance and Response

The proposed structure for the Post-clearance Directorate is confirmed.

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It is recognised that there are significant interrelationships between the groups proposed for this Directorate and between the Directorate and groups within other Directorates (eg. with the Labs). However, these can be addressed through the way the organisation works rather than requiring a change to the proposed structures at this time – future experience may give rise to changes over time. HSNO Act incursions responses will be addressed within this Directorate.

Roles and Responsibilities

The accountability arrangements for the biosecurity system will see the Director-General of MAF accountable for oversight of the end-to-end system and accountable for the delivery of biosecurity services within the context of Vote Biosecurity. Oversight includes facilitation of a shared sense of strategic direction, provide comment and advice, facilitate cooperation and coordination, gather information and reporting and undertaking national coordination and leadership of the pest management function.

The “in principle” decisions below require further work on transition issues and are subject to Cabinet confirmation. 

Ministry of Fisheries

It has been agreed in principle that the marine biosecurity functions currently undertaken by MFisheries should transfer to MAF. This would provide the strongest base for the building of marine biosecurity capability. Such a decision would need to be confirmed by Cabinet.

Other biosecurity organisations will retain accountability for some services, in particular the regional councils and MFisheries for aquaculture, and DOC for protection of marine species and marine reserves.

Department of Conservation

It has been agreed in principle that DOC national pest management programmes (other than those undertaken under legislation other than the Biosecurity Act) should become MAF's responsibility. This includes programmes on pyp grass, hydrilla, white briony, rainbow lorikeet and pest fish, but excludes programmes managed under the Wild Animal Control Act or under some Freshwater Fisheries regulations.

DOC regional and site-based pest management activities, delivered in support of biodiversity outcomes, will remain with DOC as part of its Vote Conservation responsibilities.

Ministry of Health

It has been agreed that port sanitation functions remain the responsibility of MoH. Responsibility for mosquito responses passes to MAF and decisions on whether to delegate to MoH the delivery of future mosquito incursion responses and/or saltmarsh surveillance will be made during the transition period. Delivery of other health biosecurity activities will be undertaken by MAF once the capability and capacity is available within MAF.

Page last updated: 30 April 2008