An Independent Review of New Zealand's Biosecurity Surveillance Systems-Summary of Recommendations

Background & Disclaimer

Summary Of Recommendations For Overall Policy Framework

1. That the governance of Surveillance be resolved to address the following issues:

  • Provision of strategic direction;
  • Clarity of accountabilities. Between agencies there are gaps where no accountabilities exist and overlap areas where accountabilities are duplicated;
  • Effective involvement of regional government;
  • Consistent priority setting within a single Risk Management Framework;
  • Application of 'best practice' technologies across all sectors;
  • Resource allocation;
  • Consistency in establishing incentives for industry and sector participation;
  • Equity of funding formulae;
  • Accountability to industry groups providing funding as beneficiaries;
  • Management of a single communications strategy to support Surveillance objectives, and;
  • Elimination of "silo" thinking ie considering issues only from a within group or discipline perspective.

2. That the findings of this Review are considered alongside the output of the concurrent Biosecurity Strategy Review process in determining an appropriate governance system.

3. That the Biosecurity Act is reviewed to take account of the specific legal requirements for improved Surveillance as part of the overall Biosecurity Strategy. This review should include consideration of:

  • Prescription of the statutory obligations of Government and industry with regard to Surveillance for unidentified or unexpected pests;
  • Legal mechanisms for the central Government and local/ regional Government to work collaboratively on nationally coordinated regional programmes;
  • Effective representation of Maori interests, and;
  • Relationships with other related legislation, and in particular the HNSO Act and RMA.

4. That the conflicts with other legislation be noted and operational solutions found wherever possible unless or until the relevant statutes are amended.

5. That a strategic planning process be developed for Surveillance to provide an overall framework for guiding programme design and allocation of resources, as part of the overall biosecurity strategy development process.

6. That this strategic planning process be strongly linked to parallel development of strategies for comprehensive biosecurity risk assessment and management of information about baseline biodiversity.

7. That a further specific study be undertaken to determine the appropriate funding model [and funding base?] for biosecurity Surveillance in conjunction with all key stakeholders.

That this study take account of the following principles:

  • That Surveillance for organisms new to New Zealand and activities to develop and maintain the nation's information base on baseline biodiversity are primarily a Government responsibility.
  • That programmes focused on monitoring of targeted pests and risk pathways can be funded in a range of ways based on pre-agreed decision-making principles.
  • That programmes carried out primarily to support market access for traded goods may be funded in whole or in part by specific industries.

8. That the appropriate management framework for biosecurity Surveillance is to build on existing structures rather than create new ones.

9 That common standards be developed in these areas for adoption across all biosecurity agencies:

  • The definition of Surveillance and what it comprises;
  • Terminologies;
  • Statistical methods;
  • Risk analysis methodologies;
  • Economic analysis methodologies, and;
  • Data recording, analysis and reporting.

10. That auditable quality systems become a requirement for all Crown-funded biosecurity Surveillance programmes.

11. That a consistent Risk Management Framework be established for biosecurity Surveillance decisions across all sectors which includes:

  • A structured approach to risk profiling of actual or potential pests;
  • Consistent technical approaches across sectors;
  • Evaluation of pathways, habitats and at-risk resources;
  • Assessment of potential impacts in New Zealand;
  • Consistent approaches to evaluation of cross-sectoral effects;
  • Evaluation of impacts on both economic and societal values;
  • Monitoring and review processes, and;
  • Requires a timely decision on action following detection.

12. That a rigorous process of establishing and monitoring biosecurity surveillance Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) be established. As far as possible these should be output-focused.

13. That all surveillance contracts include target KPIs.

14. That a human resources strategy be developed as part of overall Surveillance planning to take account of these factors:

  • Measurement of actual skills gaps and ways of closing them;
  • Views of personnel currently engaged in Surveillance about job design and career development;
  • Development of active networking amongst Surveillance professionals;
  • Promotion of the personal, professional and public service value of Surveillance work as a career.

15. That the proposal by Carter to expand peri-port forestry Surveillance be evaluated.

16. That sufficient resources be made available to allow practical testing of BIOSECURE.

17. That improved targeting and caseload intensification and better resourcing of the 0800 and Freepost services for detecting new pest species should be explored.

18. That there should be a closer linkage between the Surveillance programmes directed at new pests and weeds and the environmental indicators programme.

19. That the enhanced Ant Surveillance programme should be continued on a permanent basis, subject to annual efficiency and effectiveness reviews.

20. That enhanced Surveillance systems directed at emerging pathways such as adventure tourism and remote container sites should be implemented, initially as projects and then ongoing subject to efficiency and effectiveness reviews.

21. That existing surveillance programmes be evaluated against options arising from the use of the newer decision support tools such as CLIMEX that are now becoming more widely available and in particular the wider use of GIS-based methodologies be actively evaluated.

22. That custodians of all crown-owned databases (including data sets, paper files and other notional databases) and collections that could contribute to biosecurity Surveillance be encouraged to collaborate by developing and implementing harmonised procedures for:

  • Data quality;
  • Privacy;
  • Accessibility;
  • Spatial and temporal referencing, and;
  • Incentives for input and output of information and systems maintenance.

23. That systems providing baseline Surveillance information be strengthened and viewed as a shared communal resource with a single portal of entry and rapid reporting to the relevant sectoral Chief Technical Officer of any detections.

24. That the Protect New Zealand campaign be continued while an overall biosecurity communications strategy is developed.

25. That an overall communications plan for biosecurity Surveillance be developed as part of a total suite of biosecurity communications.

26. That the findings of this Review be noted in the development of that plan.

27. Based on the findings of this Review, a structured decision-making process is recommended for adoption in Surveillance decision-making.

28. It is important to note that many aspects of this decision-making process are iterative and will need to be repeated a number of times before the best final decision can be made. Also, for the process to be fully effective, it is vital that, the technical and economic components continue to "inform each other" throughout all iterations of the process.

Page last updated: 16 October 2008