An Independent Review of New Zealand's Biosecurity Surveillance Systems-Surveillance for New Organisms
Surveillance For Organisms New To New Zealand
The purpose of maintaining systems directed at the detection of incursion of new organisms is to allow a response. The type of response that might be mounted to an incursion tends to be different between Ministries and between sectors.
A focus in MAF is directed toward attempting to eradicate new diseases that might present a significant threat to either productivity or to trade access. In situations where eradication is not a cost-effective option, advice on control measures can be provided.
MAF also provide a surveillance service to DOC and MoH by attempting to detect exotic species that may impact on conservation values or human health.
This contrasts with MFish operating in the marine environment, where it is broadly accepted that eradication of the new organism is likely to be impractical. The response in that environment might include helping aquaculturists to minimise impacts, adopting measures to delay impacts or passive acceptance. In some cases, however, containment through restricting spread and ongoing control of established populations are likely to be feasible options.
MoH and DOC rely on MAF for much of their new species surveillance needs other than the detection of mosquitoes at sites away from ports and airports, which is managed by MoH. However, their expectations of MAF are unclear and are not explicitly addressed in the inter-departmental biosecurity MOUs.
Strengths
The citizens of New Zealand in general make a major unpaid contribution to the success of biosecurity Surveillance. For example:
- The Painted Apple Moth was recognised as being unusual by an office worker who brought it to the attention of entomologist;
- The Red Imported Fire Ant was detected by a person carrying out ground maintenance duties;
- Undaria was first observed by marine scientists during off-duty hours;
- Southern Salt Marsh Mosquito was reported by people who were being bitten by the insect;
- Suspect exotic animal diseases, plant pests and diseases, environmental pests and others are regularly reported to the MAF 0800 number by individuals who observe something which they consider to be unusual and recognise that it is in the national interest for their suspicions to be investigated. These notifications account for the majority of detections of new species.
Surveillance systems directed at detecting pests, or diseases that affect commercial production are well documented though of varying quality. Many of these Surveillance systems are supported by formal contracts with the affected industries.
Skilled scientists and others with appropriate training are actively engaged in designing and servicing Surveillance processes and New Zealand has a well-developed core of technical knowledge in these areas.
A developing resource is the growth of research and database development related to Surveillance systems for those sectors that deal with New Zealand native species in the terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments. This is complemented by a depth of understanding about pests and diseases in the livestock, forestry and plant production sectors built up over several decades.
Weaknesses
There is an absence of any unifying statement of purpose, an absence of overarching strategy, an absence of strategy statements within agencies and an absence of technical objectives for almost all current Surveillance programmes. MOUs between agencies on biosecurity matters are virtually silent on Surveillance requirements.
There is no clear and comprehensive linkage between the Surveillance programmes being undertaken and an objective risk assessment process that would guide priority setting.
Many (perhaps all) Surveillance programmes are cost driven and their technical standards suffer as a result. A number of the Surveillance programmes in operation have a "scatter gun" approach. They fail to systematically target the higher risk pathways by which exotic organisms are more likely to come into the country.
There is a significant erosion of knowledge and skills in Surveillance in the plants and animals sectors.
A weakness of Surveillance in those sectors unrelated to trade is the continuing development of Surveillance programmes before comprehensive risk management processes have been put in place. Part of the problem here is a lack of baseline knowledge about New Zealand's biodiversity and the likely behaviour of introduced organisms in our environment.
Conclusions
There is a requirement for a more strategic approach to the planning of Surveillance for the detection of organisms new to New Zealand. This approach needs to align the conduct of such Surveillance programmes as closely as possible with current risk profiles and other interdependent activities such as development and maintenance of baseline databases.
Increased emphasis should be placed on the technical soundness of Surveillance processes, including both risk assessment and key technical aspects of programme design. The latter includes the choice of the most appropriate Surveillance mechanisms and the targeting of higher risk entry pathways.
Page last updated: 16 October 2008