An Independent Review of New Zealand's Biosecurity Surveillance Systems-Terrestrial Fauna

Background & Disclaimer

Terrestrial Fauna (other than farmed livestock)

Includes: Indigenous animals and ecosystems they occupy including forested areas, plant species most likely to be at risk from introduced exotic organisms, protected lands, wetlands, offshore and outlying islands and sub-alpine herbfields as well as vertebrate pest control.

Conclusions

  • DOC and Regional Councils have a large and educated group of employees working in the areas of interest and staff commitment is a major strength.
  • Monitoring of vertebrate pests is well established under RPMSs.
  • RPMSs are developed through a public consultation process with risk assessments based on an economic approach.
  • However, monitoring for new incursions is not well established and Chief Technical Officer Surveillance responsibilities for this sector are not explicit under the BSA.
  • Many DOC and Regional Council biosecurity Surveillance programmes have no formal quality systems and not all are subject to external audit.
  • Regional Councils must make a clear separation between monitoring of established species and Surveillance for new incursions. They have no statutory responsibility or authority to spend ratepayers' funds on Surveillance for exotic species unless they are included in RPMSs or have been declared an unwanted organism.
  • Section 100 of the BSA also places financial and technical constraints on Regional Councils and public notice must be given before they can take action. They are therefore unable to respond promptly to new incursions.
  • The Crown can choose not to be bound by RPMSs, under Section 87 of the BSA. This limits coordinated Surveillance and management.
  • Adventure tourism operators who potentially represent a high risk pathway are not well targeted.
  • Gaps and overlaps of responsibility between MAF, DOC and MoH with regard to Surveillance of wildlife diseases pose a risk that wildlife may act as undetected reservoirs of human and domestic animal pathogens.

Risk factors specific to the sector:

  • Rapid growth in adventure tourism is creating new incursion pathways which are very difficult to target;
  • Eco-vandalism, particularly by hunters, frustrates control of vertebrate pests and increases the need for Surveillance systems [54];
  • RPMSs focus mainly on requiring landholders to control widely established agricultural pests rather than focusing on environmental pests requiring regional coordination and intervention [2].

Surveillance objectives:

  • Protection of indigenous faunal biodiversity from exotic pests and diseases [10];
  • Protection of high value habitats and ecosystems from vertebrate pests [10];
  • Protection of amenity values and valued natural resources from vertebrate pests in some RPMSs [55];
  • Monitoring the spread of vertebrate pests, local Surveillance for new incursions of a few existing species beyond current range - eg. Thar, mustelids, wallaby;

Surveillance processes:

  • Some autopsies of wildlife - birds and marine mammals - are carried out with results entered into the Huia pathology database;
  • DOC plans to expand this work to include samples from sick animals and baseline pathogen Surveillance;
  • Pre-translocation disease screening;
  • Island surveys for disease status of avian fauna;
  • All threatened species that die in captivity or are found freshly dead in the wild are necropsied where possible to determine the cause of death and to provide baseline pathology information. These results are then forwarded to Massey University for inclusion in the Huia database;
  • Health investigations of specific species - captive and wild (kiwi, black stilts, North Island Kokako, Tuatara, Takahe, NZ Shore Plover, North Island Kaka, NZ Falcon, Campbell Island Teal, Brown Teal and hihi) prior to their reintroduction into the wild;
  • Annual sea lion Surveillance is undertaken in the Auckland Islands in January/ February as well as monthly whale surveys of the East Coast of the North Island;
  • There have been several surveys conducted specifically aimed at collecting Surveillance information, these include: Kakapo (E. coli and Chlamydia), New Zealand dotterel (avian malaria), native parrots and feral pigeons (Chlamydia, avian influenza, and paramyxoviruses, DOC and MAF funded), penguins (avian malaria, Ph D study), rockhopper penguins (avian cholera), black robins (pox), introduced and some native species (avian influenza and newcastles disease). Most recently a survey was conducted on the Chatham Islands for Avian Influenza, Paramyxovirus, Salmonella, Yersinia, Pasteurella, Campylobacter, Pox, Chlamydophila in domestic and wild ducks, black swans, weka, Chatham Island snipe, broad billed prions, and black backed gulls[10];
  • An avian health survey is now under way [56] following up on recommendations to DoC about risks to native avian species[57];
  • Chytrid fungus Surveillance in native and introduced frogs [58][59][60];
  • Predator Surveillance on some offshore islands;
  • Salmonella Surveillance in native birds DOC/NCDI;
  • Passive Surveillance associated with other survey and research work;
  • Threatened species status of host appears to be one determinant for Surveillance targeting;
  • Surveillance for stoats at various islands (Stewart, Chalky, Breaksea, Hawea) and rodents at other islands (Ulva, Codfish, Snares, Enderby, Adams, Breaksea, Hawea, Chalky, Campbell)

Strengths:

  • Staff commitment is a major strength;
  • DOC and RCs have a large and educated group of employees working in the areas of interest;
  • RPMSs are based on a public consultation process and risk assessments based on an economic approach [61][62];
  • RPMSs are reviewed at least every 5 years [63];
  • Most DOC and RC biosecurity Surveillance programmes have no quality systems and are not subject to any external audit even where they are delivered by contracted suppliers [55];
  • The planned avian health survey is based on targeting of high risk species and high risk sites;

Weaknesses:

  • There are no documented objectives or performance indicators established yet;
  • Passive Surveillance associated with other survey and research work is unstructured;
  • RCs not required to include biosecurity Surveillance plans in their RPMSs;
  • The Crown is not bound by RPMSs, section 87 limits coordinated Surveillance and management [63];
  • Adventure tourism operators who potentially represent a high risk pathway are not well targeted [64];
  • RCs generally have no formal Surveillance processes for new incursions or for handling information on new incursions [55];
  • For RCs there is a clear separation seen between monitoring of established species and Surveillance for new incursions. RCs have no statutory responsibility or authority to spend ratepayers $$ on Surveillance for exotic species unless they are included in RPMSs or have been declared an unwanted organism [63];
  • There is no database of exotic species in captivity in New Zealand listed either by species or location. Many of these were imported long ago and are potential pests;
  • Gaps and overlaps of responsibility between MAF, DOC and MoH with regard to Surveillance of wildlife diseases pose a risk that wildlife may act as undetected reservoirs of human and domestic animal pathogens.

Page last updated: 16 October 2008