Avian and pandemic influenza preparedness activities: 2007

Many countries continued to experience outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 during 2007. Although New Zealand is considered well prepared to respond to an outbreak of avian or pandemic influenza, with comprehensive response plans and policies, we must remain vigilant and not become complacent about this ever-present threat.

MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) participated in a number of avian and pandemic influenza preparedness activities in 2007, including continuing involvement in the Interagency Pandemic Group (IPG), and two interagency exercises led by the Ministry of Health and the Department of Conservation. New Zealand also hosted the annual QUADS1 meeting, which provided an opportunity for HPAI preparedness to be discussed by the Chief Veterinary Officers and working group members from the member countries. MAFBNZ avian influenza surveillance programme and response preparedness activities also continued throughout the year.

Interagency Pandemic Group

MAFBNZ played an active role throughout the year in the IPG, which is led by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and includes all relevant government agencies. The IPG was integral in the production of the New Zealand Influenza Pandemic Action Plan 2006 (NZIPAP) (offsite link to www.moh.govt.nz). MAFBNZ, as part of the IPG, assisted with the development of Exercise Cruickshank.

Exercise Cruickshank

Exercise Cruickshank was a whole-of-government influenza pandemic exercise, led by MoH. The main objectives of the exercise were to practise specific aspects of the NZIPAP and test intersectoral responses during the four phases of a pandemic.2

The exercise ran over five full days in May–June 2007, and included
40 government agencies at local, regional and national levels. The exercise scenario was based on an influenza pandemic with sustained human-to-human transmission.3 MAF mainly provided assistance in an observer and reviewer capacity, as this was seen primarily as an MoH-led initiative. However, MAF border staff at Christchurch and Auckland airports were involved on Day 1 of the exercise “Keep it out” (border management).

The scenario did not test animal-related infection, which would be a biosecurity response that MAF would lead4 in accordance with its Technical Response Policies for Avian Influenza Viruses of Regulatory Concern.

Exercise Cruickshank helped participating agencies to develop and improve networks and working relationships across government sectors that will enhance normal day-to-day activities. It also gave MoH and other agencies the opportunity to identify key issues and priority areas in their individual plans that need to be addressed to improve their operational application.5

Operation Gallus

The Department of Conservation (DOC) conducted a two-day Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) Exercise – Operation Gallus – for the North Island conservancies in June 2007. This was to test the department’s biosecurity capability in the event of an incursion of HPAI. It was also an opportunity to exercise the DOC Draft Avian Influenza Response Plan and the Biosecurity Standard Operating Procedure. MAFBNZ staff gave presentations on the MAF Biosecurity Strategy, HPAI Technical Response Policy and disease control measures, as well as providing technical liaison during both days of the exercise. A similar South Island-based exercise – Operation Avis – was completed in late February, 2008.

QUADS response policy comparison

New Zealand hosted the QUADS meeting held in March 2007. At this meeting, the Emergency Management Working Group proposed that a comparison review of each country’s Notifiable Avian Influenza (NAI) response strategies and policies should be undertaken. The comparison will allow the exchange of information on unique methods, better understanding of each country’s response process, and identification of policy gaps. MAFBNZ has undertaken responsibility for the comparison project and expects completion by the 2009 QUADS meeting.

AI Surveillance and Response Preparedness activities

Surveillance is a key tool for preparedness and early recognition of introduction of new or unwanted organisms into the country. New Zealand’s avian influenza surveillance programme is multifaceted, incorporating active surveillance of poultry, active surveillance of resident and migratory wild birds and enhanced passive surveillance. Survey findings to date have found no HPAI in New Zealand. The most recent reports may be found in Surveillance Magazine at:

Members of the MAF AI Response Preparedness Team6 met in 2007 to review and update MAF AI response policy and operational plans. The team also provided feedback to DOC on their response policy, in preparation for Operation Gallus.

MAFBNZ will continue careful monitoring of the world HPAI H5N1 situation and preparedness activities here at home to ensure New Zealand is ready to respond if it arrives in the country.

1 Signatories of the Animal Health Quadrilateral Agreement are Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

2 Keep it out (border management), stamp it out (cluster control), manage it (pandemic management) and recover from it (recovery).

3 To date there have been no reported cases of sustained human-to-human transmission of HPAI H5N1. All human cases of H5N1, reported by the World Health Organization (WHO), have occurred either by direct contact with infected birds, or very close contact with infected persons.

4 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) is the lead agency for planning and responding to an outbreak of HPAI in animal species, including birds. MAF will continue as lead agency in the event of a confirmed case of HPAI identified within the New Zealand human population in the absence of human-to-human transmission. MAF will work closely with MoH on the risks associated with human cases. Where human-to-human transmission occurs, MoH will become the lead agency for managing the pandemic, but MAF will retain responsibility for animal response.

5 Ministry of Health, 2007. Report on Exercise Cruickshank. Wellington: Ministry of Health.

6 The MAF AI Response Preparedness Team mirrors MAFBNZ’s infrastructure under the National Response Centre framework, and coordinates contingency plans to manage the risks associated with AI and activities around disease response.

  • Jane Rooney, Senior Adviser Animal Response, Post Border Directorate, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand, jane.rooney@maf.govt.nz

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Page last updated: 30 April 2008