Editorial - Building partnerships to strengthen readiness and response
Douglas Birnie
The focus of this issue of Biosecurity is joint decision making and resourcing, a theme that underlies an important truth about New Zealand's biosecurity: simply put, we're all in this together.
Central and local government, industry organisations and private enterprise are getting better at working together to achieve common biosecurity goals. Readers see many examples of such collaboration in this publication – where the most appropriate combination of skills and resources is applied to tasks such as pest management or biosecurity surveillance.
In September 2007, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand (MAFBNZ) began consulting stakeholders on a discussion paper that gets right to the heart of the matter.
Joint Decision-Making and Resourcing for Readiness and Incursion Responses was prepared by a working group of agriculture, horticulture, forestry and MAFBNZ people. It proposes a framework whereby government and industry should share decision making and resourcing responsibilities for both readiness (surveillance and preparing for future biosecurity responses) and response (actions needed after a biosecurity incursion has been detected) activities.
They would agree on priorities for readiness and response, determine how to share costs and how to make rapid joint decisions during a response.
The desired outcomes were focused around reduction (lowering the risk of pests or diseases crossing the border) readiness, response and recovery (regaining our pre-incursion status in terms of production, trade and biosecurity).
There was a healthy level of interest in the paper and we received 34 formal submissions during the consultation period (see web link below for a submissions summary).
It was clear that the groups involved had put much thought and analysis into the cases they made, and understood the importance of good planning and decision making.
About three-quarters of the submissions came from bodies representing primary producers, with the balance coming from central and regional government, Crown research institutes and non-profit organisations. While MAFBNZ did not receive formal submissions from any Māori groups, the consultation round involved four hui, which yielded several useful comments and suggestions.
Many of those making formal submissions supported the desired outcomes for the paper and noted other positive outcomes, such as increased certainty, better informed decisions and use of resources.
There were mixed views about resourcing. Some felt that most resources for readiness and response should be provided by the Crown and/or ‘exacerbators' – importers and incoming passengers who may be providing a pathway for unwanted pests or diseases.
It was felt by others that, where industries shared the cost of readiness and response, the emphasis could be on in-kind contributions.
The principles for joint decision making were strongly supported. Some felt that where a group would directly benefit from readiness and response activities, their right to take part in joint decision making should be linked to their commitment to share costs. Others opposed this view. (The discussion paper suggested that those not contributing resources, while not taking part in joint decision making, should still be consulted.)
The discussion paper suggested that where benefits from surveillance, planning and response activities were enjoyed by the wider public, rather than specific sector groups (e.g., benefits to human health or the environment), then the Crown alone should manage and fund this work. Several submitters were concerned that determining a cost-share between private and public benefit, or allocating costs between sectors could be difficult when the potential impact of a new organism is not fully understood.
One area of concern for some submitters was the management of risk at the border, and suggestions were made as to how this could be remedied.
Under the framework, MAFBNZ would retain its leadership role for incursion responses. There was support for this to continue, with some suggesting MAFBNZ should lead all responses, not just nationally significant ones.
The MAF-industry working group that prepared the discussion paper is continuing to discuss the proposed framework. The next step for MAFBNZ is to consider the issues that have been raised and prepare advice for the Minister for Biosecurity to take to the Cabinet.
New Zealand is a small country facing big biosecurity challenges. In a large-scale response, resources can quickly become stretched. We only have to look at the recent equine influenza outbreak in Australia to appreciate that. By building a better understanding of how government and its partners will work together, we put ourselves in the strongest position to deal with the next unwanted organism to cross our borders.
- Douglas Birnie
Director Policy and Risk
MAF Biosecurity New Zealand
For the summary of submissions:
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Page last updated: 12 June 2008