Submission 1

Auckland Regional Public Health Service
Rātonga Hauora ā Iwi o Tamaki Makaurau

Working with the people of Auckland, Waitemata and Counties Manukau

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24 July 2015

Biosecurity and Environment Group
Plants, Food and Environment
Ministry for Primary Industries
PO Box 2526
WELLINGTON 6140

Submission on the revised draft Facility Standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods and associated revised draft Guidance Document

1. Thank you for the opportunity for the Auckland Regional Public Health Service (ARPHS) to provide a submission to the revised draft Facility Standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods and associated revised draft guidance document.
2. The following submission represents the views of the Auckland Regional Public Health Service and does not necessarily reflect the views of the three District Health Boards it serves. Please refer to Appendix 1 for more information on ARPHS.
3. The primary contact point for this submission is:

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Yours sincerely

Jane McEntee
General Manager
Auckland Regional Public Health

Simon Baker
Medical Officer of Health
Auckland Regional Public Health

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Thank you for the opportunity to provide advice and input into the revised standard and guidance documents for Transitional Facilities (TFs) for General Uncleared Risk Goods.

We are generally supportive of the revised standard and guidance documents. However, we do have a number of suggested amendments in light of issues that our operational staff have identified when responding to interception notifications from Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI).

The specific issues we have identified and subsequent amendments are:

1. The need for improved pest management control measures, particularly in regard to managing breeding habitats in and around TFs.

   ARPHS recommendation:

   Amend the Standard to add a requirement for TF manuals to include procedures on how breeding habitats in and around the TF will be managed, and ultimately eliminated, as well as supporting amendments to the Guidance document.

2. Difficulties in accessing TFs afterhours.

   ARPHS recommendation:

   Amend the Standard to require TFs to have procedures for afterhours access. Place greater emphasis on TFs to provide contact information (including afterhours contact details) on their official signage.

ROLE OF ARPHS (BIOSECURITY MATTERS)

ARPHS undertakes a number of activities to ensure that effective biosecurity procedures are implemented to deal with potential threats. We have a particular responsibility in the control and surveillance of vectors of disease. Of particular concern is the risk that New Zealand faces from the introduction of exotic mosquitoes that can carry dengue fever and other arboviruses.

ARPHS responds to exotic mosquito interceptions and incursions. The following table shows the number of notifications that ARPHS has responded to in the last six years, of which, a number involved the interception of exotic mosquitoes.

Year	Total Number	Number of Exotic Mosquitoes	Number of Local Mosquito Species	Number of Non-mosquito Species	Number of Notifications without Specimens
2015 (up to July)	16	2	7	5	2
2014	21	6	12	3	0
2013	20	2	11	7	0
2012	8	1	3	1	3
2011	8	2	2	4	0
2010	9	1	3	3	2
2009	8	2	3	1	2

MANAGEMENT OF HABITATS / PEST MANAGEMENT PLAN

When responding to an interception at a TF site, our heath protection officers sometimes notice that there are mosquito habitats at the TF.

Section 3.7 of the revised Standard states that;

> 'TF Operators must ensure that pests are effectively managed in and around the TF'.

Under section 3.1 of the Standard a TF Manual must be prepared for each TF, and where applicable, should contain procedures identifying management and exclusion of pests, vermin and weeds, in and around the TF (i.e. pest control plan). Section 5.10 of the Guidance document goes on to provide examples of how pests may be effectively managed, and explains that it is important that vegetation is managed so that regulated pests do not have any nearby places to hide.

ARPHS fully supports these sections in the standard and guidance documents, but believes further detail can be provided in both documents to strengthen a TFs requirement to adequately manage mosquito breeding habitats, and other pest habitats.

Apart from our suggested amendment outlined in the table below, we consider section 3.7 of the Standard should clearly stipulate that TF operators are not only responsible for effectively managing pests, but also their potential breeding habitats in and around the TF.

Furthermore, we believe the Guidance document should explicitly outline the auditing and enforcement role of MPI in this regard.

AFTERHOURS ACCESS

At times when our health protection officers arrive at a TF afterhours, they are unable to gain access.

Accordingly, we believe TF operators should have a process in place to ensure that the TF is accessible outside of business hours for public health unit staff to respond to potential mosquito interceptions, and other public health issues. We consider it important that MPI send a clear message to TF operators that they need to be available to meet our officers at the TF afterhours, if required.

While beyond the scope of this consultation, it would also be helpful for MPI to provide us with afterhours contact details at the time of notification (as a means to back-up TF operators' afterhours procedures).

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS

To address the identified issues we have recommended a number of minor amendments to the standard and guidance documents. This information is outlined in the table below.

Standard Document		
Clause	*Page*	*Suggested amendment(s)*
3.1.1 TF Manual Structure and Information	10	Under the title 'TF Procedures for compliance and ongoing TF management', amend clause (f) to read: "(f) Procedures identifying management and exclusion of pests, vermin and weeds in and around the TF, including treatment of the inspection area by physical means or with pesticide. *This should include the elimination of all breeding habitats in and around the TF, and regular inspection to ensure no habitat regenerates. Where potential breeding*

		habitat cannot be physically removed, regular monitoring and treatment should occur."
3.1.1 TF Manual Structure and Information	10	Insert a new clause (j) under the title 'TF Procedures for compliance and ongoing TF management': *(j) Procedures for ensuring that the TF is accessible outside of business hours for public health unit staff to respond to potential mosquito interceptions, and any other public health issue.*
3.5 Record keeping	11	Clause 3 under section 3.5 lists what records (including dates and times) TF operators must keep. Insert a new sub-clause (f), stating: *(f) An up-to-date pest management plan.*

Guidance Document		
Clause	*Page*	*Suggested amendment(s)*
5.8 TF documents and records	9	Section 5.8 (1) lists the type of documents that should be kept securely by the TF operator for MPI external audit purposes. ARPHS considers the following item should be added to the list under TF and TF operator approval documents: • *"Copies of pest management plans."*
5.10 Pest, vermin and weed control	10	Section 5.10 should specifically make reference to 'mosquitoes'. For example: *(3)... to control pests such as* ***mosquitoes,*** *birds and rodents. For example, the positioning of exclusion devices,* ***removal of all mosquito habitats,*** *the laying of poison..."*

5.13 Official signage	11	Section 5.13 discusses official signage at a TF, and states that "TF Operator or Deputy TF Operator contact details may also be added to the sign information". ARPHS considers the guidance document should place stronger emphasis on including the operators contact details on the signage. We recommend the following be inserted: *"TF Operator or Deputy TF Operator contact details (including afterhours contact details) should be included in the sign information".* To make it explicitly clear to those operators referring to the guidance document, we believe this information should also be shown on the example 'sign' provided below the text. For example: These premises are a TRANSITIONAL FACILITY Approved under the Biosecurity Act 1993 ACCESS IS RESTRICTED TO AUTHORISED PEOPLE ONLY ***[TF Operator: Joe Bloggs*** ***Opening hours:*** ***Afterhours contact: 02x xxx xxxx]***

CONCLUSION

Thank you for this opportunity to provide input into the revision of the standard and guidance documents for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods.

Appendix 1 - Auckland Regional Public Health Service

Auckland Regional Public Health Service (ARPHS) provides public health services for the three district health boards (DHBs) in the Auckland region (Auckland, Counties Manukau and Waitemata District Health Boards).

ARPHS has a statutory obligation under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 to improve, promote and protect the health of people and communities in the Auckland region. The Medical Officer of Health has an enforcement and regulatory role under the Health Act 1956 and other legislative designations to protect the health of the community.

ARPHS' primary role is to improve population health. It actively seeks to influence any initiatives or proposals that may affect population health in the Auckland region to maximise their positive impact and minimise possible negative effects on population health.

The Auckland region faces a number of public health challenges through changing demographics, increasingly diverse communities, increasing incidence of lifestyle-related health conditions such as obesity and type 2 diabetes, infrastructure requirements, the balancing of transport needs, and the reconciliation of urban design and urban intensification issues.

Submission 2

EC Quality review of MPI-STD-TFGEN Draft (completed 1st of July 2015) - Mark Brooker. EC Quality Ltd

Thank you for the opportunity to provide a review of the new requirements. I feel that the general content and structure of this standard has several areas of improvement from the previous standard, and although I will focus on the areas of contention below, these comments should not take away from my support of a lot of the improvements made (especially the addition of Air Container requirements, reformatting to align with other MPI standards etc).

My opinion below has been formed as a culmination of my experiences working as a government verifier, working within industry groups as a compliance consultant (across several compliance systems), and discussing some of the proposed changes with my TF clients.

MPI has specifically requested feedback on external training frequencies. In MPI's moves to "disincentivise" organisations who import in low volumes for their own use from running a TF, it would be unwise and unnecessary to align AP training with Operator training. The two roles are very different, and the greater the volume of imports at a company, the more differentiation there tends to be between the two roles. Aligning the training would only add to the confusion between the two roles and disenfranchise the operators who seldom see or touch a container in their capacity as an Operator. MPI inspectors are now rightfully quizzing Operators (and deputies) on their compliance training and experience during audits – and someone with this background is unlikely to be utilised to devan a container but makes an excellent Operator.

In my experience, AP's don't tend to "lose knowledge" on container devanning procedures between training courses (whichever frequency) but the courses are a useful tool to update them on current risks, review new MPI requirements and processes, and rebuild their enthusiasm for biosecurity (this enthusiasm can be lost if the course is dull or too repetitive from the last session). The same can be said for Operator training. Like getting your driver's licence, you get better at being an AP or Operator with practice and timely supervision (internal and external) – the qualification just gets you started with some background skills. It is important that refresher training is not just the same material as what the trainee learned at the previous session. The optimal frequency could be easily tested by reviewing the performance of people completing the training initially, with people on a 2 year or 4 year intervals – and it would be more useful to make this determination based on data rather than industry feedback.

The duration of the courses will obviously be dictated by the content that needs to be covered – and I am unsure what additional content needs to be added to the AP or Operator course (I am not too familiar with the current content so won't comment further on this)? For my clients, I would prefer to see the operators committing more time to reviewing systems and internal staff training at their worksite over spending more time in a classroom (especially for refresher training). I would like to see an assessment conducted for Operator training completed back at the worksite (this could be instead of adding additional time to the training session) where internal systems were reviewed against the standard and "reality checks", mock internal "non-compliances" were created (as practice), and an internal training module and test is created and distributed to relevant staff (as internal training) etc.

Some organisations may elect (or be compelled to elect if non-compliant) to use their compliance budget to engage an external consultancy company to review their system (including their people, premise, internal training etc.) to ensure it is optimal for the companies desired outcomes (including, but not limited to, MPI compliance). My clients will tell you this is a better use of time and money than any additional external training and probably delivers a better compliance outcome for biosecurity. A general comment now on the standard and guidance document: The standard and GD are largely outcome focussed – which they need to be when dealing with such a wide range of end users. However, sometimes the outcome is lost in the drive for black and white compliance (especially with statements like "this should be documented for audit purposes"). If something is only done for audit purposes, then it is not needed to be done at all as this is not an outcome (the outcome may be to provide a reference as to when pest control was last done or who has visited the site etc.). The reason I mention this is any quality systems (e.g. Operating Manuals) primary objective should be to make a process more efficient, effective, consistent in application, understandable, reduce risk etc., while the secondary objective is to meet compliance. The reason for this is if it is the other way around then the system becomes prohibitive to the business rather than enhancing it, so organisations are prone to ignore or not keep up with documented processes. The TF system has many aspects that enhance a business, even if meeting compliance wasn't a desired outcome (documented hygiene, training, pest control, security etc. are all good things for any business). The following ideas (mostly picked from the standard) make me believe that MPI is inadvertently disempowering organisations from having and utilising their own internal controls (which are audited by MPI), therefore making the sole focus compliance rather than adding value to the business:

- Sending internal audit reports to MPI
- Notifying MPI when major and minor non-compliances are identified
- Lack of emphasis on internal training
- Providing applicants with a template quality system (rather than letting them create their own which can benefit their organisation in other areas).

The less time and money TF's invest in creating their own system, the less time they will spend understanding and implementing it.

Facilities (operators DN) must be compelled to create and manage their own quality systems – otherwise they won't value the system which leads to bad biosecurity outcomes. MPI has, dis-incentivised this in favour of making it really easy for companies without a strong quality system focus to attempt to run what is a process of every increasing complexity. There is no economic or political reason for this (that I can think of), as the type of facilities who don't have this focus would usually survive without becoming a TF (i.e. handling imported goods isn't their core business – they just do it because the process is so easy) – and biosecurity is harmed as a result. For companies without a suitably trained compliance person on site that must be a TF for business reasons, there are compliance companies out there who they could engage to assist them with process on an ongoing basis. This idea is widely supported by MPI staff and is prevalent in the MPI export sector (such as RMPs) and is a win-win for all parties involved.

This review provides a wonderful opportunity to put a line in the sand, and bring the quality of the applicants into line with those in the export sector (biosecurity is important enough to warrant this).

Some more specific comments are on the below pages.

The below tables outlines the areas identified in my review that I recommend MPI review further. Some outline opportunities for improved compliance practices for both TFs and MPI (in GREEN), some outline proposed improvements in the standard itself (in RED), and others are typos that I came across when carrying out the review (in BLUE).

TFGEN Standard Review

Section	Issue	Suggested Change / Comment
Standard	**Standard**	**Standard**
Proposal 2.1a (Requirements for TF approval)	"Inspectors requirements" must be followed along with documented requirements in TFGEN, IHS's, CTO Authorisations and Permits	In an outcome based standard, it is hard to imagine any situation where MPI would want an inspector to "create" a requirement which is not specified in the four docs mentioned. For prevention of biosecurity risk, there are provisions in the Act that compel people to follow all reasonable directions of an inspector – but I don't think these stretch as far as setting up a TF. Surely if they can't meet documented requirements they won't be approved and conversely where they do meet all documented requirements (including prescribed outcomes) then they will be approved. Concerned this provision could lead to inconsistency.
Proposal 2.1.1(1) – Changes to a facility	"Depending on the extent of the change, a new approval may be required".	I can't think of any situation where a structural change would lead to a new approval. Probably an inspection but not a new approval
Proposal 2.3(1)	Facility location must be within metro areas	This contradicts the GD which allows provisions for non-metro sites (dependant on risks). It is to be noted that some high risk sites are currently located outside these areas due to their operations (e.g. Landfills)
Opportunity 2.4	Signage	Not sure the purpose of stating the name of the TF on the sign? Will the cost to industry of doing this be outweighed by the benefit to biosecurity?
3.1.1	Manual	An amendment register is a key part of being able to track changes that were made more than one version before the latest version and could be added as a requirement?
Opportunity 3.1.1(f)	Manual – Internal audits	I would recommend not being so specific on who conducts the internal audits. The quality of the audit (and the competence of the auditor) is more important than stating who. I would prefer this said "the procedures and regime for internal auditing and the competencies required of the person who conducts them" (note that the operator is not always the most skilled person within the company when it comes to compliance.
Opportunity 3.1.1(g)	Manual – "Details of supplementary staff training for biosecurity awareness"	Internal staff training is one of the cornerstones to TF compliance. It is one of the main reasons for the manual and it ensures staff are familiar with their roles and processes within that specific TF. I would remove the word supplementary, and change "biosecurity awareness" to "TF Operation" (as bio awareness is conducted at external training).
Proposal 3.1.1	Scope has been changed to TF Function and Purpose	Not sure why this change has been made but it no longer aligns with the text later in the standard and the GD which discusses "scope"
Proposal 3.1.1	3.1.1 TF Procedures (e) – transport to the TF	Everything in the manual must be able to be verified by the TF and the auditor somehow. I'm not sure how the receiving TF will verify (and document) how goods are to be transported to their facility from the POFA or other TF and wonder if this effort could be better used in other areas. Agreed that for goods travelling from the TF, there needs to be clear processes to ensure they are transported securely.
Change request 3.2.1 (1)	Risks "eliminated or mitigated"	Wonder if these two things means the same thing?

Proposal 3.2.3 (2)	Unclaimed risk goods being held under an inspectors authorisation for 90 days	Can a provision be added here for goods contaminated with live animals or not properly contained? It seems 90 days is far too long but if it's in the standard, someone might try and test it
Proposal 3.3 (1)d	Access at "any reasonable time or when provided 24 hours of advanced warning	Suggest clarifying who gets to choose the option of "24 hours or any reasonable time?" (i.e. whichever comes first)
Change request 3.7 (1)	"TF must ensure that non-reg pests (such as arthropods)..	Text suggests that all arthropods are non-risk – perhaps this could be reworded?
Proposal 3.8(2)	Audit frequency	
3.8(5)	Internal audits being sent to MPI	I disagree with this proposal for the following reasons: 1) It does not align to any other quality system that I am aware of that will be operating within TFs. 2) The TFs must be given the opportunity (and encouraged) to run an effective quality system in house – and requiring what will be perceived by compliant TFs as pointless government oversight will dis-empower the internal compliance process. 3) There could be an "implied consent" issue if non-compliances noted on audit reports are not responded to by MPI in a reasonable timeframe. 4) MPI resources would be more effective in other areas (e.g. auditing).
Proposal 3.9 (1)a	Adequate lighting	There was a statement on the MPI checklist requiring 600 lux for general inspection (such as personal effects, machinery, selecting seed for sampling etc). It would be useful if this was in the standard along with 1000lux for close inspection
Opportunity 3.11	Staff Training	As mentioned, the most effective trainer in internal TF operations may not be the Operator (eg it may be a member of the company's quality team or an external consultant). There should also be a requirement on describing how the learnings are verified (eg with an in house test). This is common at the sites I visit and it is a good opportunity to review systems with staff when creating or marking each test.
Change request 3.12 External MPI audits	Wording issue. The first sentence suggests that the outcome of an audit will be that requirements are met (and that a company's site cannot be compliant without an audit)	Suggest rewording
Proposal 4.2.8 (2)a Seed	Transport requirements in here does not state that an enclosed vehicle is required	This could be bolstered to require an enclosed vehicle, double packaging etc.
Proposal 4.2.8 (5)	Cleaning dressing machinery	Suggest the standard specifically requires the cleaning to be documented.
Change request 4.3(2)	Typo	The word "destroy" is mentioned twice
Change request	Typo	Remove bracket closing sentence

4.3.4 (1)h(i)		
Guidance Document	**Guidance Document**	**Guidance Document**
Proposal 4.4.6 (1)d	Chicken and egg. Thermocouple test cannot be conducted with "biosecurity refuse" prior to approval	Change "bio refuse" to "domestic refuse simulating biosecurity refuse "
Opportunity 5.5(1)	Maintaining a logbook "for external audit purposes"	There are many reasons why facilities maintain a visitor log, the most common being internal H&S. The outcome that MPI wants to achieve is to identify visitors on site, so this should be stated rather than "for internal audit purposes"
Opportunity 5.10(1)	Same comments as above	Suggest removing all references that say "for external audit purposes" as this isn't the primary outcome (if it was it wouldn't be a requirement).
Proposal 5.13	Signage	The requirements here don't align with the standard.
Opportunity 5.14 (2)	Lighting	Having a recommended lighting level is contentious and difficult for verifiers and TF's. Can this be changed from a "should" to a "must". There is no reason why facilities handling the same product should have varying requirements on this.
Proposal 5.12 (2)	Segregation:	Can the "3 metre" segregation rule be added here to prevent inconsistencies?
Proposal 5.16 (4)	"a regular staff induction program and is available from an inspector"	Is MPI going to provide training material for TF's. Surely with the thousands of different quality systems out there it is better for them to create their own?
Proposal 5.18 (1)	Audit report issued at the time of the audit	Common practice contradicts this with reporting happening a few day after the audit.
Proposal 5.18 (2)	Compliance frequency. This section reads very messily. Consulting with the operator on the compliance frequency (surely this should be a decision made only by MPI)? Then it recommends a lower audit frequency for satisfactory compliance, and then discusses increased training for non-compliant sites.	Perhaps the consequences of non-compliances could all be discussed in point (1) and compliance in point (2). No objective way of determining audit frequency is discussed. Re-sitting external training hasn't historically been an effective tool for improving compliance (after all, it didn't work the first time) – removing people from roles, retraining internally, increasing audits, and cancelling sites has a much better impact.
Opportunity 5.18.1 – 5.18.3 Non-compliances and MPI	TFs are required to notify MPI if they discover any type of noncompliance and there are no incentives for self-identified non-compliances.	Not sure of the benefit of having facilities who identify major or minor NC's report these to MPI (this just passes over the ownership of the problem to MPI who are not resourced to work with the facility to resolve what could be 10000+ NC's per year). This disempowers TFs from making their own decisions on corrective and preventative actions. I expect that all facilities should identify some NC's as a matter of course and rectify them through an internal process.

notification		MPI may also like to consider mirroring their export standard which does not increase audit frequencies for facilities that notify them of non-compliances. I can see this being a benefit to biosecurity as organisations are unlikely to notify MPI of issues if they think they will be disadvantaged because of it.
Change request 5.18.3 (2)	typo	"notify an MPI and"
Change request 6.1.5 (1)	Typo	"an operator may work at more than one TF Operator and TF"
Opportunity 6.1.6 (2)	"A solid bin (such as a wheelie bin) with a tight fitting lid... "	A wheelie bin doesn't have a tight fitting lid in that when they are knocked over the waste will spill so I don't recommend them to my clients. Perhaps the example could be removed so people opt for a more secure bin?
Opportunity 6.5.3 (2)	Bench top colour	White is recommended for produce, while stainless steel is recommended for seeds. Both are effectively looking for the same things, and some of my clients have both types of inspections as part of their approval. Can this be made more consistent? White trays and benches are predominantly used in the seed inspection industry.
Opportunity 6.5.4 (1)	"Wash basin with alcohol based sanitiser"	In the biologicals and micro standard (or at least the interpretations of these) – sanitiser or a basin are the minimum requirements – not both. Can this be an either / or statement for consistency as the outcome is the same?
Proposal 6.11.4 (2)	Looking under containers	I think it would be worth spelling out here that people should not go under containers unless they are on certified stands?
Proposal 6.12.1 (1)	"Separation should be a minimum of 3-5 metres."	A range is not an effective minimum. Suggest this is changed to 3m to align with current expectations.
Proposal 6.14.2 (2)	"Operators of hoists should be trained and certified to run this equipment"	Does this certification exist? It may be a difficult requirement for places to meet.
Change request 6.14.3 (3)	"Alternatively, the TF Operator.....	This sentence needs rewording.

I am happy to discuss any of the above suggestions further. Please feel free to contact me on mark@ecquality.co.nz.

Submission 3.

Melanie Chong [redacted]

Fri 24/07/2015 11:30 a.m.

Hello,

Attached is the Fonterra submission on the consultation *for "Revision of the Ministry for Primary Industries Facility Standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods and Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods."*

Please confirm receipt of our submission.

Kind regards

Melanie Chong

Technical Officer – NZ Focus

Food Safety & Quality – Regulatory Team

Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited

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Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited
Submission on:
Revision of the MPI facility standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods and Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods
24 July 2015
Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited

Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (Fonterra) appreciates the opportunity to work collaboratively with the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) in support of the New Zealand dairy industry and to protect and build on

New Zealand's reputation as a world class producer of safe food.
Fonterra is owned by around 10,500 New Zealand dairy farmers. Fonterra and its subsidiaries (collectively, the Fonterra Group), has a global supply chain that stretches from Fonterra's shareholders' farms in New Zealand through to customers and consumers in more than 100 countries. Collecting more than 20 billion litres of milk each year with around 18 billion litres sourced from New Zealand, the Fonterra Group manufactures and markets over two million tonnes of product annually. This makes the Fonterra Group the world's leader in large scale milk procurement, processing and management, with some of the world's best known dairy brands.

General Comments

1 Fonterra appreciates the opportunity to comment on the proposed revision of the requirements and guidance for the Facility Standard: Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods.

2 Fonterra supports the intent of the proposed standard, recognising that it is in the interests of maintaining the integrity of biosecurity of New Zealand.

3 Transitional Facilities (TFs) operating to this standard within Fonterra are those within our New Zealand Distribution Centres (NZDC) and Fonterra Brands New Zealand (FBNZ). NZDC scope is sea containers, animal products (holding only) and wood packaging. FBNZ scope is sea containers only. FBNZ and NZDC TFs are not high risk biosecurity TFs.

4 The proposed changes will require some minor procedural and operational changes and we are confident that the NZDC and FBNZ TFs will be fully comply with these requirement within the proposed transition (3 months from publication).

Specific comments

5 3.9 Inspection of uncleared risk goods at TFs

a. Sub clause (1) c) requires the temperature of the inspection are to be between 10-25°C. Fonterra maintains the goods at a temperature to ensure that product integrity is maintained. Inspection areas are sometimes outdoors and as such will be subject to ambient environmental temperature conditions. This statement appears to replace current standard clause 2.13 "*the area must not be subject to extreme temperatures*". Fonterra does not believe that temperatures at, say, 9°C or 26°C could be considered extreme and the inclusion of the 10-25°C range seems arbitrary. We also assume that the inclusion of a temperature range is intended to maintain comfortable working conditions for the MPI inspector. If this is the intent, Inspector comfort can be addressed by the provision of suitable equipment, as clearly for outside areas it is very difficult to maintain the temperature range of the area. For example, in the case of low temperatures, cold temperature clothing could be provided (as worn by staff required to work in chilled areas). Fonterra asks that sub clause (1) c) be revised to remove the temperature range, as this can be appropriately managed by provision of equipment and be addressed by sub clause (2) of the proposed standard.

If there are any queries relating to this submission, please contact Melanie Chong.

[redacted]

Yours faithfully
Stan Bunting
Food Safety & Quality – Risk and Regulatory Manager

Submission 4

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Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited

Submission on:

Revision of the MPI facility standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods and Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods

24 July 2015

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Specific comments

5 **3.9 Inspection of uncleared risk goods at TFs**

a. Sub clause (1) c) requires the temperature of the inspection are to be between 10-25°C. Fonterra maintains the goods at a temperature to ensure that product integrity is maintained. Inspection areas are sometimes outdoors and as such will be subject to ambient environmental temperature conditions. This statement appears to replace current standard clause 2.13 *"the area must not be subject to extreme temperatures"*. Fonterra does not believe that temperatures at, say, 9°C or 26°C could be considered extreme and the inclusion of the 10-25°C range seems arbitrary. We also assume that the inclusion of a temperature range is intended to maintain comfortable working conditions for the MPI inspector. If this is the intent, Inspector comfort can be addressed by the provision of suitable equipment, as clearly for outside areas it is very difficult to maintain the temperature range of the area. For example, in the case of low temperatures, cold temperature clothing could be provided (as worn by staff required to work in chilled areas). Fonterra asks that sub clause (1) c) be revised to remove the temperature range, as this can be appropriately managed by provision of equipment and be addressed by sub clause (2) of the proposed standard.

If there are any queries relating to this submission, please contact Melanie Chong.

[redacted]

Yours faithfully

S. Bunting

Stan Bunting
Food Safety & Quality – Risk and Regulatory Manager

Submission 5

Ian Cardno iancardno@xtra.co.nz Tue 21/07/2015 1:41 p.m.

Submission on Guidance Document TF GEN GD, and TF Standard MPI STD TFGEN

To Whom It May Concern

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission on the draft guidance document and draft standard for transitional facilities.

The NZFPIA's submission is attached.

To continue our review of technical requirements and operations for this standard we request copies of relevant procedures that border inspectors are required to implement regarding the transitional facility standard.

In addition, the NZFPIA requests a meeting with the author (Dr Dave Nendick) to discuss these drafts and our submission as part of the consultation process.

Kind regards

Ian Cardno

(on behalf of the NZFPIA)

i4 independent

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New Zealand Fresh Produce Importers Association Inc. (NZ FPIA) Submission on the draft Guidance Document: Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods – TF GEN-GD, and draft Facility Standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods - MPI-STD-TFGEN

The NZ FPIA appreciates the opportunity to make a submission on the public consultation documents.

The NZ FPIA has identified a number of important technical and consistency issues, within the documents as listed below.

Draft Guidance Document: Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods

This document contains a number of inconsistencies, contains formatting, grammatical errors as well as questionable interpretation of the Biosecurity Act 1993, and lacks clarity of requirements.

Inconsistencies are numerous. What should be generic requirements for each section may or may not be present. Various parts of the guidance are placed within incorrect or inappropriate topics, incorrect grammar and/or spelling has been used, and in some cases there is evidence that the powers of Inspectors and other requirements of the Biosecurity Act may have been interpreted incorrectly. The document lacks clarity on numerous occasions and often contains a jumble of suggestions that are not relevant to the topic.

Findings as follows:

4.1.1 Changes to the operation of a TF

(1) Note: Unauthorised changes of a significant nature may result in the cancellation or suspension of a TF and may result in cancellation or suspension of approval for operating the TF.

Why does this note appear in this section? Any sanctions should be documented in a more appropriate section of the Guidance Document.

4.2.2 Deputy TF Operators

(1) When a Deputy TF Operator has been approved for a TF why does MPI need to be advised if the TF Operator is absent?

5.3 Receipt and transfer of uncleared risk goods

Subsections 1-3 provide clear guidance for receipt and the transfer of uncleared risk goods.

Subsection 4 is a combination of numerous actions, "rights", requirements, explanations and sanctions, which are part of this clearly identified section (i.e. Receipt and transfer of uncleared risk goods).

What is the basis for categorisation of "major non-compliance" for a situation where a TF Operator fails to report to MPI on unclaimed uncleared risk goods or uncleared risk goods subject to an importer's or agents decision?

Subsection 5 also provides clear guidance for any spillages that may occur. However, it also contains a number of items focused on sanctions, suspension or termination of TF approval. These should not be part of this subsection.

5.5 TF access and security of uncleared risk goods

(3) This subsection contains an unrelated item to the heading "TF access and security of uncleared risk goods" in that it suggests that the TF should have "an inventory system for example log sheets (or other method) for always tracking the uncleared risk goods in and out of the TF so this can be audited by an Inspector".

Suggestions for an inventory system should be relocated to a more appropriate section of the Guidance Document.

5.6 Segregation of uncleared risk goods

This section contains a jumble of requirements or suggestions that are not related to the heading e.g. management of designated areas to control pests; control of unloading places for pest management. These should be located under separate sections for pest control or pest management.

5.9 Hygiene requirements

(5) This subsection discusses management of contaminated protective clothing and the risks of diseases and pests spreading by people and appropriate management thereof.

Why is it mentioned here that "A list of approved refuse disposal companies can be found on the MPI website"?

5.11 Internal assessment of TFs

(1) This subsection states "Regular self-assessments of TF management and processes by the TF Operator or Deputy TF Operator will ensure that a TF is operated to the specifications of the TF Manual and the standard".

This is incorrect. Self assessments may *verify* or *confirm* that TF management and processes by the TF Operator or Deputy TF Operator are operated to the specifications of the TF Manual and the standard, but they will not *ensure*.

5.14 Inspection areas

(2) The wording of this subsection could be better worded to outline requirements for lighting and temperature.

5.17 External MPI audits

(2) There is a repetitive description of audit i.e. MPI external audits will involve ... , and ... by conducting an audit.

The second sentence of this subsection is a repeat of subsection (1) under this heading.

(3) This subsection states that:
"Should a TF Operator and/or Deputy TF Operator display a lack of sufficient biosecurity knowledge (with regard to TF operation and/or their responsibilities) an Inspector could cancel or suspend approval of a TF. There is also the possibility that retraining is specified by an Inspector. An increased frequency MPI external audit regime will also be maintained until an Inspector is confident that the TF is managed compliantly. Conversely, MPI may reduce the external audit frequency for TFs that continually display full compliance with the standard and the TF Manual."

Why does this subsection (under the section heading External MPI audits) include details of any sanctions?
Under what circumstances and authority may an Inspector cancel or suspend approval of a TF?

Who can approve a TF?
Who can specify the level of training required for a TF Operator?
Who can increase or decrease the frequency of MPI audits, and on what basis is this to be applied?

What is MPI's policy and process for approval of TFs and TF Operators?

(4) This subsection states that "Under section 122 of the Act, Inspectors have the power to authorise a TF Operator to conduct required actions regarding TFs or uncleared risk goods or cleared material that has or maybe cross contaminated with biosecurity contaminants or regulated pests. Failure for a TF Operator or Deputy TF Operator to act on a lawful authorisation from an Inspector is very likely to lead to cancellation or suspension of TF Operator/Deputy TF Operator approval and subsequent cancellation of the TF approval; and this may also lead to prosecution under the Act".

Why are these details included under the section heading MPI external audits?

If the Guidance Document is to contain any details of potential breaches of the Biosecurity Act and outcomes of those breaches, then they should be carefully worded to encourage TF Operators and Deputy TF Operators to act in a legal manner, and not be used to intimidate as has been included here.

5.18 Non-compliances against the Standard

(2) The last sentence of this subsection should be listed as a separate subsection i.e. Non-compliances are graded as **Critical, Major or Minor**.

5.18.1 Critical non-compliance

(1) This subsection contains a multiple of descriptions. The use of the word "it" to start the second sentence indicates poor grammar. It would be more technically correct to start the sentence with "The detection of a critical non-compliance could lead to..."

(4) This subsection contains several descriptions e.g. "MPI may further investigate Critical Non-Compliances and this could possibly lead to prosecution"; and "It is expected that at least one repeated MPI external audit will be required to ensure that the Critical Non-Compliance has been effectively resolved and measures have been taken to prevent its reoccurrence".

Why is it necessary to use intimidatory language?

What is meant by "critical non-compliance has been effectively resolved" and "measures have been taken to prevent its reoccurrence"? Where are these requirements discussed in detail?

5.18.3 (2) Should read "Notify an MPI inspector..."

6.1.2 Transportation of air containers to TFs

(1) Why is the 3rd sentence of this subsection included here? What does it mean?

6.1.3 The physical operation of air container TFs

(3) This subsection contains "Note: Any open drains within 5 metres of air containers at any TF should be covered during checking and unloading to prevent the possibility of any live pests from escaping".

Is MPI serious about this requirement?

6.1.5 Unpacking air containers

(1) The last sentence of this subsection does not make sense.

6.1.7 Record keeping

(1) This subsection makes a recommendation to record:

- Confirmation that internal and external checks were conducted (dates and times).
- Names of the AP who conducted the above checks.
- Online declarations.

Completing these records will place unnecessary and meaningless requirements on TF Operators. Approved TF manuals will already specify the activities that need to be completed and by whom.

The recommendation to record of contaminants found and how and when MPI was notified, and to record any remedial actions taken should be retained.

6.2.1 Physical requirements

(1) Why is the 2nd sentence "Animal products may not be removed from the TF unless biosecurity clearance or another MPI authorisation for destruction, export or transfer is received by the TF Operator" included in this subsection?

6.3.1 Physical requirements at biological product TFs

(1) Why is the 2nd sentence "Biological products may not be removed from the TF unless biosecurity clearance or another MPI authorisation for another activity is received by the TF Operator" included in this subsection?

6.5.1 Location of fresh produce or nursery stock TFs

(1) The 2nd sentence of this subsection states "TFs outside the metropolitan area surrounding the POFA from where the fresh produce or nursery stock arrived should have approved processes in place regarding the secure transfer of the fresh produce or nursery stock to the TF including the secure unloading and inspection".

When uncleared fresh produce or nursery stock is authorised by an Inspector to be transferred from a POFA to a TF, the receiving TF Operator has no control or input into how those risk goods are transferred, i.e. they arrive at the TF at which time the TF Operator takes over responsibility, therefore cannot be responsible for the secure transfer aspects of this requirement.

6.5.2 Inspection at fresh produce or nursery stock TFs

The heading of this section should be "Inspection facilities at fresh produce or nursery stock TFs" as it relates to aspects of facilities rather than inspections.

(3) This subsection contains two suggestions for the floor surfaces and an unrelated suggestion for "1 metre clear floor space separating each item including boxes or pallets of plants or produce". The latter suggestion is out of place in the Guidance Document.

(6) This subsection discusses actions to be taken when live organisms are detected on nursery stock or fresh produce, but only discusses subsequent actions for fresh produce samples.

6.5.3 Equipment for inspection at fresh produce or nursery stock TFs

(1) Why is it necessary to restrict the use of a binocular microscope for MPI inspection purposes only? Microscopes are expensive pieces of equipment and TF Operators may require their own use of such a piece of equipment for their own purposes.

Draft Facility Standard: Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods - MPI-STD-TFGEN

This document contains a number of inconsistencies, contains formatting, grammatical and spelling errors as well as questionable interpretation of the Biosecurity Act 1993, and on numerous occasions lacks clarity of requirements.

Findings are as follows:

2.2 Cancellation of approval for a TF

(1) The last sentence of this subsection states "... and followed up by MPI". What is meant by this statement?

3.1.1 TF Manual structure and Information

Business identity, location and staff (including training)

This heading does not represent the requirements a) to h) that are listed.

TF Procedures for compliance and ongoing TF management
There are no requirements listed for corrective actions and prevention of reoccurrence.

e) This subsection states that "Procedures specifying the secure and contained packaging and transportation of uncleared risk goods to the TF".

There are numerous TFs that receive risk goods for the purposes of conducting some sort of authorised activity, but where the TFs are not in control nor have responsibility for arrangements with the transportation of those risk goods.

How does MPI see this requirement being met in these situations? The wording of this requirement should be re-worded to reflect appropriate responsibilities and control.

There are no details (requirements) for procedures to be documented for internal audits, i.e. Who should conduct an internal audit, when it should be completed, the audit scope, and any records that may be required?

There are no details (requirements) for procedures to be documented for notification to an Inspector for unclaimed uncleared risk goods.

3.2.3 Unclaimed uncleared risk goods authorised to TFs
(1) The wording of this subsection is confusing.

3.4 Segregation of uncleared risk goods
(3) Spelling mistake – risks.

3.5 Record keeping
(3) a) and b) What is meant by "approval documentation"?

(4) This subsection states "Records must be legible, readily identifiable, and must be kept for a minimum of seven years from receipt, preparation or amendment".

Why are records required to be kept for seven years? What purpose or benefit is there for retaining records for that length of time?

3.6 Hygiene requirements

(1) This subsection states "The TF Operator must ensure that there is a hygiene system in place that ensures that the TF is kept clean at all reasonable times. The TF Manual must specify hygiene procedures that will be used in the TF to achieve this. Hygiene requirements must take into account prevention of accumulation of debris, dunnage, packaging, soil, or other waste that might pose a biosecurity risk, prevention of possible refuge areas for pests, sweepings and the disposal of such material.

This section has a mixture of inconsistent terminologies.
The heading is "Hygiene requirements".
The second sentence requires the TF manual to specify hygiene procedures.

The third sentence states that the "Hygiene requirements" must take into account...".

3.8 Internal audits of TF activities

(2) Audits must occur must occur at least once a year. A double-up of words.

(5) This subsection states "Within 10 working days of each internal audit being completed, the TF Operator must send an electronic copy of the report to an MPI email address as supplied by an Inspector".

If the internal audit records are to be retained (refer 3.5 (3) d)), why is it necessary for the internal audit record to be sent to MPI?

3.11 Staff training

(1) This subsection states "TF Operators must provide for staff member training".

It would be appropriate to require the training to be specific for the TF operations.

3.12 External MPI audits

(1) This subsection states "TFs will be audited by an Inspector so that the biosecurity requirements specified in this standard are met".

This statement is technically incorrect. An audit cannot ensure requirements are met, but can confirm compliance with requirements.

(2) This subsection states "The TF Operator must provide an Inspector access to the TF at any reasonable time or when provided with 24 hours advanced warning", and "The TF Operator may be notified of the audit in advance or it may be unscheduled".

For the purposes of an inspection of the TF or risk goods that may be held at the TF, it is quite appropriate for the TF Operator to provide access as stated. However, for the purposes of an audit, it is not always appropriate for MPI to require this short notice time-frame, nor is it appropriate for unscheduled (or unannounced) audits.

Some TF operations are spasmodic and in some situations the TF Operator (who may be the only appropriate person) maybe absent from the TF.

(3) This first sentence of this subsection states "Where a TF is not compliant with this standard, approval for the TF Operator and the TF may be cancelled or suspended immediately".

What is the meaning of this statement? Is it directly related to section 3.12 regarding access for the auditor and availability of the TF Operator and relevant documentation? What legislation supports this statement?

The Standard should specify the function, frequency and expectations for MPI external audits. Audits should be conducted following official notification with the TF Operator, including:

- Advice of commencement time and date, and who should be present.
- The scope of the audit and any other documentation or related matter that might be required.

This will enable TF Operators to provide any personnel and access assistance and documentation required and so that audits are conducted in an efficient and professional manner, without causing any unnecessary interruptions to commercial practices.

At the time of the audit, the Inspector (or auditor) should:

- Have an entry meeting with the TF Operator
- Outline the audit function, the timeframe and scope of the audit
- Advise any additional requirements, and that an exit meeting will be conducted at the end of the audit.

Part 4: High Risk Biosecurity TFs

(2) b) This subsection states "A description of the method by which uncleared risk goods are transported to a TF (including packaging)".

As indicated in 3.1.1.e) above there are numerous TFs that receive risk goods for the purposes of conducting some sort of authorised activity, but where the TFs are not in control nor have responsibility for arrangements with the transportation of those risk goods.

How does MPI see this requirement being met in these situations? The wording of this requirement should be re-worded to reflect appropriate responsibilities and control.

c) & e) Similar to (2) b) above.

Note: Comments in sections (2) b), c) and e) above are also applicable to other parts of this standard.

4.2.4 Fumigation TFs (including treatment with Formalin or Hydrogen Cyanide)

(3)d) Should this read "Has fans that circulate the *chamber's air* capacity in one minute?

What is the technical data supporting the requirements for circulation of chamber's air capacity within one minute? Is this appropriate for all fumigation TFs?

4.2.7 Nursery Stock Treatment TFs

(2) a) Why is nursery stock that has been inspected at the border and found free of risk organisms authorised by an inspector to a designated TF for treatment? If it is inspected and found free of risk organisms then shouldn't it be considered a cleared risk good?

4.3 Decontamination TFs

Subsections 2) and 3) contain poorly worded statements i.e. Decontamination TFs are those that devitalise, or must remove...

4.4.6 Specific requirements for incineration or sterilisation TFs

(1) d) & e) Why is it necessary to conduct a thermocouple test in the specified manner and frequency?

Surely an approved sterilisation process has demonstrated that sterilisation requirements have been met (by following a documented processes including equipment calibration). If the TF Operator detects any variation in results or is required to deviate from documented or approved process, then authorisation from an Inspector could/should be obtained.

(2) What is the basis for an Inspector being able to request a verification test at any time?

Submission 6

24/06/2015

dave.cookson@landpower.co.nz

Here is my feedback for the proposed submissions to the Guidance and Standard Documents. No issue with the proposed changes. I used the new template to create my Operating manual so I already have a lot of this information.

Training – AP training every 2 years; TFO training every 2 years. Another way could be to test all staff at the MPI site audit, anyone that doesn't meet the required score should be retrained.

Submission 7

24 June 2015

I believe that both TFO and AP training should be 2 yearly. My reasons for this are: • The cost of training is relatively small for the benefits that accrue from the process. Our company employs 2 staff - one is the TFO and an AP and I am an AP - which costs us around $3-400 per year.

• The benefits in time saved, costs saved, reduced potential for damage, etc far outweigh the cost.

• Too long a period between refreshing can lead to bad practice. Complacency can kill a good program.

• More frequent renewal would assist in ensuring all the roles are filled within an organization. How often does the TFO role fall vacant because of staff churn?

• As I understand the process the greater responsibility is on the AP - that is the person who has to hold the goods / halt the unloading if there is a problem and as a consequence absorb pressure from colleagues to "get the goods out". The TFO should be supporting the AP when this occurs - but this may not be happening. If that is the case then more frequent training / reminder of the impact of not following the rules needs to be made. If the training frequency was reduced to 2 years for both would it be possible to merge the AP and TFO training into one course for those who hold both roles?

Sales@transportect.co.nz, Paul Craddock, Transportect LP, 021 726473

Submission 8

SUBMISSION

Ministry for Primary Industries

Draft General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods - standard and guidance documents

Introduction

This submission is from the Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders Federation of New Zealand Inc. (CBAFF)
President: Glenn Coldham
Executive Director: Rosemarie Dawson
Physical Address: 162 Mokoia Road, Birkenhead, Auckland 0626
Postal Address: PO Box 34-530, Birkenhead, Auckland, 0748
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The Federation represents those companies and individuals who are involved in the business of border logistics facilitation. Membership representation is diverse, covering all facets of service provision for the facilitation of international trade – both import and export. Our nationally based membership is comprised of 120 business members, who make up 80 per cent of the industry. Included in the Federation's aims is the following statement: "To liaise, maintain and develop communication within the industry and between various stakeholders to ensure mutually beneficial strategic partnerships result".

General Comment

CBAFF has reviewed the documentation released relating to the Draft Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods.

CBAFF wishes to continue discussion with MPI on the issues that are raised in this submission and others that may arise in the future.

We note that the consultation document is very similar to the existing Transition Facility Standard. The point of difference appears to be in a greater and stronger emphasis now being placed on the Operator and the TF Manual. CBAFF supports this change.

We suggest that the increased costs imposed in the Biosecurity Regulations, together with the added conditions of this TF document may add unnecessary cost to small business owners, forwarders and business operators alike.

CBAFF's position is that MPI should be dealing with non compliance rather than impose restrictive conditions upon all sectors of the industry. CBAFF submits that the level of non-compliance within the industry is insufficiently large, both in occurrence and size, to warrant blanket regulation.

Specific Comment

In the Standard it states: *2.1 A TF must be physically/structurally secure…*

What is the measure to be used to determine this? CBAFF suggests that this should be specified, either by way of individual criteria for a storage facility of by reference to other legislation which already outlines appropriate criteria.

3.12 External MPI Audits – CBAFF is concerned that the authority of a MPI Inspector has changed from "recommending" that approval be cancelled to having the authority to cancel or suspend immediately. CBAFF does not support this proposal as it has the potential for "abuse of privilege". The proposal does not provide for sufficient checks and balances in respect of the suspension or cancellation of the TFO or the TF. CBAFF submits that such authority to determine an organisation's business future must be subject to a process of review and appeal, under the principles of natural justice.

In respect of training, CBAFF supports re-current training and has no opinion on whether training of TFO and APs should be aligned or the frequency of training. We do point out though, that in a number of instances the TFO and APs are one in the same person, so it would make sense to have the training aligned.

-End-

Submission 9

Thu 16/07/2015 9:01 a.m.

Lisa Dobbie lisaplantresearch@icloud.com

Submission for; Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods - MPI-STD-TFGEN

To Whom it may concern,

I wish to make a submission for the; Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods - MPI-STD-TFGEN.

It is in regard to section;

4.2.8

(4)

b) Conducted on an approved bench or table made of stainless steel (or similar) construction that has a raised edge of 5mm to 10 mm to prevent seeds from spilling off the surface during treatment.

Is it possible to have a tray (possibly plastic) in place of a permanent bench? This would prevent seed spilling in a similar manner, but it would be easier to manage in small facilities.

Lisa Dobbie

Plant Research (NZ) Ltd

Transitional Facility approval number 4039

Phone: +64 3 3257031
Mobile: +64 29 770 6375
Email: lisa@plantresearch.co.nz

PO Box: Plant Research (NZ) Ltd,

PO Box 19

Lincoln

Thank you,

Lisa Dobbie
Doubled Haploid Production
Plant Research (NZ) Ltd

2009 AUSTRALIAN PORK COOPERATIVE RESEARCH CENTRE (CRC): ADOPTION AND COMMERCIALISATION AWARD -
For "Excellence in science and the commercialisation of research outcomes"
2007 AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE/UPS SUCCESS AND INNOVATION AWARDS - EXPORTER OF THE YEAR TO THE USA UNDER $500,000

Phone: +64 3 3257031
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Plant Research (NZ) Ltd

Advanced Plant Breeding

Submission 10

Department of Conservation
Te Papa Atawbai

Dr Dave Nendick
Biosecurity and Environment Group
(Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods Consultation)
Ministry for Primary Industries
PO Box 2526
Wellington

23 July 2015

Dear Dr Nendick

Thank you for your letter to Department of Conservation dated 22 June 2015 advising of the Draft MPI Facility Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods (the Standard) and its associated Guidance Document and seeking feedback on the proposed changes[1].

Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods

1. *General comments*
   - 1.1 Transitional facilities (TF) pose inherent biosecurity risk, given goods and vehicles are moved from a Place of First Arrival (POFA) to TFs located throughout the country, or from a TF to another TF without biosecurity clearance.
   - 1.2 It is clear that the scope and scale of the activities regulated by the Standard are considerable.
   - 1.3 Despite the comprehensive standard and guideline it is not clear if these standards are consistently and rigorously implemented or audited. The transparency of this system is also complicated by overlapping standards that the Department is not necessarily familiar with (e.g. the interlinking IHSs - see the sea container point in (3.2) below).

2. *The greater number of Transitional Facilities throughout NZ, the greater the risk of new organism introduction*
   - 2.1. We are unclear on the amount of TFs throughout NZ, but believe it to be a significant number. It would be useful for the locations of TFs within NZ to be explicit and mapped – currently this is not transparent. To varying extents the uncleared risk goods being moved around the country will be contaminated - particularly sea containers and Inorganic Risk Materials and possibly their conveyance vehicles. We are aware of an MPI survey which found a container is in New Zealand for about 44 days before exportation and within those 44 days it had ample opportunity to be exposed to potential establishment sites via transit (truck or rail) and rural destinations[2].
   - 2.2. Having TFs located throughout NZ increases the risk of hitchhiker establishment. The Department's preference is for minimal transportation of uncleared risk goods. TFs

[1] http://mpi.govt.nz/news-and-resources/consultations/draft-general-transitional-facilities-for-uncleared-risk-goods-standard-and-guidance-documents/
[2] Glassey, K. 2000: Container Movement Pilot Survey.

should ideally be located as close to a POFA as possible to minimize transportation risk pathways. Numbers of TFs located in rural areas should be kept to a minimum.

3. *Transparency regarding contamination, hygiene, inspection*
   - 3.1 The Standard states Decontamination TFs must remove or destroy biosecurity risk material associated with inanimate risk goods including equipment (of all types), such as sea containers. Does this mean all contaminated sea containers would be taken to Decontamination TFs to have all their six sides cleaned; and other contaminated inanimate goods would also go through this process?
   - 3.2 We are aware the Sea Container IHS (SEACO) prescribes all containers to be clean and free of pests and biosecurity contamination before being imported into NZ and that inspections or checks to verify this must be carried out by legally approved persons. However, for reasons of feasibility, only a certain percentage (offshore or in NZ) are inspected. This means the residual risk of contamination is probably reasonably significant. The discrepancy between what is stated cf. what is done (due to feasibility, *inter alia*) means it is very difficult for an external stakeholder to be conversant with the system, which is a concern.
   - 3.3 In spite of the inclusive definition of 'contamination' in Schedule 1, we are not clear on what MPI consider contamination to be in an applied sense. We are aware of a 1999 study which found the tops and bases of shipping containers held the most amounts of contaminants[3]. Yet in our understanding the tops and bases are rarely inspected because it was (is?) believed they did not pose a significant area of risk. We understand this belief stemmed from the Marshall & Varney (2000)[4] study that assessed soil contamination as a risk pathway, but looked at bacteria, fungi and nematodes only. For some reason the study did not assess soil as a risk pathway for insects, weed seeds, or other biosecurity contaminants (e.g. skink eggs). Would you advise on the inspection regime for tops and bases of sea containers? Is this regime still informed by the Marshall & Varney study?

4. *Reporting suspect new organisms*
   - 4.1. There seems to be only two references to MPI's 0800 hotline service in the Standard (and these are referred to as an **emergency** number for inclusion in the TF manual, and under high risk TFs). We suggest a specific section on the MPI 0800 hotline to emphasise this is the first line of action in reporting suspect new organism(s). Don't hesitate—call the hotline, even if you just suspect a new organism.

5. *Pathway analysis – link to emerging risks*
   - 5.1. Is the TF new organism/contamination reporting linked into MPI's emerging risk system (emergingrisks@mpi.govt.nz)? Analysis of the data on the relationship between types of goods and contamination rate would help determine high risk pathways. This intention could be explicit in the Standard.

6. *Robust, transparent auditing*
   - 6.1. The level and frequency of the auditing regime for TFs is not clear in the consultation material. We note TFs are subject to their own annual internal auditing regime and

[3] Gadgil, P.; Bulman, L.; Crabtree, R.; Watson, R.; O'Neil, J.; Glassey, K. 1999: Significance to Forestry Quarantine of Contaminants on the External Surfaces of Shipping Containers. New Zealand Forest Research Institute, AgResearch, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

[4] Marshall, J.W.; Varney, G. 2000: Assessment of contamination soil as a risk pathway. Crop & Food Research Report No. 284.

periodic external MPI audits. We suggest more regular auditing (>annually) to ensure adequate hygiene and new organism detections. We would expect to see the high risk TFs audited the most often.

Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods

7. *General comment*
   7.1 We found the Guideline useful and practical, clearly unpacking the actions expected of TFOs and APs. However, we think the use of *'should'* in many areas of the document introduces ambiguity as it implies actions are optional; yet many are linked to risk actions or non-compliance consequences. For example, 5.5(5) states "*If spillage occurs during transport, the transporting vehicle or container* should *immediately be thoroughly cleaned and the waste managed as authorised by an Inspector. The TF Operator* should *also report any spillage or leakage of uncleared risk goods (that constitutes or is likely to constitute a biosecurity risk) to an Inspector as soon as possible*". We think the use of *'must'* is more suitable for most of the prescribed activities in the Guideline.

Training programme of Transitional Facility Operators (TFOs) and Accredited Persons (APs)

8. *General comment*
   8.1. We have not viewed the training material for TFOs or APs, but consider training every four years for regulatory information is too infrequent. To keep regulatory information in the forefront of the DOC Great White Butterfly Authorised Persons' minds, the Department undertakes a comprehensive training day, followed by an annual refresher course (a couple of hours only). Staff have found this to be extremely valuable. It provides the opportunity to raise questions and share applied knowledge; both of which reinforce understanding. For this reason we propose biannual training on an ongoing basis would be more suitable; even if every second training is a refresher.

We hope this has been useful. Please contact me if you have any queries.

Kind regards,

Verity Forbes
Kai-mātonga Matua - Koiora Mōrearea
Technical Advisor - Biosecurity Threats (National)
Science and Policy Group *Te Pūnaha Pūtaiao/Mahere Rautaki*
Department of Conservation *Te Papa Atawhai*

submission 11

Wed 15/07/2015 10:30 a.m.

Martyn Freer martynf@tapper.co.nz

MPI-STD-TFGEN + Guidance document

Comments and observations on the proposed MPI-STD-TFGEN and GD.

TFGEN

Page 3 – *TF approval must be renewed annually.*

This appears to be a new requirement. To what degree does the approval need to be renewed? Will this be a "behind the scenes" function within MPI, or is there going to be some trigger required from the TF? Have MPI got the resources to process annual renewals for all TF's if not automated?

Part 2

2.1(1) – *A TF must be physically/structurally secure.*

Could we have a definition of this please? It does suggest that all TF's must be able to operate within a perimeter fence, or inside a secure building. What if there are several TF's operating in same industrial park where there is common hardstand for containers?

2.4(1)a) – *State Name and MPI number of the premises.* (Signage)

This appears to be a complete u-turn by MPI as we have previously been instructed to remove the premises numbers from our signage. Please confirm.

Part 3

3.2.2(1) – *If spillage occurs during transport.....the TF operator must report any spillage.*

This requirement assumes that the driver/transport operator is aware of biosecurity requirements despite not being authorised/licenced by MPI. TF operators at either end of the transport movement may not be aware and/or informed of any spillage. Currently MPI issue re-directions for uncleared cargo to move and these usually stipulate any wrapping requirements. In these cases, the origin TF would present cargo to transport operator in an appropriate condition, but they have no control from this point onwards.

3.2.3(1) and (2) – Unclaimed uncleared risk goods reporting.

This is a significant new requirement for 30 and 90 day reports to be submitted by TF's. The rules need to be clearer, for example, once cleared goods are no longer risk goods and therefore not subject to reporting requirements.

Is there any particular information required in these reports?

3.4 – Segregation of uncleared risk goods

Consider this example - a risk consignment has spent two months in a container *en route* to NZ, along with a dozen non-risk consignments. Upon deconsolidation, MPI require the risk consignment to be segregated from the other dozen for fear of cross-contamination. In reality, the likely risks posed by the risk goods to the other consignments once in the TF are negligible, making segregation in the TF pointless. There is no increased risk of cross-contamination having risk consignments sit alongside non-risk consignments at the TF after they have shared a container for many weeks.

3.11 – Staff training

Will MPI provide training templates for TF's? MPI auditors have previously indicated that training modules were being prepared for industry to use. This would then help TF's select appropriate modules for their operations, but also give MPI some control over the content.

Part 4

4.2.1(1) - *...transported to the TF securely...*

The receiving TF operator is unlikely to have control over the transport of risk goods coming to them and therefore should not be regarded as responsible for this movement.

4.2.1(4) – MPI approved transport operators

Please identify list/link giving details of MPI approved transport operators with approved vehicles for moving risk goods before POFA to TF, or TF to TF?

4.2.2(1) – Holding of uncleared risk goods

See response to 3.4 above.

4.3.2(4) – MPI approved transport operators

See response to 4.2.1(4) above.

Guidance Document

5.1 – TF Manual Development

No mention is made of the template manual available via MPI website. It must surely be to MPI's advantage to encourage use of this template so as to standardise TF manuals for audit purposes.

5.3(3) – Transport TF's

Please explain this term and how it differs from air/sea/deconsol TF's.

5.3(5) – Spillage during transport

See response to 3.2.2(1) above.

5.15(1) – Contingency Plans

Has it been considered to include the full approval process for operators at time of training? For smaller TF's, they may only have one trained operator, so they will need to be approved. For larger TF's, where deputy operators are encouraged due to scale/complexity of the operation, having these deputies already approved would mean improved business continuity if the main operator was not available for any length of time, or short-notice replacement of TF operator if necessary. Essentially, MPI would then know that all trained operators were suitable to be the TF operator. Notification process of change of operator to MPI would still be necessary, but could be a much simpler/quicker process.

5.19 – Staff Training

See response to 3.11 above.

6.11.1(3) –

Where containers have travelled side-by-side on vessel, then door-to-door on truck/rail wagon, seems a little late to then insist a one metre clearance is maintained at the TF to avoid cross-contamination.

External checks need to be completed at POFA and any issues get resolved before containers are moved on. This would also mean that transport operators know that all containers have been cleared externally and so can place containers side-by-side at those TF's with limited space.

6.12.1(1) – Minimum separation distance

Suggest if it's a minimum, you don't quote a range!

Specific Request for Feedback

TFO and AP retraining.

Firstly, the TFO training should include AP training. For smaller operators, these roles may be covered by the same person. For larger operators, the TFO/deputies need to audit their APs and so having completed the same training will help them conduct these internal audits.

Both TFO and AP retraining should be completed every two years. Facilities handling large numbers of containers on a frequent basis would be disadvantaged if re-training was required annually as the AP's are able to consistently practice these skills. Whereas facilities handling few containers on an occasional basis may find retraining every four years too infrequent as they are unable to put these skills into regular use. Hence, two years, and ongoing every two years seems to be a good compromise.

Four yearly intervals for any refresher training suggests that there is likely to be long periods of stability around biosecurity risk for NZ. Does MPI believe this to be the case?

Martyn Freer
Logistics Manager

Phone: 09 634 4948 | Cell: 021 366 501 | martynf@tapper.co.nz | www.tapper.co.nz

submission 12

Thu 9/07/2015 10:52 a.m. Carole Grasso cgrasso@malaghan.org.nz

Re: Feedback wanted on draft transitional facility standard changes

Feedback on Training Regimes:

- AP and TFO training should be not be aligned
- AP training regime to remain the same
- TFO training Yr 1 and Yr 3, then every 5 years (retrained if do not pass audit)
- Training schedule responsibility of MPI - mandatory training dates sent to TFOs and APs

Regards

Carole

submission 13

Tue 21/07/2015 10:33 a.m. Howard Henderson Howard@rjstewart.co.nz

Feedback MPI

MPI would like your feedback on the proposed changes to the standard and guidance related to transitional facilities for uncleared risk goods, in particular:

- training for Transitional Facility Operators (TFOs) and Accredited Persons (APs),
- alternative suggestions to assess the competence of APs and TFOs after the initial training is conducted,
- content, duration and testing requirements for AP and TFO training.

MPI Consultation
Specific request for feedback.

Dear Sir,
Comments from a low volume ,low risk facility .
Small businesses are being swamped by over regulation and compliance requirements that reduce productivity and increase operating costs .
Our TF operates solely for the purpose of processing up to 8 containers a year of Factory new , clean , unused earthmoving tyres .
From a Bio security point of view ,we understand that strict adherence to best practise is an absolute minimum .
As a very low volume ,low risk facility , Our TFO view is that rigorous initial risk based assessment and audit that reflects the nature and volume of goods imported is better than a broad approach which requires all facilities to commit to the same administration and training process regardless of risk and volume.

With regard to AP training .
After the second training (Year 3) , Experience overtakes the training content and although specific threats may change ,The AP working environment and inspection requirements remain the same.

Howard Henderson AP 18802 on behalf of Rebecca Stewart Operator TF 15591

Regards
Howard

Howard Henderson
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Submission 14

29th June 2015

TFGEN Feedback

We operate a low-risk TF in Christchurch for sea containers originating from China containing new machinery and tools. We consider INITIAL training for TFOs and APs important. But we feel that RE-TRAINING every 4 years and 2 years respectively is an absolute waste of time and money for our organisation. I have attended initial training and re-training courses for both TFO and AP positions. Re-training does not cover any new information than that learnt from the initial training course. The trainer has occasionally made reference to a new type of insect that may have been found with imported goods on a given occasion, but this information can be far more productively passed on to the TFOs and APs, at considerably less cost to our organisation, in the form of an ELECTRONIC EMAIL with attached images of the pest to look out for.

ANY new content with reference to biosecurity can be emailed in this way, saving organisations a lot of time and a significant cost. We are unsure why it is necessary to access the competence of TFOs and APs after initial training. None of the TFOs or APs we have had initially trained for our organisation have forgotten how to be TFOs or APs after a 4 year or 2 year period respectively. We are sure that the need to re-train TFOs and APs has been a welcomed revenue earner for trainer providers (such as IVS), however, we believe re-training to be totally unnecessary where the same result can be achieved with simple informative and regular emails.

James Hitchon

James@topmaq.co.nz, Hitchon International Ltd. 32 Hammersmith Drive, Sockburn
Christchurch 8042, New Zealand
Ph: 0064 3 3666143 ext 202
www.topmaq.co.nz

Submission 15

21st July 2015

Hi,

After looking over the proposed changes it looks like it is more orientated to risk goods, we have low risk goods come in and all the changes seem fine. In terms of training I feel it is satisfactory as it is for our situation, maybe a refresher 2 hour course every 2 years for TFO's that have done it for some time? But not sure.

Thanks

Les

Les Howard
Customer Services/Stores

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submission 16

Submission on 2015 Revision of Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods MPI-TFGEN

Submitter: David Jenkins, University of Auckland

A. Biosecurity Awareness Training of the Operator

Clause 1.3.1 in the current version of the standard notes that a Corporate or the Crown might be the Operator. This clause also notes that the person who runs the Operation on a day-to-day basis must undergo Operator Training and will therefore be the de facto Operator.

While we agree that the person who in charge of the day-to-day operation of the TFGEN must have biosecurity awareness training, we note that this person may not have control over the resources that are necessary for proper running of the facility. It is axiomatic that the person who has legal liability (ie the Operator) must have control of resources.

We therefore submit that the standard allows for CEOs or a Senior Manager could be the Operator provided there is *at least* (our emphasis) one person on site that has undergone Operator training who reports directly to the Senior Manager who is the Operator.

We submit that the required accountabilities necessary for the best running and resourcing of the TF best rest with Senior Management of the company or legal entity, but also that it is inappropriate for the Senior Managers to be attending courses on devanning risk goods *provided* (our emphasis) one person on site that has undergone Operator training who reports directly to that Senior Manager who is the Operator.

Specific Feedback on Training

It is submitted that if Operator training is mandatory, this should be a requirement of the standard (as it is in the current standard) and this requirement should NOT be located in the Guidance document. While Guidance Documents might refer to normative statements in the standard, they generally provide means of compliance and/or informative statements

Clause 1.3.1 in the current version of the standard provides clarity on who may be an Operator and on the training requirement *and should be retained in the revised Standard.*

With regard to frequency of training of Operator, it would seem prudent for Operator Training to be aligned with AP training (i.e. Year 1, 3, 5, 9 and 13)

B. Specific Comments

3.10 Contingency Plans

We submit that suggested list of events that might need contingency plans should include:

1. Loss of fuel and gas (particularly relevant for facilities that are involved in steam sterilisation TFs)
2. Force majeure events such as earthquakes and flooding

4.14 Hygiene requirements

Contact times for most disinfectants is at least 5 minutes to provide biocidal activity. It is suggested that the microbiocidal efficacy of foot baths/footpads/wheelbaths is reviewed.

4.16 Effluent treatment

If sodium hypochlorite is used as a source of chlorine, it is suggested that users' attention is drawn in an informative reference in the Guidance document to rapid decay rates for hypochlorite when in concentrated form (i.e. 4 month half-life for 12% solutions)

4.4.7 Biological Indicator Testing for Steam Sterilisation Facilities

It is suggested that the standard specifies the spore loading of *Geobacillus strearothermophilus* on the carrier strip in biological indicators. The most common loading used in hospital sterilisers is > 5 x 10^5 spores.

It should also be noted that self-contained test strips are available (c.f. 3M Attest 1262 and 1292) and are commonly used in hospital steam sterilisers which obviate the need for a testing laboratory. In particular rapid fluorescent based systems are available (3M Attest 1292) which also have special self-contained reading systems and will give a reliable result within 3 hours.

It is suggested that the standard allows the use of these self-contained systems as being equivalent to independent laboratory testing. Being self-contained and easy to use, such biological indicators will promote more frequent testing by Operators which is to be encouraged.

General Comment

It is submitted that Systems of Equivalence (clause 2.16 in the current standard) be retained as it will promote best practice and innovation

Submission 17

Jill Jones jilljones@btsouth.co.nz

Fri 24/07/2015 4:31 p.m.

TFGEN & Training Discussion Comments

HI

Please see attached comments re: TFGEN , Guidance document and the Biosecurity Awareness training.

Please feel free to get back in touch at any time if you have any queries or require clarification in any way.

Regards

Jill Jones

Biosecurity & Training South Ltd

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TFGEN and Guidance Document Submission July 2015

Jill Jones – Biosecurity & Training South Ltd – Trainer, Managing Director

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed changes to TFGEN.

Time constraints and the need for my input into other areas of MPI procedures/training has meant I have had limited time available to commit to this document to the degree I would like so I have focussed mainly on the Standard in relation to Seaco facilities and the training.

Comments:

1) Scope

There is a lot of reference to the Scope of the documents but there is no heading for Scope anymore. Is this now meant in general terms as opposed to the literal Scope section?

2) TFO description TFGEN Background / GD 4.2

- The existing Std states a TFO is *".....a person, normally an individual, but may be the Crown, a corporation sole, or a body of persons (corporated or unincorporated)....."* but the new version does not state this.

Is this an over site or deliberate, in which case, what happens to those facilities that have the company as the TFO at present?

- The GD states only that the TFO *should* have the "necessary authority & resources".

I query the use of the word "should" leading a person to believe there may be another option to having the authority & resources? Perhaps this should be a "must"

3) Sea Containers & Risk Goods

It is difficult to know whether the term Risk Goods includes the Container. As there is an IHS for Sea Containers then technically, the answer is yes.

Following this theory and the way TFGEN is written, I'm assuming that commonly termed "low risk" seaco facilities must adhere to all of Part 3 eg

- 3.2 Receipt & Transfer of uncleared risk goods (5.3 GD).

This talks about 'Control Areas' for devanning. IF this refers to the container pad then terminology needs to be consistent.

- 3.4 Segregation of Uncleared Goods/5.6 GD
- 3.9 Inspection of Uncleared Risk Goods at TF's

With the new requirement for a 'Holding Area' this could apply to Seaco sites but it falls down when you talk about the need for Inspection benches, lights, microscopes etc.

4) 3.3 Security (5.5 GD)

The GD talks about the TFO maintaining a logbook for Visitors and yet this is not mentioned in TFGEN.

5) 2.3 TF Location (5.2 GD)

Std states "must be located in metro areas of cities or towns *that can provide services & systems* to ensure that the Biosecurity requirements....."

The GD states "must be located within metro areas of cities or towns where *access to services and amenities (such as sewerage and mains power) are provided...."*

There is a difference here. I would suggest the Standard wording is better as there are TF's on the city perimeter that are on spring or bore water, and/or septic tanks but have appropriate premises. This may be best as a discretionary decision based on the cargo/area (as per the remainder of the GD description).

6) 2.4 Official TF Signage (5.13 GD)

I don't believe having the TF name, ATF no. is advisable. The sign message needs to be short and to the point and adding unnecessary info dilutes that.

Sourcing individual signs would be difficult and expensive for TF's as each has to be printed individually. The option to 'hand write' the details on generic signs (or making their own) only makes the sign look unprofessional, and the writing will no doubt wear off in a short space of time.

The GD 5.13 doesn't say this is mandatory so some ambiguity between the two docs.

7) 3.1.1 Manual Structure (5.1 GD)

Business identity, location & staff

a-h doesn't mention Pest, Weed, Vermin control records or Waste Disposal records (but does specifically mention the internal staff training & internal audit)

It is possible this could come under f) Procedures & regime etc or the following TF Procedures but so could Internal training & audits. I would suggest either all or none are mentioned specifically.

8) 3.2.3 Unclaimed uncleared risk goods (5.3 GD)

I have concerns that risk goods can be held for 90 days while awaiting the importer or agent's decision? This is a long time, potentially allowing at least two stages of any insect life cycle (and two seasons with a range of temperatures that would at some stage be 'suitable' for most insects).

I'm not familiar with this requirement but I have concerns there could be Biosecurity issues here.

9) 3.4 (2) Segregation of Uncleared Risk Goods (5.6 GD)

Instead of saying "...in the same manner as uncleared risk goods." Perhaps the TFGEN statement could say " ....in an appropriate manner as prescribed by MPI".

This allows the affected cargo to be dealt with in a different way to the original risk cargo if necessary. Different types of cargo may require different treatment methods for the same contaminant, or the importer may choose to destroy instead.

10) 3.7 Pests, vermin & weed control

The inclusion of "*non-regulated pests (such as arthropods)*" is confusing? There may be a valid reason for this inclusion but it seems at odds with the discussion in other areas and the terminology isn't consistent and not clear to TF's.

GD 5.10 does not mention arthropods.

11) 3.8 (2) Internal Audits

Edit 'Audits must occur *must accur* at least once a year'

Perhaps add after this 'or as directed by MPI (or the relevant IHS/Import Permit)'

3.8 (3) The statement that TFO's review their manuals 'at least annually' is at odds with MPI requirement that the manual is 'up to date'.

During TFO training I state their manuals must reflect at all times what is happening at their facility. Annually isn't usually sufficient for this. MPI states the TFO must inform MPI immediately of any changes at a TF, so saying the manual only needs updating once a year, sends the wrong message.

I know this will mean for TFO's that they do a quick revamp just prior to audit.

12) 3.9 Inspection benches

There is no clear or constant requirement around the surface of benches and this is an issue many TF's have as some are being issued CAR's for not having Stainless Steel benches when nowhere in the Standard does it say this is mandatory. This is a costly exercise for TF's and confusing.

13) 4.1.5 Reusable Equipment

(1) f) & h) say very similar things?

High Risk TF's

I haven't had the time to go through this but I'm sure there are people more experienced than I who are capable of commenting on this area.

TRAINING

Specific Request for Feedback

10. In addition to general feedback that may be provided, MPI seeks specific feedback on the following:-

Biosecurity Awareness Re-training for TFO and Aps

Comments:

1) Accredited Person Training

It is interesting that the examples given for the Accredited Person training on pg 9 of the Discussion document still shows confusion around Accredited Person training frequency.

The wording suggests it correctly as 2yrs: 4yrs but the diagram suggests the incorrect 2:2:4yrs ie training in years 1, 3, 5 & 9.

My belief is that 2 yearly training is appropriate when you weigh up the potential for risk from inadequately trained Accredited Person's. Some things are too valuable to put at risk and I believe four yearly training is setting TF's up to fail by not receiving adequate training.

Too much can change in four years, Accredited Person's move around so much that they can get 'lost' in the system. Additional to that, the inconsistencies in procedures between TF's means good habits can be replaced with bad.

Many of our trainees have stated they still learn something new every two years and they themselves have concerns around their ability to remember the procedure between four year training.

For low volume TF's, the gaps between containers may be so great they forget what they need to do. High volume TF's can fall into the typical human nature trap of cutting corners so more frequent training is a good reminder for them.

Finally, every two years will avoid the confusion which has surrounded the training frequency in recent months. The variation in training frequency is too hard to track and there has been no end of re-work required to sort incorrectly dated certificates which looks extremely unprofessional.

As a governing body, MPI should be leading by example.

2) Operator training

Full day training every two years is necessary to ensure TFO's are fully aware of their legal responsibilities. If they are to be held more accountable, as MPI have indicated, then MPI has a responsibility to ensure TFO's are provided with the appropriate & relevant information (training).

High Risk TFO's

The suggestion of a full day course then an additional half day for High Risk TF's is a good one but I have concerns that covering the variables between facilities would dilute the importance of the message and may not be as beneficial as first thought. It could in fact be too confusing.

An alternative I suggest is:

- Full day course for all TFO's to provide Biosecurity background and legal information
- Half day on site (semi practical) course for High Risk TFO's by an approved trainer

The benefits would be:

- More site specific information provided in a practical fashion
- One on one training -more likely to ask questions/clarify/remove uncertainty
- More focus on individual product, procedures, documentation, audit process, etc
- Ability to adapt training to encompass regional/product/site variation
- Remove confusion when delivering 'generalised' training in a mixed group
- Result in more highly trained, confident, knowledgeable TFO's
- Less non-compliances at MPI audits based on well-educated confident TFO's
- Better feedback to MPI from trainers re: training success, issues etc

The difference is comparable to having heart surgery by a General Surgeon v's a Cardiologist.

More specialised training - more knowledgeable/confident TFO's - better outcomes.

Please feel free to get in touch at any time if you have any queries regarding my comments.

Regards

Jill Jones
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Submission 18

Fri 3/07/2015 2:03 p.m.

SCR Solutions greg@scrsolutions.co.nz MPI-STD-TFGEN Draft

As a TF Operator and AP as well as discussing the Draft with our other AP we have the following comments.

2.1.1 Changes to a TF
If a physical or structural change to a TF has a direct impact on the way the TF operates then yes MPI should be notified prior to the change. A lot of TF's like our own are multipurpose i.e. a part of the property is used as a TF or temporary TF and the majority is used for normal business practice like retail showroom, warehouse, office etc. The way the Draft is worded means that a change to a part of a building that has no impact on how the TF operates requires MPI approval which we feel is wrong.

3.9 Inspection of uncleared risk goods at TF's
(2) We strongly disagree with having to provide MPI with equipment for inspection. How many small businesses have ready access to things like microscopes. Sure given enough time we could hire or buy benches, lights and sample bags but our view is that these are the tools MPI require to do their job so they should provide them.

Does a mechanic ask his customers to provide the tools to fix their cars
Does a bricklayer ask his clients to provide the concrete mixer
Does a radiologist ask the patient to provide the x-ray machine

A TF should provide an area or room for inspection but not the equipment.

Retraining for TFO and AP
We feel that the TFO retraining should be every 5 years or earlier if multiple or serious issues are found during an Audit.

The AP should be initially trained and then in 2 years and then every 5. It must be hard for MPI to come up with a training regime as some AP's check multiple containers a day and others do 2 or 3 a year. Some sites have the same product coming in from the same place all of the time and others have many products coming in from different countries.

One thing that needs to be addressed is the requirement for difference courses for initial training and retraining. I have been on a number of IVS retraining courses and they are no different from the initial training course, in fact they are the initial course with a mix of new and existing AP's.

Given the type of retraining currently offered we would be better off doing the initial course and then an MPI online questionnaire every 2 or so years. It would be less disruptive to the business (could be done after hours) and if MPI came up with the questions they would relate to current topics that need addressing instead of how to fill in a container log sheet for the 2nd, 3rd or 4th time.

Regards

Greg Jorey

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Submission 19

Thu 9/07/2015 12:36 p.m. Laurence Kent laurence@premierbeehive.co.nz

FW: MPI Submission - MPI-STD-ANiPRODS

Dear Sir/Madam

I wish to make a submission in respect to section 3"operational Requirements"- "3.6 Waste disposal"

Guidance statement 3.6 states

- ***Waste for treatment or disposal might include shipping material (e.g. contaminated pallets, shipping container), contaminated packaging***

(i.e. packaging that has been in contact with uncleared animal product), trim, by-product and liquid.

I believe MPI have got the waste stream management wrong – I base this on the following

1. Current requirement of plastic packaging (carton liner) treatment requires verified heat treatment within a certified transitional facility – the current allowance of raw (uncooked) pork of no more than 3kg in weight (CRC) being available to retailers in greater quantities appears a contradiction in standards. These retailers are not "transitional faculties" and not subject to any regulation to manage this risk.
2. Deep burial for plastic waste is still referenced within the IHS as an option for all packaging material, why are we then required to send this to a "certified transitional facility" at additional cost to our business (PBNZ expects this to be within the vicinity of $55k for FY 2015)
3. Recent e-mail correspondence with MPI, indicates that there is likely to be a requirement for a transfer request to MPI for the movement of packaging material from qualifying "un-cleared animal product" this would create a significant impact on our business – Currently we would process around 20 – 30,000kg per day this is a mixture up to 6 different cuts of pork a day and sometimes from up to 8 different suppliers, therefore a container may move through our plant within a couple of days or sometimes up to a month. The process of managing this and multiple transfers, let alone the process of verifying each movement and reconciliation of all would be a large administration effort. And for what benefit?

Questions

1. Have MPI assessed the risk to the NZ pig heard from previous processes of deep burial what was there finding and what caused them to make the change to current heat treatment.
2. Can we PBNZ investigate the possibility of heat treating on site all plastic packaging to avoid this cost.

Kind regards

Laurence Kent

Operator/Factory Manager

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submission 20

Andrew Lawes <Andrew.Lawes@redstagtimber.co.nz>

Wed 22/07/2015 4:02 p.m.

Hi

Please find our feedback on the proposed changes to standard and guidance documents as well as specific feedback request on training.

Firstly regarding the standards/Guidance documents,

- Hygiene requirements (Guidance 5.9 mainly): needs more detail on what TF can do with their biosecurity bin waste. Do they place bag back in empty swept container or hold for collection by approved organisation? ; Do we place pallets and dunnage in container after emptying container for disposal? We have a two very large woodwaste boiler (20MW each) into which our biosecurity bin bag is incinerated. We often get clean ISPM15 compliant pallets or dunnage timber within container shipments, some of which would simply be disposed in waste bins as we do not reuse onsite. Guidance around these would be helpful.
- Inspection of uncleared risk goods Standard 3.9: Our facility does not possess a specific area/room that will meet the inspection room requirements as listed. All work involves containers and is done outside in the open. Please advise if this room/area is a mandatory requirement. We currently work on a three step process: (1) goods inspected and unloaded; (2) placed outside near container in case we need to return to container; (3) once container is fully cleared the goods are moved to storage or install location.

Secondly, the training frequency and content.

- I feel Facility operator training every 4 years is sufficient as yearly audits will ensure compliance with standards and operation's system. Major changes to facility requirement however could require retraining. Training content is good.
- I feel Accredited Persons training is best done every two years. The training content does not cover actually doing an inspection; needs to include a practical run-through of a container inspection process. AP's could then be reviewed at place of employment for practical on the job compliance annually as part of internal audit by the TFO or similar.

Regards

Andrew Lawes

TFO (1652) and AP (32765)

Andrew Lawes

Environmental Administrator

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submission 21

Anson.li@newbright.co.nz, Yiqiang Li

25 June 2015

TFGEN Feedback

I think Facility Operators (TFOs) expiry time should be 2 years and Accredited Persons (APs) expiry time should be 3 years, thanks!

submission 22

Mark Lythe Mark@stellarint.co.nz Wed 1/07/2015 10:33 a.m.

RE: Feedback wanted on draft transitional facility standard changes

TFO is also some times an AP so they should not have to do both courses?
The TFO should automatically qualify as AP

Current retraining for first 2 years for AP is good then move to 4 years
4 years for TFO-- maybe should reduce to 3 year refresher

regards

MARK LYTHE CUSTOMS MANAGER
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mark@stellarint.co.nz www.stellarint.co.nz

-----Original Message-----
From: seacontainer@mpi.govt.nz [mailto:seacontainer@mpi.govt.nz]
Sent: Tuesday, 23 June 2015 4:54 p.m.
To: Mark Lythe
Subject: Feedback wanted on draft transitional facility standard changes

MPI would like your feedback on the proposed changes to the standard and guidance related to transitional facilities for uncleared risk goods, in particular:

training for Transitional Facility Operators (TFOs) and Accredited Persons (APs), alternative suggestions to assess the competence of APs and TFOs after the initial training is conducted, content, duration and testing requirements for AP and TFO training.

The draft documents and process for making submissions can found on the MPI website <http://mpi.govt.nz/news-and-resources/consultations/draft-general-transitional-facilities-for-uncleared-risk-goods-standard-and-guidance-documents/>

submission 23

24/06/2015

Feedback to Biosecurity awareness retraining for TFO and APs.

The current regime is a good time line. The only suggested change we would like to see is the ability to be able to complete your TFO and AP retraining at the same time. Surely if you are on your 2nd or 3rd retraining course you are more than aware of why you are there and how important your job is so you just need a refresher and update on any changes to the standard. Based on this you should be able to do your retraining for both at the same time. It would decreases costs and save time and be far more efficient. Feedback to the major change to the guidance document.

Having further guidance and examples on what you actually want in plain English is definitely a good move. The guidance is for the use of warehouse staff more than anything and having hard to understand language included is not helpful or practical. A large portion of your warehouse staff may not have English as a first language. Examples, photos and flow charts in manuals are all preferred.

Racherl Madden, rachelm@firstgloballogistics.co.nz

Submission 24

measuring your peoples' competency

assessment

Submission for:

Consideration of Competency Assessment in lieu of AP/TFO Retraining

Submitted by: Stephen Mansfield, General Manager

Organisation Name: 4c Assessment Limited

Contact Details: stephen.mansfield@4cltd.co.nz

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PO Box 23, Albany Village, Auckland 0755

Submission of Consideration

It is requested that MPI consider Accredited Person (AP) personnel certification to an Accredited Person Scheme and a Transitional Facility Operator (TFO) personnel certification to a Transitional Facility Operator Scheme as formal competency assessment alternatives to retraining of Accredited Persons and Transitional Facility Operators.

This submission is made in reference to the draft Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods – TFGEN-GD, Sections 4.2.3 (2) & 4.2.4 (1) which refers to 'retraining or formal re-assessment'.

Overview

The schemes to be called:

A Accredited Person Scheme
B Transitional Facility Operator Scheme

Assessment is to be conducted by an organisation accredited to ISO 17024 - 'Conformity assessment – General requirements for bodies operating certification of persons'. The organisation once accredited is to be known as the certifying body (CB). The accreditation body is JAS-ANZ.

The CB draws up the competency criteria based on related standards and normative documents.

TFOs would be assessed **on-the-job** to demonstrate applied skills/knowledge based on competency criteria from the following standards and normative documents:

- Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods – MPI-STD-TFGEN
- Guidance Document to the Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods – TFGEN-GD
- TF Manual

APs would be assessed **on-the-job** to demonstrate applied skills/knowledge based on competency criteria from the following standards and normative documents:

- The Import Health Standard for Sea Containers
- Current MPI Accredited Person Training Resource Material

Competency assessments are to be in line with the retraining frequency as per the MPI website e.g. currently every four years for TFOs.

For Competent TFOs: The CB would provide a TFO with an ISO 7024 accredited Certificate of Competency valid for 'current retraining frequency' when competency has been demonstrated. The TFO can use this Certificate of Competency to show they are meeting the 'retraining frequency' or use it to apply for a new approval if they have moved to a new TF.

For Competent APs: The CB would provide the AP with an ISO 17024 accredited Certificate of Competency valid for 'current retraining frequency' when a candidate has demonstrated competency. This certificate would allow MPI to re-issue a Certificate of Approval as an Accredited Person, pursuant to Section 103(7) of the Biosecurity Act (1993).

Where competency is not yet demonstrated the options are to provide further objective evidence, be re-assessed or attend a re-training session by approved training supplier.

Reporting to MPI

For APs, the CB would report each week the AP candidates who have demonstrated competency against the AP Scheme. MPI can re-issue AP certificates as per the current practice.

For TFOs, the CB would report each week the TFOs who have demonstrated competency against the TFO Scheme.

Other

Personnel Certification is transferrable by the person from business to business similar to current AP approval certificates and TFO training certificates.

The CB will be required to describe all inputs into the assessment process (e.g. application process, assessment process, examination process, decision on certification, suspension, withdrawing or reducing scope of certification, recertification) and into its quality management system as part of the accreditation process with JAS-ANZ. This is likely to include technical input by MPI.

MPI may wish to consider that the personnel certification for TFOs could reduce the need for MPI facility audits (especially for low risk facilities), as when competency is demonstrated, compliance has been verified.

Benefits

BENEFITS TO MPI	BENEFITS TO THE APs AND TFOs
Confidence that personnel certification is based on robust and accredited systems.	Assessment on the job minimises time resources attending a class room training.
Compliance is enhanced as part of the competency assessment would pick up non-compliance (or potential) that requires address.	Can schedule assessment around when staff are available as opposed to fixed training dates.
Accredited persons are seeing, containing and reporting.	Confidence in AP and TFO competency and facility compliance.
Transition facility operators are able to implement the requirements of MPI-STD-TFGEN.	Enhanced preventative management of non-compliance risk.
Assessment is at the ATF and on-the-job.	Assessment is on-the-job at the AP/TFO place of work.
Assessment is internationally recognised.	TFOs who are also APs, can be assessed for both functions at the same time.
No changes to current administration inputs.	Assessment reports can provide recommendations and suggested improvements that can enhance compliance and competency.
Assessment is independent.	Assessment can be considered an informal internal audit identifying non compliances (or potential).

Submission 25

NEW ZEALAND GOURMET

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To The Ministry for Primary Industries: Re Draft General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods – standard and guidance documents. Thank you for the opportunity to read the above Draft and make my comments. I believe Transitional Facilities, Facility Operators and Accredited Persons need to be assessed on a Risk Profile after the initial two year period.

1. There is no need for Transitional Facilities to have their site approved annually unless there has been issues highlighted. Another words Transitional Facilities can be ranked, high risked can be inspected and renewed annually, low risk say 5 yearly.

2. There are a number of locations that do not have access to cities or towns that can provide all services and systems e.g. sewage and town water supply. Again I believe each application needs to be taken on their merits.

3. I am pleased to see Accredited Persons now only have to renew their certificates four yearly, after the initial renewal of two years. With the move towards more electronic means of communication, renewal of the Accredited Person's certificate could be done on line with say 20 or 30 questions having to be answered with say 80 or 90% pass rate.

4. The same could apply to Facility Operators based on the Transitional Facility Risk Profile.

Yours sincerely Rodger Matheson, Operator No. 1682. AP No. 6853. Ph. 021 376497. Email. Rodger@nzg.co.nz

Submission 26

Trent McCarroll Trent.McCarroll@miraka.co.nz

Fri 24/07/2015 3:21 p.m.

Feedback on Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods- MPI-STD-TFGEN

Hi,

Couple points of feedback on the below documents....

Standard for Transitional Facilities for General Uncleared Risk Goods- MPI-STD-TFGEN

2.4 Official TF signage

(1) A TF must have a prominent sign or signs that :
a) State the name and MPI number for the premises (including designated areas) as being a "Transitional Facility as approved under the Biosecurity Act". From our last audit we got told we should remove our MPI number from the sign, for the reason people can use your number to arrange clearance of a container when they don't have a Transitional Facility, therefore I don't think it's a good idea to display the number of the facility on the sign that the general public can view.
b) State that entry is restricted to only those persons receiving permission from the TF Operator.

(2) Signs may also specify appropriate contact details for the TF Operator and/or other staff members such as Deputy TF Operators. Note: Signs are not permitted to display the MPI logo or the acronyms 'MPI' as per the Flags, Emblems, and Names Protection Act 1981. As for the same reason for 1-(a) TF Operator details should not be displayed on any sign that the general public can view, all this information is held in the Transitional Facility manual and is not needed to be displayed to the general public. Also the cost involved having to replace signs when any changes to TFO staff are made is an unnecessary expense.

Specific Request for Feedback on Biosecurity Awareness Re-training for TFO and AP's

MPI would particularly like to know if AP and TFO training should be aligned as the same training regime or remain as separate training regimes (as is currently operated). In particular, MPI would like to know if stakeholders consider the training regimes to be too frequent or infrequent, and why they hold that view. Some stakeholders have previously indicated to MPI that they consider training every four years to be too infrequent and propose alignment to the regime undertaken by APs as being better. Some also consider that both APs and TFOs should be re-trained every two years on an on-going basis.

MPI is also interested in whether there are alternative suggestions to assess the competence of APs and TFOs after the initial training is conducted, and if there are suggestions regarding the content, duration and testing requirements for AP and TFO training.

My view is the current training regime for TFO and AP's is good and should remain and the frequency is about right. Only comment I would make about AP training that in-between times more in house training should be undertaken by the TFO for that facility, this way training can be specific to the operating manual the AP is working under and would keep them refreshed with company producers etc. relating to the Transitional Facility manual, and by doing so will help their understanding of what is required when re-training as an AP is undertaken. Also need

to keep in mind cost of training, as some TFO's are also AP's, so make the training to frequent will incur added cost for a small business.

Kind Regards

Trent McCarroll | Export Warehouse Supervisor – Mt Maunganui | Miraka Limited

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Submission 27

24th June 2015

AP Training should include a practical assessment i.e. a mock-up of a Transitional Facility and all the gear/layout required to properly conduct processing. A practical element to testing would reinforce what is taught in the classroom and could be part of the Transitional Facility Operators assessment to ensure the AP uses the correct paperwork and procedures. The Mock-up should be the perfect example with all equipment and layout according to MPI policy.

terence.mcgeough@nzdf.mil.nz, Warrant Officer Class One, Terence McGeough BAL Advisory Quartermaster (J44LC-3) HQ Joint Forces New Zealand

Submission 28

24/06/2015

Feedback to Biosecurity awareness retraining for TFO and APs.

shayne@lenker.co.nz; Shayne McNamara – Director (also Operator and AP – backup)
Lenker Music Ltd

This submission relates primarily to the request for feedback on the frequency and training required for Operators and Accredited Persons. Our major concern relates to compliance cost and training. Frequency of Training. In terms of the proposed 4 year retraining for operators and 2 year retraining for AP's in principle we have no issue although our preference would be to have both Operator and AP training aligned at say 3 years. Alternately have the schedule go out to 3 years for both after the second retraining. E.g. • Year 1 - initial (first) training. Hope this submission is of some use.

• Year 3 - (two years later) - 1st retraining or refresher. • Year 6 – 2nd retraining or refresher. • Year 9 – 3rd retraining or refresher
• Etc. 3 years apart. The above would apply only in the cases where the facility and operator and AP have no major audit failures or other issues. In these cases we believe that retraining of these AP's and operators should be annual for 3 years after the "failing" was identified.

This would serve both as a "punitive" measure for people failing audits or other, but more importantly would aid in reducing issues as the retraining or refreshers would be more frequent. After 3 refreshers with no further breaches or audit failures then the normal refresher programme and timing would commence again. Combining Operator and AP training: We also believe that both Operators and AP's should be tied to a TF unless they have special training to allow them to operate at multiple TF's. The rationale behind this is that Operators are TF specific and AP's generally work in that TF. It is usually a TF breach or audit failure so all operators and AP's associated with that TF should then undergo more frequent retraining to ensure that the TF remains a strong Biosecurity facility.

Failures at a TF are usually the result of a failure by the Operator (audit failures?) or the APs associated with that facility. Facilities that are regularly compliant and have no audit or other Biosecurity issues obviously have well-trained, responsible management, operators and AP's so their need for retraining could go out a little further. Smaller companies like ourselves with often have the Operator also one of the AP's (in some small companies it may be that the Operator and the only AP are one-in-the-same). Although there are differences there is much of the training duplicated so our submission is that the training protocols be revised to enable joint training for Operators/AP at the same time. Certainly I believe that all Operators should be trained as AP's anyway in order that they fully understand at a practical level the requirements of an AP. For small companies where an Operator is also an AP it would reduce both compliance costs but also the amount of time spend to participate in the retraining. It would be interesting to know the number of Operators registered in NZ that are also registered as AP's.

shayne@lenker.co.nz; Shayne McNamara – Director (also Operator and AP – backup)
Lenker Music Ltd

Submission 29

24 June 2015

Submission on TFGEN and the Guidance Document.

Easy to get the information.

mikem@pomonagroup.com

submission 30

Sat 11/07/2015 10:13 a.m. newelar@ihug.co.nz

Submission

Submission

1. Not every facility is run by a large business, some like mine are run by a sole trader, I am the facility owner, operator and accredited person.
2. My facility has not changed since my original application, eg: my hardstand is the same my warehouse is in the same place, nothing has changed, so why do I have ongoing compliance costs? When my facility gets audited what are they looking for? If it is to check to see if my paperwork is current, if so surly this can be done by email.
3. As a sole trader I find the compliance costs to MPI too expensive for any service provided
4. The frequency of retraining is far too often, once you know the rules you don't need reminding every, one to two years.
5. I have to take time away from my business to attend MPI approved courses; a better way would be a desktop assessment that could be done without the need of lost productivity.
6. MPI make me pay to become accredited so that I can inspect any containers that I bring in, in effect doing the work of customs, however if I find a container that is contaminated I must close the door and inform customs, who will then remove the container with my goods for fumigation for up to four days then they will send me the bill.
7. This simply encourages the facility owner to keep quiet about any contamination.
8. A more sensible solution would be not to penalise the operator for doing the right thing but instead at least pay for the removal of the container and fumigation so that there is no cost to the operator. This would also be much cheaper for the country in the long run as an infestation is more costly to eradicate after it has left the container and become established , examples are Gypsy moth, fruit fly, red back spiders. Argentinian ants etc the list goes on.
9. The costs involved with compliance to MPI are at the point of making it uneconomic for me to continue in business

Regards,

Geoff Nieuwelaar

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Submission 31

SUBMISSION

Regarding changes to the MPI STD TFGEN and The Guidance Document

FROM

Don O'Connor (Managing Director) T.F.O
Eurobike Wholesale Ltd
Licensed Transitional Facility – New Plymouth
Email: marketing@eurobike.co.nz

GENERAL COMMENT

I would like to make clear that my staff and I are fully aware of the bio security risks that New Zealand faces from internationally imported goods and the containers they are transported in. We fully support the objects of these regulations and at all times will endeavour to comply with and support this programme.

We are however, concerned about the exponential expansion of training, record keeping, auditing, and general paperwork that is requied of our staff and our time.

Continuing to regulate for every contingency that occurs or may accur for every transitional facility in New Zealand is becoming a financial burden to many small business. I am certain that the MPI objectives can be achieved in a much more efficient manner with proper risk assessment and variations to the training, record keeping, and auditing requirements based on risk assessment.

SUGGESTIONS

I am going to make some suggestions that, if considered, may require some alterations and additions to the Facility Standard at Part 3.5, 3.8, 3.11, and 3.12; and to the Guidance Document at 5.7, 5.8, 5.16, and 5.17.

There are around 100 authorised transitional facilities in the Taranaki region. After speaking with a number of operators, it would appear that the majority of them unpack their own sea freight containers at their own premises containing non-organic, new manufactured goods for resale or as imported components of products they manufacture themselves. These are very low risk facilities.

Around 20% of facilities are contractors unpacking containers likely to contain unknown and/or high risk goods. Contractors are generally larger companies with high staff turnover. These would be regarded as high risk facilities.

A further 20-25% of facilities are companies unpacking their own product that may be organic or arriving from countries that have unknown bio security standards. These would be medium risk goods.

I would like to see a uniform risk assessment regime that divided transitional facilities into three categories. Each category would have its own record keeping, auditing, and training programme. Training in particular could be structured around the risks. Such a regime would achieve the bio security objectives of the Ministry at much lower cost to both the Government and industry.

I have a lot of ideas on how the risk assessment could be carried out, implemented, and manitored without too much additional input for MPI staff. Once set up, the scheme should be simple and cost effective to administer.

CONSULTATION

Obviously consultation with TFO's is essential to formulate a points scoring risk assessment that is meaningful. It should result in TFO's and AP's receiving the same training together for the risks they are actually managing with a frequency based on their cumulative training record and their compliance audit history.

I hope you find my suggestion of interest and that discussians between your department and representatives of TFO's in Taranaki to implement risk assessment can be arranged prior to changes in regulations.

I have spoken only about my region, however, I would be very surprised if there were big variations in bio security risks at all the provincial regions with the possible exception of Auckland.

Don O'Connor

submission 32

Lee Osborn leeandgreg@ihug.co.nz

Thu 23/07/2015 9:53 a.m.

TF-GEN and training comments

TF-GEN Discussion Document comments

Firstly, the reference numbers in TF-GEN and its guidance document still don't align. It would be helpful if the sections were more or less in the same order or at least always have the same titles.

Under "Other Information" paragraph 1 states that TFOs "should" read and be familiar with the guidance document. This implies that it is an optional extra. A stronger message is needed because some critical information is contained in the GD.

Location – There is reference only to metropolitan areas in TF-GEN 2.3, yet 5.2 (1) of the GD states that some approvals may be made outside these areas. This is contradictory and someone in a rural location might put off applying after reading this in TF-GEN.

Signage - TF-GEN 2.4 and GD 5.13 state that TFO and deputy TFO contact details may be added to signs. This is unnecessary and because TFOs and deputies change for various reasons, could be expensive for businesses. Most activity occurs within normal business hours when people are easy to locate and after-hours contact details are usually displayed elsewhere.

The very helpful example of a sign in GD 5.13 isn't referred to in TF-GEN 2.4.

Internet Access – There is no mention of this in TF-GEN. GD 5.4 reads as a gentle recommendation about this yet under 3.8 TF-GEN and 5.11 GD, reports from internal audits musts be sent electronically. Also, a current copy of TF-GEN and the GD is expected to be available and this would be very difficult without internet access.

TF-GEN 3.1.1 I'm not sure that the manual structure as described in this section matches the template (which needs to be improved incidentally and is not referred to in TF-GEN).

TF-GEN 3.2.1 (3) and GD 5.3 (1) only refer to re-shipping goods back to their country of origin. This leaves no provision to send goods to an alternative overseas country.

TF-GEN 3.3 doesn't mention maintaining a log-book for visitors yet GD 5.5 (1) places importance on this.

After a brief mention of record keeping in GD 5.7, there is a very detailed section in 5.8 about required records. This is not referred to in TF-GEN 3.5.

TF-GEN 3.7 and GD 5.10 now covers keeping pets out of designated areas which is useful but could be missed by a person who takes their dog to work because the heading Pest, Vermin and Weed Control doesn't reflect this.

GD 5.12 is an important section but there is no similar section in TF-GEN even though it contains a Critical Non-Compliance warning.

TF-GEN 3.9 and GD 5.14 cover the same topics but the headings are very different. TF-GEN 3.9 (2) a) mentions TFOs providing sample bags for inspectors. Is this a new requirement? In all my years as an inspector then trainer for MAF we provided our own.

GD 5.16 (2) spells "complements" incorrectly. Compliments has a very different meaning.

GD 5.18.1 (2) has a very good, clear note re TFOs needing to advise MPI when leaving the role. Hopefully this will be highlighted in the training because it isn't in TF-GEN.

Under "Other Information" the current TF-GEN standard refers to information on managing specialised TFs in the GD (i.e. the former annexes – which is term I was pleased to see is no longer used). Mention of this additional information could be in a note just before Part 4, with a list of headings. This would avoid important aspects being overlooked for example the special requirements for fresh produce and nursery stock TFs.

The Sea Container information is crucial to most TFs. It would make sense to place this first (as Annex A is currently) for ease of access and so those who are printing the GD can select just this extra part easily if applicable.

Discussion Document

9. I disagree that removing "mandatory" language from the GD will remove ambiguity. It will add confusion where it appears something is optional but in fact must be done.

10. Specific Request for Feedback (details below requested on external consultation webpage):

MPI would like your feedback on the proposed changes to the standard and guidance related to transitional facilities for uncleared risk goods, in particular:

- **training for Transitional Facility Operators (TFOs) and Accredited Persons (APs),**
- **alternative suggestions to assess the competence of APs and TFOs after the initial training is conducted,**
- **content, duration and testing requirements for AP and TFO training.**

As a former MAF employee and current AP/TFO trainer I am aware that APs and TFOs can be as passionate about biosecurity as MPI personnel if armed with regular knowledge.

TFO Training

Four years between training sessions is too long. This role is extremely important for NZ biosecurity. The training level and frequency need to reflect its importance. I am aware of proposals to increase the course length from half to a whole day, and perhaps require TFOs at high risk facilities to receive additional training as well, and to make training two-yearly.

MPI's willingness to penalise non-compliant TFOs more readily through the court system is a good way of ensuring TFOs take their responsibilities seriously. However the training needs to align with this so TFOs are completely aware of their obligations.

I support two-year training. There is no requirement for TFOs to receive AP training even though they are overseeing the AP role. This is a huge omission in that TFOs may never receive basic biosecurity awareness information therefore are sometimes less informed than APs about its importance to NZ.

If this was incorporated into the AO training, it would have to be sufficiently different from that in the AP course that it wasn't too repetitive for those undertaking both roles. Alternatively, a requirement for AP training could be put in place for TFOs. Then such duplicated areas such as basic documentation could be removed from the AO course.

This would mean a two-yearly half day session would be sufficient for importers of low-risk goods and a whole day for those importing high-risk goods. From a logistical perspective there could be two types of course held on different days or low-risk TFOs could finish after the morning and high-risk TFOs stay on for the afternoon. Separate courses would make travelling to the regions more difficult to keep cost effective. Same day split courses could mean high-risk TFOs are resentful that they have to stay on so the afternoon session would have to be worthwhile.

Courses running for 1½ days (also a suggestion I have heard) would be too long and very hard to administer, presenting problems when participants couldn't attend the second day. The training shouldn't become too complex and high-risk TFOs all have quite different requirements which are only relevant to those importing particular goods. Having to learn a lot of irrelevant material wouldn't be useful and could confuse them.

In my experience being able to ask questions, both in the session and afterwards, as well as taking part in group discussions is a very valuable part of attending courses for TFOs. Computer-based learning doesn't cater for that or enable trainers to share their passion for biosecurity and there is sometimes doubt that the correct person has done on-line assessments. There is no substitute for an experienced trainer conducting both formal and informal assessments.

AP Training

AP training isn't accurately described in the discussion document. I understand the 2-2-4 year frequency was discussed but wasn't instituted because it would have caused administrative difficulties. The decision was made to change from two-yearly training to a 2 then 4 year frequency. This is inadequate and APs handling low volumes have very little focus on biosecurity for long periods. First aid training refreshers are two-yearly for very good reason. More frequent training enables changes to be discussed and understood much more easily than just reading about them. I feel that two-yearly training was the right frequency for APs. Four years is definitely too long between sessions. As a compromise, three years would be preferable to four but even that would mean a long time between sessions reminding them of the important role they play.

I feel similarly about assessing APs as mentioned about TFOs above with regards to drumming up enthusiasm for the role and possible abuse of on-line testing.

Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the draft standard and training.

Lee Osborn

Trainer

Biosecurity and Training South Ltd, Christchurch

Work email: admin@btsouth.co.nz

Home email: leeandgreg@ihug.co.nz

Submission 33

25 June 2015

Feedback for the proposed submissions to the Guidance and TFGEN Standard Documents

chris.presto@solvay.com; Chris Presto

I have just read through the sections of the proposed changes to the above from my use point of view and make the following comments. Sections: 3.5(4) Why 7 years for record keeping? I feel this is too long and amounts to a huge amount of paper records to keep.

3.8 (2) Typo here with "must occur" twice. **DN - Reply. Understood.**

3.9 (2) Dictating that facilities must provide equipment like microscopes seems excessive to me for small operations which have no other use for such equipment.

2.4 in Std vs 5.13 in Guide have differing wording for signage, suggest they read the same.

Submission 34

24th June 2015

Dear Sir, In my opinion tfo and ap scheduled retraining should be run on the same timeframes, at our last retraining there were quite a lot of changes to the manuals and documentation requirements, it is best that this is done two yearly to keep people up to date with changes other than reading a newsletter that doesn't always get fully understood ,in our particular case we fumigate all incoming which mitigates a large proportion of risk. Regards D J Stewart

DougStewart@lakelandsteel.co.nz

Submission 35

24th June 2015

Brett Whalley, Operations Co-Ordinator, Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Limited

Submission on TFGEN and the Guidance Document

The current time frame regime is adequate. If companies feel that there TFO, APs are not getting enough exposure to MPI then it should be an internal decision to retrain up skill. As we are a TF that handles containers frequently my team are honing their skills on the job.

Brett Whalley, Operations Co-Ordinator, Arch Wood Protection (NZ) Limited

Submission 36

23 July 2015

Biosecurity and Environment Group: Standard for
General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods Consultation
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Dear Sir

Submission on the Draft General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Risk Goods – standard & guidance document

The AgriChain Centre is an Approved Training Provider for the Sea Container Pathway delivering training on MPI's behalf for both Accredited Person training and Transitional Facility Operator training.

Our submission comments have been written on the basis of being an MPI Approved Training Provider to the import industry.

As a training provider we regularly receive enquiries and therefore clarification on some aspects will improve our ability to provide support to facilities and facility operators.

On a general note, The AgriChain Centre is aware of the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) rationale behind the changes and the importance of Transitional Facility Operators understanding their responsibilities.

Purely from the point of view of the majority of our clients, importers of goods in Sea Containers, the inclusion of all of the annexes into MPI-STD-TFGEN is likely to cause confusion.

In addition, the need to use both the Standard and the Guidance Document for interpretation, whilst not a new concept, will lead to more confusion where the numbering of the sections does not match and the titles of both documents do not allow the reader to find the relevant guidance easily. This has been raised previously. A better approach may be to include guidance clearly within the standard in a similar manner to the Plant Export Requirements: MPI Certification Standard.

It is our assertion that some of the fundamentally important aspects, such as AP checks, are listed as "should" and are contained in the Guidance Document; however, our belief is that they are critical to maintaining positive Biosecurity outcomes and should therefore be "musts" included in the Standard. Further details are provided in the feedback that follows.

We look forward to the outcome of the consultation process and value the ability to assist MPI as it moves towards implementation of these changes.

Yours faithfully

Debbie Woods
General Manager

FEEDBACK ON TFGEN STANDARD

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
3	MPI-STD-TFGEN Background	A place cannot operate as a TF unless it is approved by the Director-General. In order to be approved, it must comply with the Act and the requirements of this standard. **TF approvals must be renewed annually** and may be subject to specific conditions.	It is not clear from the Standard (STD) or the Guidance Document (GD) what the process will be? GD needs to provide details about how to obtain annual approval. Do TF's need to complete an application document?
6	MPI-STD-TFGEN 1.4 Implementation Arrangements	Full implementation of this standard will occur when the old standard is replaced by the new version.	Auditors are already enforcing this DRAFT standard during audits.
7	MPI-STD-TFGEN 2.4 Official TF Signage	(1) A TF must have a prominent sign or signs that : a) **State the name and MPI number for the premises** (including designated areas) as being a "Transitional Facility as approved under the Biosecurity Act"	The example provided in the GD does not show the facility name and number? If this is mandatory can facilities add a sticker onto existing signage? Do you have to provide the ATF code on the sign on a gate to the facility which is accessible to the public or can this only be included on signs actually within the facility only?
9	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3 Operational requirements for TFs 3.1 Requirement for TF Manual	(1) A TF Manual must be prepared for each TF. It is a document that specifies all relevant information about the TF regarding the scope of operation and how it will be operated to meet the requirements of this standard. It must include all the matters specified as being required in this standard. An up-to-date copy of the TF Manual must be readily accessible to staff members and an Inspector at all times. If a TF Operator intends to change the TF operations to activities outside the approved scope of the TF Manual, an Inspector must be informed as a revised TF Manual or new approval may be required.	Previous TFGEN stated that the TF Operating Manual had to be approved before the TF could be approved. This was a mandatory requirement until now. Should this be added to the STD?
9	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.1.1 Business Identity, Location and staff	b) A site plan of the general layout of the TF (including areas/rooms for MPI inspection, designated areas for biosecurity risk goods, entrances/exits and holding areas) with **other features**	It is our understanding that the "musts" are located in the standard. There is no mention of

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		of significance marked (for example, buildings and roads).	drains in the STD or GD. The MPI template for a site plan states that you **MUST** include specifications and dimensions .... This does not appear to be a requirement of the STD. Auditors are insisting on dimensions on all Site Plans and a HOLD / Inspection area (risk goods) for all facilities regardless of the scope of the goods they receive.
10	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.1.1 TF Procedures for compliance and ongoing TF Management	i) Contact details for the local MPI office or Inspector, and emergency contact details for MPI (phone 0800 80 99 66 immediately on detection of live pests outside of normal working hours) and other relevant emergency services.	It would be prudent to include another requirement - to include contact details for MPI approved waste disposal and treatment providers.
11	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.3 TF Access and Security of uncleared risk goods	b) Visitors must comply with access procedures and must be accompanied by a TF staff member.	Does this relate to all areas of a TF or just the area where devanning occurs and goods are held? Does it only relate to when containers/uncleared risk goods are present?
11	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.3 Security of uncleared risk goods	(2) Prior to inspection, uncleared risk goods must remain secure and intact at the TF. Uncleared risk goods must also be held in such a manner that organisms (for example, live arthropods) cannot escape from the TF.	In addition, the term "arthropods" is introduced but this is not included in the definitions.
12	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.7 Pests, vermin & weed control	(1) TF Operators must ensure that non-regulated pests (such as arthropods), regulated pests, vermin and weeds are effectively managed in and around the TF. The TF Manual must describe the processes that will be undertaken to manage them. Live animals and plants that are not part of a consignment being imported into New Zealand are not permitted in the designated areas of a TF.	The terms "non-regulated pests", "regulated pests", are used but no definition provided.
12	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.8 Internal Audits of TF	(2) Audits must occur must occur at least once a year.	Typo – remove the second "must occur"
		(5) Within 10 working days of each internal audit being completed, the TF	A central email address would be better for this as

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
	activities	Operator must send an electronic copy of the report to an MPI email address as supplied by an Inspector.	Inspectors change and TFOs will not necessarily see the Inspector regularly to know who to send this to.
13	MPI-STD-TFGEN 3.10 Contingency Plans	(1) The TF Operator must ensure that a written contingency plan is specified as part of the TF Manual to manage all identified biosecurity risks associated with the TF. Contingency planning may include:	The GD wording varies from the STD and does not actually provide sufficient guidance.
14	MPI-STD-TFGEN Part 4: High Risk Biosecurity TFs	(1) This part of this standard lists mandatory requirements for TFs where specific high risk biosecurity goods or refuse are managed and must be dealt with in a prescribed manner. The requirements contained here are for the following TFs: a) Biosecurity refuse TFs. b) Biosecurity treatment TFs. c) Decontamination TFs. d) Incineration or sterilisation TFs. e) Holding non-compliant farm animals at TFs at POFAs	The initial wording on this section would suggest that it does not apply to TFs receiving low risk goods. Where in the STD does it prescribe what low risk TFs need to do around Biosecurity waste?
15	MPI-STD-TFGEN 4.1.1 Transportation of biosecurity refuse	4.1.1 Transportation of biosecurity refuse to TFs (2) Conveyances (such as sea containers for transportation/trucks and trailers) used to transport biosecurity refuse to TFs for treatment that may become contaminated must be: a) Made of impervious material suitable for easy, cleaning and decontamination. b) Washed clean and disinfected (if contaminated) within a TF designated area after each day or specific period of use. (4) The transportation of biosecurity refuse from a Place of First Arrival (POFA) to a TF, or from a TF to another TF for holding, disposal and/or processing must occur as approved in the TF Manual. The TF Manual must include details of MPI approved transport operators using approved vehicles following written MPI authorisation from an Inspector	Common practise has been that a staff member from the TF will take the biosecurity refuse (sweepings from the container in the secure lidded, lined biosecurity bin) in a private vehicle, sometimes a company truck, to the Biosecurity refuse TF, Incineration, Sterilisation or transfer station. Is the new standard now saying that this practise is no longer permitted? Does this mean that a TF will need to make arrangements for collection of waste from a company like Interwaste using one of their approved vehicles and that MPI will have to issue BACC's for each transfer to occur?

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		as specified on a BACC.	This will be prohibitively expensive for a TF for a small amount of sweepings. MPI Inspectors in some regions are insisting bins are emptied once per year. We cannot see this specified in the STD. Biosecurity waste companies have approved route plans to follow for their major clients. How will this work for all TFs? Does the transport of biosecurity refuse regardless of its source now need a BACC or is the BACC indicating approval of the vehicle used? This is not clear.
15	MPI-STD-TFGEN 4.1.1 Transportation of biosecurity refuse	b) Biosecurity refuse is placed in a lockable plastic wheelie bin within a leak-proof liner which must be transported within a vehicle with 6 solid sides (including the doors). or c) Another Inspector approved device that meets the same security outcome as an HSTU.	Do the small plastic lined bins such as the ones Biosecurity Training Providers supply in the Biosecurity kit meet the requirements of (c)?
14 & 27	4.1 Biosecurity refuse TFs 4.4 Incineration or Sterilisation TFs	4.1 Biosecurity refuse TFs (1) This section for Biosecurity Refuse TFs states the mandatory requirements for disposal, holding, processing and/or treatment of biosecurity (quarantine) refuse such as from airports (including flight kitchens) and other port refuse TFs. 4.4 Incineration or sterilisation TFs (3) Where there is no immediate ability to incinerate or sterilise refuse or risk goods at a POFA, a TF approved as an MPI approved transfer station (TF) may be used to hold the uncleared risk goods temporarily. This TF must meet requirements of this standard except for	TF's are required to transport their own quarantine contamination (sweepings from the container) and items for destruction to a Biosecurity refuse TF, Incineration, Sterilisation or transfer station. The process of TF's transporting their own quarantine contamination practise does not seem to be covered or clearly explained in either of the above sections and the heading for Part 4 suggests that this does not relate.

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		the specific details of incineration or sterilisation requirements contained as below.	There is no guidance around Biosecurity Waste.
15	4.1.1 Transportation of biosecurity refuse	(3) Only MPI approved disinfectants/chemicals in the list specified at the following link may be used: MPI **Approved Disinfectants** for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods.	There is currently no hyperlink to the disinfectants list. The list needs to be reviewed, removing those items not available or manufactured in NZ.

In addition, TFO is not included in the Definitions.

FEEDBACK ON GUIDANCE DOCUMENT TO STANDARD TFGEN

Where MPI are making references to documents on their website should the reference be to www.mpi.govt.nz or www.biosecurity.govt.nz

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
5	4.2.3 TF Operator and Deputy TF Operator Training	(2) Once training has been completed, approval for the TF Operator/Deputy TF Operator is valid until re-training is required once again or they have been formally assessed as being competent. Approval to run a TF is transferable to other TFs for the purpose of management. However, if a TF Operator/Deputy TF Operator transfers or moves to a separate TF (different to the one that the applicant was originally approved for), then the TF Operator/Deputy TF Operator should become familiar with the TF Manual of the new workplace (TF) as soon as possible. An Inspector should also be informed that the TF Operator has left the previous TF. More information on TF Operator/Deputy TF Operator and AP training is available from an Inspector or this may be found on the MPI website at: **http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/regs/trans/register**	There should be some mention that the TFO must submit an application to MPI as soon as possible to become the TFO at the new site whereas the guidance statement seems to indicate all they need to do is to read the manual.
9	5.8 TF documents and records	Copies of the Craft Risk Management Standards, **IHSs**, and Import Permits (with relevance to imported uncleared risk goods).	Import Health Standards should be written in full
		External and internal **and** audit records (including date, auditor, non-compliances and any corrective actions requests and completed actions).	Typo remove the word "and"
			Add - "current TF Operating Manual inclusive of site plan to the list of documents"
10	5.9 Hygiene requirements	(4) Equipment used for hygiene purposes (including a biosecurity bin or broom, dustpan or other cleaning equipment such as vacuum cleaners) should **only** be used **only** for biosecurity purposes within the TF and should be clearly labelled. This is to prevent cross-contamination occurring. The bin should be emptied as required and the waste material disposed of as described in the TF Manual (records of waste disposal should be kept). The biosecurity bin should be lined with a disposable bag or thoroughly cleaned after being emptied.	Typo remove one of the word "only"
11	5.12 Inspection and treatment of identified biosecurity risk	(1) It is important that if any biosecurity risks (contaminants or pests) are detected in or on uncleared risk goods, they are managed properly and as soon as possible. The best treatment option can be determined by an Inspector. If risks goods have to go another TF for treatment, an Inspector will provide	Suggest that the words, "if treatment is required" gets added after, The best treatment

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		written authorisation that they are transported securely so that contaminants or pests cannot escape. This could mean securely packaging or wrapping of the uncleared risk goods or using a fully enclosed container or enclosed vehicle. It should be noted that failure to properly secure uncleared risk goods will be regarded as a Critical Non-Compliance by MPI. A list of MPI approved treatments is available on the MPI website at: **http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/regs/stds/bnz-std-abtrt.pdf**	option. The reason we suggest this is management does not necessarily equal treatment. Also missing the word "to" between "go" and "another". We also suggest that a section needs to be added on this in the STD. This is deemed as a Critical Non-Compliance more guidance for the TFO regarding "**properly secure**" might be useful
11	5.13 Official Signage	Having official signage at a TF will let people know that the premises and designated areas are TFs as approved by MPI, and that only people who have permission may enter. This sign (or signs) should be of an appropriate size and clearly visible to visitors.	The example shown does not include the TF Name and Number.
12	5.15 Contingency plans		This section just repeats what is in the STD but does not give sufficient guidance regarding what the contingency could be.
12	5.16 Staff Training	(4) A description of training for new staff and refresher training for current staff should be included in the TF Manual. Records should be kept as proof that staff have completed and understood the training. A review of staff training procedures should also be a component of a TF Operator's internal assessment of biosecurity management at the TF. For example, a component of the biosecurity requirements at the TF could be added to a regular staff **induction programme and is available from an Inspector.**	Is there a new staff induction programme available? There is a power point available about Biosecurity awareness in a port environment but this is aimed more at staff working at a seaport POFA rather than a TF.

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
13	5.18 Non compliances against the standard Page 13	(1) Details of any non-compliance discovered during an MPI external audit will be provided to the TF Operator by an Inspector on an MPI Corrective Action Request (CAR) form issued at the time of the MPI external audit. This CAR form will specify the non-compliance or non-compliances and will lists the corrective actions and/ or preventative actions required. It will specify the timeframe where these actions should be completed. TF Operators that operate TFs that are non-compliant may be subject to an increased number of MPI external audits or inspections until an Inspector can be confident that the management of the TF is once again compliant with the TF Manual and the standard.	Typo "lists" should be "list"
		(2) Changing the MPI external audit frequency to reflect compliance will be at the discretion of an Inspector and in consultation with the TF Operator. This will usually revert to a lower frequency of intervention after two satisfactory MPI external audits have been completed. MPI may also require that TF Operators or APs attend additional biosecurity training to improve understanding of biosecurity management at TFs Non-compliances are graded as **Critical, Major or Minor.**	Typo - need a full stop after TFs.
17	6.1 Air container TFs	(2) TF Operators should be familiar with the IHS for importation of Air Containers from All Countries (MPI-AIRCON-ALL) to be aware of mandatory requirements. This standard may be found on the MPI website at: **http://www.mpi.govt.nz/importing/border-clearance/**. The outcome required by MPI-AIRCON-ALL is that air containers imported into New Zealand are free from regulated contaminants and pests.	When is the Air Container standard being released?
17	6.1.2 Transportation of air containers to TFs	(2) Air containers returning to "airside" from "landside" TFs should be transported using an agreed route and do not require further inspection. However, air containers that do not return to "airside" from "landside" TFs (such as being sent to non-TF premises to be loaded for export out of New Zealand) are required under MPI-AIRCON-ALL to receive clearance from MPI and receive a written BACC before leaving the TF located at the POFA.	How is this going to be managed in a practical sense?
18	6.1.4 and 6.1.5 Unpacking air containers	(1) MPI-AIRCON-ALL requires that all imported air containers must be unpacked at a TF in the presence of an AP or Inspector (for specific uncleared risk goods) and an AP must meet all relevant requirements of the standard and MPI-AIRCON-ALL. MPI-AIRCON-ALL requires that all air container checks completed by an AP where regulated contaminants or pests are found must be recorded electronically or using an approved system and the records kept for MPI audit purposes. (1) An AP should be present on delivery or as soon	Typo should just read TF remove the words "TF Operator and" There is no mention of training for these staff yet the corresponding section for sea containers 6.11.2 page 37 talks

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		as possible after air containers are delivered, and should check the containers externally (the underside excluded) for contamination and pests after delivery to the TF, during unpacking (where internal surfaces, uncleared risk goods and any wood packaging are checked for compliance), and when empty (a final internal check should be conducted). TF Operator should have enough APs available to ensure biosecurity risks associated with air containers and uncleared risk goods are managed appropriately. APs do not need to be an employee at the TF but should be currently approved for checking and managing containers. An AP may work at more than one TF Operator and TF.	specifically about training. If they are performing the same tasks - inspection of containers (air or sea) for contamination then shouldn't the training requirements be the same? There should be a link to the air container log sheet on the MPI website as the appropriate form for these AP's to record their checks.
18	6.1.6 TF inspection areas and equipment	A dual-action insecticide (having both knock-down and residual action properties such as tetramethrin 4g/l for knock down and permethrin 1g/l for residual) are available for use by APs. These canisters should be available for immediate use as the air container is being opened. Examples of some suitable sprays are available on the MPI website at: **http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/border/transitional-facilities/permethrin-sprays.htm**	This list is out of date with many of the sprays listed no longer available and the active ingredients having been replaced by other newly developed chemicals. There is no provision or guidance about cleaning or redirection for cleaning of air containers.
23	6.5.2 Inspection at fresh produce or nursery stock TFs	(3) The floor should have a non-slip surface for safety purposes. During inspections there should be a minimum of 1 metre clear floor space separating each item or structure in the room (either permanent or temporary) including but not limited to benches, boxes of plants or produce, desks, pallets of plants or plant material, quarantine bins and tables. Anti-fatigue mats should also be provided and extraneous noise should be kept to a minimum while MPI inspections are in progress.	We have two concerns with the highlighted part of this paragraph: 1) We don't see that being applied currently in that format in every situation. 2) Our confusion might be eliminated by more detailed

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
			clarification of what this means.
31	6.8.2 Developing a TF Manual for live animal inspection TFs located at a POFA	Additional information for the management of non-compliant Category 1 animals including: 4. For horses, the standard requires that a temporary holding box or area at the POFA TF is used. For further guidance see attached non-compliance action tree (6.7.8).	Section 6.7.8 to which it refers does not exist.
		Documented procedures including: 1. Cleaning or disinfection of incoming containers where required, appropriate to clearance status and type of animal(s). – 2. Communication to the owner/importer regarding of any non-compliances. – 3. Containment of approved animals. These may vary depending on the site of the POFA TF and the type of approved animal. – 4. Exercising or toileting of uncleared animals. – 5. Decontamination of persons in direct or indirect contact with horses eligible for biosecurity authorisation to a TF for the purpose of completing PAQ, see 6.7.7 (4). – 6. Decontamination of staff and the POFA TF in the event of non-compliant or uncleared animals (see 6.7.4). – 7. Inspection of approved category 1 animals (see 6.7.6). – 8. Notifying the MPI veterinarian 5 days prior to the arrival of the animal(s). – 9. Timely transport of animals to the POFA TF following disembarkation from the plane. – 10. Timely transport and transfer of approved category 1 non-compliant animals to suitable holding areas at the POFA TF or to a PAQ TF.	As above none of the section references exist. What is a PAQ? is this a typo and it is meant to be PEQ?
34	6.8.7 POFA TFs used for horse inspections before PEQ	• Grooms or other persons remaining with the horse(s) until arrival at PAQ need to change into clean overalls and wash their footwear prior to entering the transport truck. Showering and changing of clothes will also need to be conducted at the PAQ TF. • People that do not have direct contact with horses destined for PAQ do not have to shower. The standard requires that drivers of horse trucks remain outside the area of possible ground contamination and also walk through a footbath before re-entering the transport truck.	Is this a typo should PAQ be PEQ?
35	6.9 Personal effects TFs	(1) This section provides further guidance for TFs for the inspection of imported personal effects (including inside and outside use household goods) and best practice recommendations on how TF Operators	It appears that one or two words may be missing to make this an

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		meet the requirements of this standard. The management processes for keeping managing personal effects under the requirements of a relevant IHS, and specific details or isolation of separation of personal effects from other biosecurity cleared or domestic must be specified in the TF Manual.	understandable instruction.
36	6.10.1 Sawn Wood POFAs	(1) Imported sawn wood should be packed and transported in a manner that prevents infestation and/or manages contaminants and regulated pests, such as being shipped inside a sea container. If imported sawn wood consignments are packaged inside plastic sheeting or in a manner other than inside a sea container prior to shipping to NZ, MPI will conduct a consignment inspection at the POFA. After inspection, compliant consignments will be authorisation to a TF or held for treatment at the POFA.	Typo should read "authorised".
36	6.10.3 Alternative systems for pre-inspection imported sawn wood management	(2) An acceptable system could be as follows: • Imported sawn wood are unloaded from a sea container in a designated area at the TF (such as under a building canopy), then the imported sawn wood is surface sprayed with a contact insecticide and covered with an impervious sheet/tarpaulin that is held down completely around the consignment with sand/water snakes etc. The imported sawn wood can then be held temporarily (48 hours at maximum) at that location until MPI has conducted the booked inspection.	Typo should be "is"
37	6.11.2 Unpacking sea containers at TFs	(1) As is specified in MPI-SEACO, all loaded imported containers must be unpacked at a TF in the presence of an AP. MPI-SEACO requires that an AP has completed and passed an MPI approved course for APs associated with imported sea containers. More information is available on the MPI website at: **http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/regs/trans/register**	The SEACO STD does not currently mention completing an MPI approved course. Is this IHS being updated? This should also be included in AirCans STD.
37	6.11.3 APs at sea container TFs	(1) An AP (with current approval) should be present on delivery or as soon as possible after containers are delivered, and should check the containers on four sides (top and underside excluded) for external contamination after delivery to the TF, during unpacking (internal surfaces, uncleared risk goods and wood packaging check), and when empty (a final internal check). (2) All container checks completed by an AP should be recorded. Any contamination found, whether associated with the container or the cargo, should be recorded on the container log sheet to be submitted to MPI by fax or alternatively to MPI submitted on line	In the existing TFGEN STD under Section 2.18 this is a "**must**". If "should" is the correct statement what are the implications for the AP training? As the standard currently reads

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		at: **http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/reg/cont-carg/containerlog.pdf**	there is no requirement for the AP to be present or conduct the checks. We believe that this is a significant requirement and should be a "**must**" and recommend to move this entire section into the STD.
38	6.11.4 Equipment needed at sea container TFs	(1) The TF Operator should ensure that the TF has the necessary equipment to check and clean containers that are received. Dedicated equipment for cleaning spilled risk good material such as broom, dustpan and brush (or vacuum cleaner), and a biosecurity bin to put quarantine waste in should be provided and labelled specifically for MPI biosecurity/quarantine use. (2) The TF Operator should ensure that a functioning portable light of sufficient power (able to illuminate the far end wall from the door) is available to inspect the ceiling, floor and walls of the container. APs should also inspect the underside of containers if there is a practicable and safe way to do this such as using robust container stands. (3) The TF Operator should ensure that sufficient aerosol canisters of dual-action insecticide (having both knock-down and residual action properties such as tetramethrin 4g/l for knock down and permethrin 1g/l for residual) are available for use by APs. These canisters should be available for immediate use at the front of the container as it is being opened. For information about suitable sprays for killing arthropods is available on the MPI website at: **http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/border/transitional-facilities/permethrin-sprays.htm.** Other sprays with equivalent properties may also be approved for use on approach to MPI.	Auditors insist on this equipment being available yet it is only a "**should**" in the GD. If it is mandatory then it needs to be a "**must**" included in the STD.
41	6.13.4 TF Physical aspects of self-storage TFs	(1) Once the TF is approved, there should be a prominent sign (see section 4.12) displayed immediately that meets MPI's requirements and specifies that the premises are a TF. The premises should also have a sealed hard stand area for receiving sea containers available on site as per the requirements in the section for sea containers. This hard stand area should be available to the individual importers and should be large enough to hold as many uncleared containers as are likely to be delivered on site at any one time. For example, if	Auditors insist on this being available yet it is only a "**should**" in the GD. Hard stand area is this mandatory? If it is mandatory then it needs to be

Pg	Reference	Text	Comments
		there are three separate importers located at the premises, the hard stand area should be able to compliantly hold three (or more) sea containers at any one time.	a "**must**" included in the STD.

Biosecurity Awareness Re-Training for TFO and APs

Biosecurity will clearly remain on the agenda of the nation and the recent issues around Queensland fruit fly, live spiders found on imported grapes from Mexico and the kiwifruit PSA issues are all issues that highlight the need for MPI vigilance in relation to high risk items.

MPI as the appointed regulator and gatekeeper will continue to come under regular scrutiny from various industry groups.

The requirement for importers of low risk goods to remain vigilant at Approved Transitional Facilities (ATFs) is crucial to ensuring that goods are available in this country and that trade flows freely. MPI does not have the resources to manage the sea container pathway itself and therefore relies on Transitional Facilities to play their part in managing biosecurity.

MPI needs to have the right balance in relation to biosecurity awareness and training to ensure that it receives buy-in from industry and meeting MPI's biosecurity obligations is not just seen as compliance with associated costs.

More emphasis on the need for ATFs and the importance on the role they play is needed.

The training courses offered, Transitional Facility Operator training and Accredited Person training, require a relatively high technical input (knowledgeable and passionate trainers/facilitators) but are of low financial value.

What therefore needs to be balanced here, as we are collectively considering the future of biosecurity training, are the needs of the nation, the requirements of legislation and regulations, the expectations of industries, the constraints training providers are faced with and the resulting economic realities.

Under the MPI agreement training providers are expected to offer total national coverage, however, we believe that there are only two training providers that actually provide this, with The AgriChain Centre being one of these. We recommend that this requirement needs to be enforced.

MPI should include additional factors in its decision making process related to training, such as; the relationship between the importance given to a training regime and the value it represents from a trainee's perspective, as well as the economic outcomes that are created within the Training Provider community as a consequence of MPI decision making.

In order to be a sustainable trainer in this area over time a training provider needs to:

a) Have trainers who are competent in the technical subject matter as well as in adult education techniques.

b) Provide support in a structural environment that allows them to keep up with updates implemented by MPI on a regular basis.

c) Have the infrastructure to maintain all of the information required to meet the MPI reporting requirements in a timely and professional manner.

A training provider who wants to structure the delivery from a financial point of view in a way that is sustainable needs to consider the overheads it needs to carry, the costs of employing quality trainers and the need for the activity to generate profit for the organisation.

In summary, low cost training courses are rarely held in high regard by trainees and a lack of balance between market size and training providers appointed does not make for a stable and "fit for purpose" training environment.

Accredited Person Training

The changes made to the certification period for Accredited Person training in July 2013 are only now being felt. The frequency of re-training needs consideration, however, training programmes also need to be fine-tuned and adapted/updated on a regular basis to reflect the latest level of knowledge on the subject matter, maintain relevancy and use updated and current statistics.

The objectives of the training programmes need to be considered in making the decisions around re-training frequency. Protecting New Zealand is paramount and therefore the more this is brought to the publics' attention the better. Keeping content refreshed annually is key to ensuring that attendees retraining will pay more attention to the messages.

MPI completing TF audits regularly is also paramount to ensuring that facilities and staff at TFs understand and meet the requirements.

The frequency of retraining moving out to 4 years for Accredited Persons is too long, especially for facilities that receive containers infrequently. It is unrealistic to expect a person participating in a four hour training session covering complex issues to recall all of the messages from the session if they only hear the messages once. If they apply the messages every day in their working environment they are more likely to recall them, however, this is not the case for the majority of trainees. It is also a known fact that each time a person is trained they recall more. We have had trainees who have attended 4+ refreshers who still leave the course re-energised and providing positive feedback.

We would recommend that MPI reverts back to a 2 year training cycle for Accredited Person training as this role is critical.

Provided that the role and its importance is understood and the scenarios are constantly refreshed Training Providers can ensure a positive experience for all trainees. In addition, new APs gain valuable knowledge from existing APs sharing their experiences.

In addition, where certification lapses prior to retraining, the retraining frequency reverts to 2 years. This is causing confusion for trainees and significant rework between MPI and Training Providers.

Transitional Facility Operator Training

Unfortunately, due to the fact that Transitional Facility Operators were appointed into the role with no training requirement back in 2004, the importance of the role TFOs hold has not been fully understood and valued.

The focus that MPI are now placing on the role highlights the need to ensure that the right person in the organisation takes on the role.

Training for TFOs is only one component of approval. The fact that TFOs need to ensure that they have trained APs, conduct internal audits annually and update their operating procedures are reason enough to align the retraining frequency to that of APs, i.e., a 2 yearly renewal cycle. Four years between training is too long. In addition, turnover in this position is significantly less than that for APs.

We would therefore recommend that TFO re-training should also be set at a 2 year renewal cycle.

We would recommend that a ½ day training session attended more frequently with interactive content that enables the TFO to leave the course with an Action Plan of what they need to update when they get back to their day to day role would be appropriate. However, if MPI are looking to get more value from TFO training then we would recommend including the AP content and making it a combined full day course.

At the end of the day TFOs are responsible for ensuring that APs fulfil the responsibilities of the role. They are also responsible for providing Biosecurity Awareness training for their staff so should therefore understand what is required of an AP.

Face to face training to ensure that the message is delivered effectively is our recommendation for TFO training.

Specialist Transitional Facilities

The inclusion of specialised Transitional Facilities now needing to undertake the basic training will alter the dynamics of the training. We suggest that the highly technical components for those facilities, such as Biosecurity Refuse, Biosecurity Treatment, Decontamination, Incineration, Fresh Produce, etc., should be developed using a technology platform so that they can target the specific areas that need to be understood with regard to the risk that they pose.

The AgriChain Centre is able to assist in the development of materials specifically for these categories, if required.

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23 June 2015

Submission on TFGEN and the Guidance Document

Please give some versions in other languages, thanks!

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