



Ref: CTO 2014 026 [G]

Invertebrates: University of Otago

**CTO direction to biosecurity inspectors for the direction of various species of free living terrestrial Antarctic nematodes (as per HSNO approval NOC002379) imported by the University of Otago only.**

Pursuant to section 27(1)(d)(iii) of the Biosecurity Act 1993 I, Vicki Melville, Manager Animal Imports, Ministry for Primary Industries (under delegated authority), give the following direction for various species of free living terrestrial Antarctic nematodes (as per HSNO approval NOC002379) imported by the University of Otago to be given direction in accordance with the following measures, different from those in the applicable import health standard for the importation of new organism invertebrates into containment in New Zealand (INVCONIC.ALL):

Following a biosecurity authorisation, the container(s) containing various species of free living terrestrial Antarctic nematodes (as per HSNO approval NOC002379) must proceed to the approved containment facility which must be operated according to the **MPI / EPA standard 154.03.02** (Facilities for Microorganisms and Cell Cultures: 2007a), different to that prescribed in INVCONIC.ALL. The organisms must be held in the following locations: Benham B104, B106A, B110, B309, B311, B312).

The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) considered the following in their decision relating to HSNO approval NOC002379 and concluded that containment in a facility approved to MPI / EPA standard 154.03.02, instead of standard 154.02.08. (Transitional and Containment Facilities for Invertebrates), would be adequate to mitigate risks:

- Adherence to the regulations set out in standard 154.03.02 regarding transportation of the samples would make escape during transport highly improbable.
- Adherence to operational procedures detailed in standard 154.03.02, which covers all aspects of laboratory management including operation and management of the facility, control of access, vermin control, waste disposal, and staff training would make escape due to accidental/unintentional or deliberate removal by staff highly improbable.
- Restricted access to the containment facility as specified in the standard 154.03.02, which limits the opportunity for unauthorised persons to aid escape from containment is adhered to, escape by accidental/unintentional or deliberate removal by unauthorised persons is highly improbable.
- In conclusion, EPA considered that based on the proposed containment regime (that is physical facilities and operational procedures) and the biology of the organism, escape during transport, accidental or deliberate removal by staff and/or unauthorised persons and/or natural disaster is highly.

The reason for giving direction is that the biosecurity risks associated with this CTO direction have been assessed and are managed effectively.

This direction takes effect from the date of signing and continues in effect until amended or revoked.